Boose v. Adkins, Case No. 3:18-cv-01480

LANDRIUS TYREE BOOSE, Plaintiff, v. BRITTANY ADKINS;WESTERN REGIONAL JAIL;and ADMINISTRATOR WOOD, Defendants.

Case No. 3:18-cv-01480

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA HUNTINGTON DIVISION

May 20, 2020

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In November 2018, Plaintiff, Landrius Tyree Boose ("Boose"), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 2). Pending before the court is Defendants' combined Motion to Dismiss Complaint or for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 49). This matter is assigned to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States District Judge, and by standing order is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the presiding District Judge GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 49); DISMISS the complaint, as amended, with prejudice, (ECF No. 2, 23); and REMOVE this matter from the docket of the Court.

I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

A. Procedural History

In November 2018, Boose filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by employees of the Western Regional Jail and Correctional Facility ("WRJ"). (ECF No. 2). Boose claims that on Tuesday, October 23, 2018, Correctional Officer, Brittany Adkins ("Adkins"), assaulted him. (Id. at 4). Boose states that Adkins was overseeing medication distribution and informed the inmates that she was in a hurry and if they did not acquire their medications quickly enough, they would not receive them. (Id.). Due to Adkins's insistence that he hurry up, Boose was unable to fill his cup with water for the purpose of taking his medication. Boose explains that when he approached the medication dispensation cart, both Adkins and the nurse manning the cart gave him permission to return to his cell with the medication in order to get water. (Id.).

Adkins followed Boose to his cell and began "rushing" him to take his medication while Boose was filling his cup with water. (Id. at 4-5). As Boose started taking his medication, Adkins took his cup from him and would not let him get more water. (ECF No. 2 at 5). Boose states that Adkins "assalted" [sic] him "by taking the cup from me while I was drinking to finish taking my meds." (Id.). In response to what he perceived as an assault, Boose followed Adkins out of his cell and "pointed" at her to "tell her she was wrong for doing that and for assaulting me." (Id.). Adkins told Boose to "get out of her face" although Boose believed he was not in her face. Adkins then punched Boose in the chest. Boose told her not to hit him again, and Adkins responded by hitting him twice more. Boose then "grabbed her by her shirt to hold her back," and to stop her assault. (Id.). Adkins continued to try to strike Boose until other officers intervened andseparated the two. (Id. at 5-6).

Boose states that the responding correctional officers would not listen to Boose's explanation, but instead "put me on two man and charged me for assault." (ECF No. 2 at 6). Boose asserts that he submitted a grievance to Administrator Wood, ("Wood"), which was denied. Boose "wrote out an appeal for the assault charge two weeks ago and gave it to Sergant [sic] Brewior," but did not receive a response by the time he filed his complaint. (Id.). Boose further states that Corporal Akers informed him that he was not the first inmate Adkins had "done this to," and that Adkins was "out of control." (Id.). Finally, Boose asserts that during a hearing, Adkins testified that she did assault Boose inside his cell. (Id.).

On the section of the form that asks about administrative remedies, Boose explains that he filed a grievance related to the assault and an "appeal for my write up also." (Id. at 3). Boose asserts that prison staff "will not/have not given me an appeal which was filed two weeks ago," and Wood "just stated what the incident was and offered no help." (Id.). For relief, Boose requests monetary compensation and that the WRJ be reprimanded for allowing Adkins to assault him. Boose also requests that Adkins be fired. (Id. at 5). Boose named Adkins, Wood, and the WRJ as Defendants in his complaint. (Id. at 1).

On January 2, 2019, Defendants submitted an Answer to the complaint, asserting a number of defenses and contending that Boose's complaint should be dismissed. (ECF No. 10). On March 6, 2019, the parties attended a status conference wherein a discovery schedule was created and Defendants were ordered to provide Boose with, among other things, copies of all administrative grievances, responses to grievances, disciplinary records, reports, investigative materials, statements, video recordings, photographs, orother documents related to the incident. (ECF No. 14). Following a Motion to Compel submitted by Boose, Defendants, on May 24, 2019, entered a Notice of Compliance, asserting that they had provided all required documents to Boose. (ECF Nos. 16, 21).

On May 28, 2019, Boose submitted an Amended Complaint, which added as a Defendant, Lieutenant Flemings ("Flemings"). (ECF No. 23). Boose states that Flemings and other jail employees "repeatedly denied" Boose the ability to speak to his counsel in order to apprise his counsel of the unconstitutional assault. (Id. at 2). Boose asserts that this denial constituted a violation of his "Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment protections under the Constitution." (Id.). Boose believes that Flemings initiated and directed this denial of Boose's right to contact his attorney. (Id.). Boose further alleges that his due process rights were violated when an appeal of "the non-existent assault" received an "untimely" response. (Id.).

On June 3, 2019, Defendants Adkins, the WRJ, and Wood, submitted an Answer to the Amended Complaint, asserting a number of defenses and contending that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (ECF No. 24). Also on June 3, 2019, Flemings submitted a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and an accompanying Memorandum of Law in support. (ECF Nos. 25, 26). Flemings contended that the complaint against him should be dismissed as the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ("Sixth Amendment") only attached to criminal proceedings, and, consequently, Boose did not have a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel with which Flemings could have unlawfully interfered. (ECF No. 26 at 3).

On June 20, 2019, Boose filed a Response to Flemings's request for dismissal. (ECF No. 29). In the response, Boose asserted that Flemings "showed deliberateindifference" to Boose by "hindering and obstructing [him] from being able to file the necessary electronic grievances and follow up appeals and to have adequate access to the Law Library, Phones, and the Jail Computer System." (Id. at 1). Flemings further instructed other staff members to deny Boose access to these services according to Boose. Additionally, Flemings failed to conduct a proper investigation of the incident involving Adkins. (Id. at 1-2). Boose described an incident in which he asked to call his attorney and Flemings replied: "Hell no, write that shit on some toilet paper!" (Id. at 2). On June 27, 2019, Defendants entered a Reply to Boose's response, reiterating that Boose failed to state a plausible claim for relief. (ECF No. 30).

On July 12, 2019, Defendants submitted a Motion to Continue the deadline for the completion of discovery. (ECF No. 31). In support, Defendants noted that Boose had proved unresponsive to discovery requests and had not himself served any discovery requests on Defendants. (Id. at 1). The undersigned granted Defendants' request, extending the deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions on July 15, 2019. (ECF No. 32).

On September 3, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion to Continue and for Protective Order, asserting that additional time was needed due to Boose's dilatory and insufficient responses to discovery requests. (ECF No. 39 at 1-2). Defendants additionally requested that, given Flemings's pending motion to dismiss, he be granted a protective order delaying his responsibility to respond to discovery requests until the resolution of that motion. (Id. at 3). On September 6, 2019, the undersigned entered an Order granting Defendants' request for continuance, but denying the request for a protective order. (ECF No. 40).

On October 8, 2019, the undersigned entered Proposed Findings and Recommendation ("PF&R") with respect to Flemings's motion to dismiss, recommending that the motion be granted. (ECF No. 45). The undersigned concluded that Flemings was correct—Boose failed to assert a viable claim as "Boose did not have a constitutional right to confer with a lawyer concerning the alleged assault, subsequent events, or instant § 1983 case." (Id. at 6). The undersigned concluded that while the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that defendants shall be entitled to counsel as protection against criminal prosecution did not apply to Boose's complaint, which was civil in nature, Boose's complaint could be construed as asserting a denial of his constitutional right to "meaningful access to the courts." (Id. at 7). However, as Boose failed to allege that "he suffered any actual injury or specific harm to any litigation efforts as a result of Flemings refusing to allow him to contact his lawyer," his claim regarding denial of access to the court must also fail. (Id. at 8).

The undersigned further determined that Boose had not set out a valid claim regarding Flemings's alleged interference with his access to the law library, mail, telephone, and administrative grievance procedures, both because his complaint lacked a "factual foundation to maintain an action against Flemings," and because he failed to allege a violation of any identifiable...