Bouchard v. Wheeler

314 A.3d 604

224 Conn.App. 611

Caitlyn BOUCHARD et al.

v.Cheyanne E. WHEELER et al.

(AC 45627)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 3, 2023

Officially Released April 9, 2024

Philip T, Newbury, Jr., Hartford, for the appellant (defendant Safeco Insurance Company).

James J. Walker, Rockville, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Elgo, Moll and Suarez, Js.

ELGO, J.

₆₁₃This case concerns the proper application of General Statutes § 38a-336, commonly known as the underinsured motorist statute. See Tannone v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 329 Conn. 665, 676, 189 A.3d 99 (2018). The defendant Safeco Insurance Company¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in accordance with the stipulation that it entered into with the ₆₁₄Plaintiffs Caitlyn Bouchard, Kayla Bouchard and Madalyn Bouchard.² On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that the automobile in question constituted an underinsured motor vehicle, as that term is used in § 38a-336. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. On February 16, 2018, Caitlyn was operating a vehicle insured by the defendant on East Main Street in Thomaston. Among her passengers were her daughters, Kayla and Madalyn. At that time, Cheyanne E. Wheeler was operating a vehicle owned by Russell Wheeler (Wheeler vehicle). As she approached an intersection, Cheyanne E. Wheeler negligently turned the Wheeler vehicle into Caitlyn’s lane of traffic, causing a collision that injured the plaintiffs and other individuals.

The plaintiffs thereafter commenced the present action, alleging negligence and recklessness on the part of Cheyanne E. Wheeler, as well as family car doctrine liability; see Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 836 n.14, 836 A.2d 394 (2003); on the part of Russell Wheeler pursuant to General Statutes § 52-182. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that, at all relevant times, the Wheeler vehicle was an underinsured motor vehicle and that they were entitled to underinsured motorist benefits from the defendant, their insurer. After the plaintiffs settled their claims with the tortfeasors’ insurer and withdrew their action against Cheyanne E. Wheeler and Russell Wheeler, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that "the plaintiffs are not ₆₁₅entitled to underinsured benefits [because their] underinsured coverage is equal to the tortfeasor’s liability coverage."

In its January 5, 2021 memorandum of decision, the court, Hon. Joseph M. Shortall, judge trial referee, acknowledged the precedent of our Supreme Court holding that a motor vehicle is not underinsured where the liability limits in the tortfeasor’s policy are equal to or greater than the underinsured benefits in the claimant’s policy. See Doyle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins, Co., 252 Conn. 79, 87–91, 743 A.2d 156 (1999); Florestal v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 236 Conn. 299, 801, 673 A.2d 474 (1996); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Gould, 213 Conn. 625, 632– 33, 569 A.2d 1105 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon, 220 Conn. 30, 594 A.2d 977 (1991). The court nevertheless concluded that a 2014 amendment to § 38a-336 (b) legislatively overruled that Supreme Court precedent. Whereas the pertinent inquiry under that precedent entailed comparison of the applicable limits of the respective insurance policies of the tortfeasor and the claimant, the trial court held that, following passage of No. 14-20, § 1, of the 2014 Public Acts (P.A. 14-20), "the comparison must be between the amount of liability insurance actually available to the plaintiff under the tortfeasor’s liability insurance policy, after other claimants under that policy are paid, with the amount of the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist coverage." (Emphasis in original.) Because the total recovery obtained by the plaintiffs was less than the $300,000 per accident limit for coverage under the automobile policy issued by the defendant (Bouchard policy), the court concluded that they were entitled to additional underinsured motorist benefits. For that reason, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The parties thereafter entered into a stipulated judgment that reserved the defendant’s right to appeal the ₆₁₆propriety of the court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. That stipulation set forth the following additional facts. At the time of the accident, the Wheeler vehicle was insured for automobile liability by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Wheeler policy). The Wheeler policy provided coverage of up to $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company subsequently made payments to the plaintiffs and other individuals injured in the accident, thereby exhausting the $300,000 per accident limit of the Wheeler policy.³

At all relevant times, the plaintiffs were insured under the Bouchard policy. As the parties noted in their stipulation, "the uninsured and underinsured motorist limits of the [Bouchard] policy are $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident without conversion coverage …. "⁴ (Emphasis added.) It therefore is undisputed ₆₁₇that the Wheeler policy and the Bouchard policy contain identical coverage limits.

By order dated June 27, 2022, the court rendered judgment in accordance with the stipulation of the parties. The defendant then commenced this timely appeal.

[1] The issue presented in this appeal is whether the court correctly determined that the Wheeler vehicle constituted an underinsured motor vehicle, as that term is used in § 88a-336. The proper construction of § 38a-336 presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary. See Doyle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 252 Conn. at 84, 743 A.2d 156.

[2] "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature…. In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Seramonte Associates, LLC v. Hamden, 345 Conn. 76, 83, 282 A.3d 1253 (2022). Pursuant to General Statutes § 1-2z, "[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."

I

In ascertaining the proper meaning of § 38a-336, we do not write on a blank slate, but rather are guided by our Supreme Court’s prior decisions construing that ₆₁₈Statute. See Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Drown, 314 Conn. 161, 173, 101 A.3d 200 (2014); New England Road, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 308 Conn. 180, 186, 61 A.3d 505 (2013). In American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Gould, supra, 213 Conn. 625, 569 A.2d 1105, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a tortfeasor’s vehicle constituted an underinsured motor vehicle, as that term was used in General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 38-175c, the precursor to § 38a-336. The court first noted that the statute contained an explicit definition of the term "underinsured motor vehicle"; id., at 629, 569 A.2d 1105; and explained that § 38-175c "requires that the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage limits be greater than the total liability limits for a [tortfeasor’s] vehicle before it may be deemed underinsured." (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 631, 569 A.2d 1105. The court then continued: "[T]he legislative objective was simply to give an insured who is injured in an accident the same resource he would have had if the tortfeasor had carried liability insurance equal to the amount of the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage. Where an underinsured motor vehicle is statutorily defined as an insured motor vehicle with applicable liability limits less in amount than the injured person’s uninsured motorist’s limits, it is clear that the underinsured motorist coverage is not applicable if the insured person’s uninsured motorist limits are equal to, or less than, the tortfeasor’s liability limits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 632, 569 A.2d 1105.

Six years later, the Supreme Court was asked to overrule its decision in Gould. In Florestal v. Government Employees Ins. Co., supra, 236 Conn. at 301, 673 A.2d 474, the court declined to do so and expressly reaffirmed its holding in Gould. The plaintiffs in Florestal argued that "a strict construction of [the definition of ‘underinsured motor vehicle’ set forth in] § 38a-336 (e) is inconsistent with the legislative purpose underlying the enactment of our uninsured and underinsured motorist statutes, which, ₆₁₉they assert, is to ensure ‘that automobile accident victims receive fair, just and reasonable compensation for their injuries.’ " Id., at 305, 673 A.2d 474. The court acknowledged that "broadly stated … the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage is to protect the named insured and other additional insureds from suffering an inadequately compensated injury caused by an accident with an inadequately insured automobile." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court continued: "It does not follow, however, that the legislature, in providing for underinsured motorist coverage, necessarily Intended to guarantee that each and every accident victim would be fully, or even adequately, compensated for injuries caused by an underinsured motorist…. [T]he legislative objective [in enacting § 38a-336] was simply to give an insured who is injured in an accident the same resource he would have had if the tortfeasor had carried liability insurance equal to the amount of the insured's uninsured motorist...