Boppana v. City of L.A.

RAO BOPPANA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent,ROBERT NOLAN, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

B304823

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN

March 12, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS159371)

APPEAL from a post-judgment order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.

Craig A. Sherman, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Senior Assistant City Attorney, and Gabriel S. Dermer, Assistant City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent City of Los Angeles.

Ervin Cohen & Jessup, Elizabeth M. Thompson and Kimberly D. Lewis, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

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INTRODUCTION

Rao and Rita Boppana and Robert Nolan are neighbors. They have been litigating with each other in a civil action for years. When the Boppanas learned Nolan had obtained a construction permit for improvements on and around his property, they filed this mandamus action to compel the City of Los Angeles to revoke the permit. The Boppanas ultimately prevailed in their mandamus action, and the City revoked Nolan's permit. (See Boppana v. City of Los Angeles (Mar. 19, 2019, B283454) [nonpub. opn.] (Boppana I).)

The Boppanas filed a motion for attorneys' fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5,¹ arguing they acted as private attorneys general and enforced "an important public issue affecting and benefitting the citizens and residents of the entire city of Los Angeles." The superior court denied the motion, and the Boppanas appealed. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Boppanas and Nolan Build Walls and Fences, Then Sue Each Other

The Boppanas and Nolan live next to each other in Playa del Rey, a residential neighborhood in Los Angeles. A 10-foot-wide public right-of-way, known as Veragua Walk, lies betweenthe two properties. At some point after purchasing their property in 1997, the Boppanas built a wall that, according to Nolan, "encroach[ed] on Nolan's portion of Veragua Walk."

In 2014 Nolan sued the Boppanas to quiet title to what he claimed was his portion of Veragua Walk. Nolan sought a judgment requiring the Boppanas to remove the portion of their wall Nolan claimed was on his half of Veragua Walk, enjoining the Boppanas from surveilling Nolan and his family, and prohibiting the Boppanas from planting trees on Veragua Walk that, over time, would block Nolan's "incredible view."

The Boppanas filed a cross-complaint against Nolan, alleging he illegally built fences, walls, gates, and other structures along Veragua Walk and the front yard of his property. The Boppanas claimed Nolan's front yard structures extended "'beyond [Nolan's] property line'" into the street (a public right-of-way) adjoining his property. (Boppana I, supra, B283454.) The Boppanas alleged that Nolan constructed and maintained "illegal structures . . . for which he has no legal right to use or possess" and that Nolan's front yard structures "protrude into the public street and right of way in a location and height not permitted as a matter of law."² The Boppanas asserted causes of action for private and public nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se, as well as for trespass, based on the allegation Nolan cut and poisoned the Boppanas' bamboo, and invasion of privacy, based on the allegation Nolan filmed andconducted surveillance of the Boppanas. The Boppanas sought compensatory and punitive damages.

B. The City Issues Nolan a Revocable Permit, and the Boppanas Obtain a Writ of Mandate Compelling the City To Revoke It

Through discovery in their civil action with Nolan, the Boppanas learned in 2015 that Nolan had applied for, and the City (through the Bureau of Engineering) had issued, a revocable permit (known as an R-Permit) under Los Angeles Municipal Code section 62.118.2 for the fence, gate, and wall Nolan built along his front yard and the public right-of-way. (Boppana I, supra, B283454.) Rao Boppana "was extremely surprised to hear that [the] City could and would grant development permits for structures and developments that [were] not allowed or authorized under city codes, development ordinances, and [their] properties' adopted specific plan."

On December 1, 2015 the Boppanas filed a petition for writ of mandate (this action) to compel the City to revoke Nolan's permit, arguing the City, in reviewing Nolan's permit application, did not comply with applicable provisions of the Los Angeles Building Code, the Comprehensive Zoning Plan of the City of Los Angeles, and the Coastal Bluffs Specific Plan. Nolan and the City argued that these provisions did not apply to structures built in a public right-of-way and that the City did not have to determine whether Nolan's application and proposed structures complied with those laws. (Boppana I, supra, B283454.)

Shortly after filing their petition for writ of mandate, the Boppanas filed a notice of related case stating that the civil action and the mandamus action involved the same parties, were based on the same or similar claims, and arose "from thesame or substantially identical transactions, incidents, or events requiring the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact." The Boppanas also filed, and the trial court in the civil action granted, an ex parte application to stay the civil action "pending resolution" of the mandamus action. The Boppanas argued in their ex parte application: "Adjudication of the issues in the writ . . . proceeding could resolve and/or cause one or more legal and factual issues in this case to be moot."

In 2017 the superior court denied the Boppanas' petition for writ of mandate, and the Boppanas appealed. On March 19, 2019 we reversed the judgment and held the superior court should have granted the Boppanas' petition. We concluded Los Angeles Municipal Code section 62.118.2 required the City to review a permit application "for compliance with City land use laws," to submit the application "for review by other city agencies," and to direct the applicant "to obtain any other necessary approvals or permits from other agencies." Because the City failed to "consider the applicability of the Building Code, the Zoning Code, and the Specific Plan" before issuing Nolan an R-Permit for his front yard structures, we directed the superior court to issue a writ of mandate "compelling the [City] to revoke the permit." (Boppana I, supra, B283454.)

On June 25, 2019 the Boppanas filed a status conference report in the civil action, asking the trial court to vacate the stay (which had been in effect for three and a half years) and to set the matter for trial. Referring to the mandamus action and our opinion in Boppana I, the Boppanas asserted: "This related case involves Boppana's now successfully challenge[d] and overturned decision of the City of Los Angeles' . . . improper granting of a development and use permit (via a Revocable Permit) that purportedly allowed . . . Nolan to construct andmaintain the subject front and side yard developments that are not allowed or permitted under the City's controlling zoning codes or the adopted Coastal Bluffs Specific Plan. [¶] Boppana contends that the illegality and unpermitted construction and nature of Nolan's developments, that have caused the subject nuisance and damages to Boppana, have been substantially admitted and substantially proven such that this matter can now be tried and adjudicated to determine damages and remedies."

C. The Boppanas File a Motion for Attorneys' Fees Under Section 1021.5

On November 19, 2019 the Boppanas filed a motion under section 1021.5 seeking to recover the attorneys' fees they incurred in the mandamus action. Rao Boppana stated that he incurred $88,500 in attorneys' fees, which he said was calculated based on his attorney's discounted hourly rate. Counsel for the Boppanas stated he agreed to reduce his hourly rate based on the "strengths" of the Boppanas' claims and the "public-interest nature" of the case. The Boppanas contended that the mandamus lawsuit enforced "an important right affecting the public interest," that a "significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons," and that "the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement make an award of fees appropriate."

The superior court in the mandamus action issued a tentative ruling denying the Boppanas' motion for attorneys' fees, concluding that the Boppanas had "not identified an important right affecting the public interest," that they did not confer a significant benefit on a large class of persons, and that their financial benefit "far exceed[ed] the $88,500 in attorneys' fees that [they] incurred in this lawsuit." At the hearing on themotion, counsel for the Boppanas argued the engineer who approved Nolan's R-Permit testified he issued "thousands" of R-Permits without considering the zoning laws and general plans of the area. The court stated that, "in every lawsuit against the City where the petitioner wins," the "City [is] being compelled to follow the law," but that "there has got to be more than that to get attorneys' fees." Counsel for the City argued that "this victory is really a neighbor dispute" and that there was "no evidence before the court" of how many R-Permits the City would issue in the future.

Turning to the Boppanas' financial burden, counsel for the Boppanas initially argued the court's tentative ruling erroneously looked at the "potential prospective outcome" of the...