Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnold, M2015-00762-SC-R11-CV

502 S.W.3d 102

Ms. Bowen ex rel. John Doe, "N"

v.William E. Arnold, Jr. et al.

No. M2015-00762-SC-R11-CV

Supreme Court of Tennessee, AT NASHVILLE.

June 2, 2016 Session¹

Filed September 29, 2016

Gary M. Kellar and Lance W. Thompson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, William Edward Arnold.

Luvell L. Glanton and Herron T. Bond, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Ms. Bowen and John Doe N.

Cornelia A. Clark, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Sharon G. Lee, C.J., and Jeffrey S. Bivins, Holly Kirby, and Roger A. Page, JJ., joined.

Cornelia A. Clark, J.

The determinative question in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling that a person convicted of rape and aggravated sexual battery is collaterally estopped in a subsequent civil lawsuit filed by the victim of the criminal offenses from relitigating the issue of whether he raped and sexually battered the victim. The trial court applied collateral estoppel, explaining that, although the victim was not a party to the criminal prosecution, the victim was in privity with the State, which satisfied the party mutuality requirement necessary for collateral estoppel to apply. The trial court therefore granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment but permitted the defendant to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. After the Court of Appeals declined to accept the interlocutory appeal, the defendant filed an application for permission to appeal in this Court, which we granted. We hereby abolish the strict party mutuality requirement for offensive and defensive collateral estoppel and adopt sections 29 and 85 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as the guidelines for courts to follow when determining whether nonmutual collateral estoppel applies. Having applied these guidelines to the undisputed facts in this appeal, we affirm the trial court's decision granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

I. Factual Background²

In November 2010, a minor child, herein referred to as "John Doe N," reported to his mother, Ms. Bowen,³ that William E. Arnold, Jr. had been raping and molesting him for about eighteen months. Mr. Arnold was the child's mentor in a mentorship program offered by the Boys and Girls Clubs of Middle Tennessee, in partnership with Big Brothers Big Sisters of Tennessee. The Metropolitan Nashville Police Department investigated the report, and on June 17, 2011, a Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Arnold on three counts of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child.

Mr. Arnold's criminal trial commenced on July 8, 2013. John Doe N testified extensively and was cross-examined by counsel for Mr. Arnold. At the conclusion of the proof at trial, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on two of the counts of aggravated sexual battery. On July 12, 2013, the jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Arnold guilty of the remaining count of aggravated sexual battery and of the three counts of rape of a child. State v. Arnold, No. M2014–00075–CCA–R3–CD, 2015 WL 99272, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 7, 2015). Following his conviction, Mr. Arnold appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, challenging the trial court's denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the counts for which he was found guilty, the denial of the motion for new trial, and the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412. Id. On January 7, 2015, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed Mr. Arnold's convictions. Id. On May 15, 2015, this Court denied Mr. Arnold's application for permission to appeal. State v. Arnold, No. M2014-00075-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. May 15, 2015) (order denying Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 application and designating the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion as not for citation pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 4, section E).

While the criminal proceeding made its way through the courts, this separate civil lawsuit, filed April 8, 2011, two months before Mr. Arnold's indictment, remained pending in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The lawsuit, filed by Ms. Bowen "individually and on behalf of" John Doe N, named Mr. Arnold as a defendant, along with the Boys and Girls Clubs of Middle Tennessee, the Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Big Brothers Big Sisters of Tennessee, and Big Brothers Big Sisters of America. Ms. Bowen alleged that Mr. Arnold intentionally molested John Doe N and that the entity defendants were negligent in various ways. Ms. Bowen sought compensatory damages from the defendants of three-and-one-half million dollars.⁴

On January 12, 2015, one week after the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Mr. Arnold's convictions, Ms. Bowen moved for partial summary judgment against Mr. Arnold, arguing, based on his criminal convictions, that he was collaterally estopped from relitigating in the civil lawsuit the issue of "whether he raped and sexually battered" John Doe N. In his response in opposition to the motion, Mr. Arnold argued that collateral estoppel did not apply because criminal and civil trials are "wholly separate and distinct proceedings" and involve different parties, interests, procedural rules, and witnesses. Mr. Arnold supported his response with an affidavit, in which he professed innocence of the crimes, stated that he had been falsely accused and wrongfully convicted, and declared that he would continue to maintain his innocence of the crimes.⁵ He also argued that one of the elements necessary for application of the collateral estoppel doctrine—party mutuality—was lacking because John Doe N was neither a party to the criminal prosecution nor in privity with the State of Tennessee in the criminal prosecution.

On April 16, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting Ms. Bowen's motion for partial summary judgment against Mr. Arnold. The trial court concluded that all elements of the collateral estoppel had been established, and with respect to party mutuality, found that John Doe N was "in privity with the State of Tennessee from the criminal case." The trial court therefore ruled that collateral estoppel precluded Mr. Arnold "from raising the issue of whether he raped and sexually battered" John Doe N in the civil lawsuit. By this same order the trial court granted Mr. Arnold permission to seek an interlocutory appeal, Tenn. R. App. P. 9, and stayed further proceedings in the trial court pending final disposition of the interlocutory appeal. On May 26, 2015, the Court of Appeals denied Mr. Arnold's request for an interlocutory appeal. Mr. Arnold then timely filed an application for permission to appeal in this Court. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(c), 11. We granted the application and set oral arguments at the Girls' State S.C.A.L.E.S. project.

II. Standard of Review

The issue in this appeal—whether collateral estoppel applies—is a question of law. Mullins v. State, 294 S.W.3d 529, 535 (Tenn.2009). Thus, summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for resolving the issue. Id. (citing 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice and Procedure § 132.05[7] (3d ed. 2009)). The party relying upon collateral estoppel as a bar bears the burden of proof on the issue. Id.; see also State v. Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tenn.2005).

An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, without a presumption of correctness. Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn.2015) (citing Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare–Memphis Hosp., 325 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tenn.2010) ; Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn.1997) ). This review requires the appellate court to make "a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied." Id. (citing Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Tenn.2013) ). Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.

III. Analysis

A. Collateral Estoppel Overview

Collateral estoppel is an issue-preclusion doctrine developed by the courts. Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 534 (citing Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) ; Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991) ).⁶ This doctrine "promotes finality, conserves judicial resources, and prevents inconsistent decisions," id. (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) ; Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103, 113 (Tenn.2001) ; State ex rel. Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 178 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) ), by barring "the same parties or their privies from relitigating in a later proceeding legal or factual issues that were actually raised and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding," id. at 534–35 (citing Barnett v. Milan Seating Sys., 215 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Tenn.2007)superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Freeman v. Gen. Motors Co., No. M2011–02284–SC–WCM–WC, 2012 WL 5197672, at *5 n. 3 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel Oct. 22, 2012) ; Massengill v. Scott, 738 S.W.2d 629, 631–32 (Tenn.1987) ; Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Holland–Am. Ins. Co., 671 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tenn.1984) ); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982) ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."). To prevail on a claim of collateral estoppel, a party must establish:

(1) that the issue to be

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