Bowler v. State

355 Ga.App. 77

842 S.E.2d 546

BOWLER

v.The STATE.

A20A0262

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

April 30, 2020

Natalie K. Glaser, Micah J. Gates, for appellant.

Herbert M. Poston, Jr., District Attorney, V. Keely Parker, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

McFadden, Chief Judge.

After a bench trial, Paul Bowler was convicted of possessing methamphetamine and drug related objects. He appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of his motion to suppress. Because a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress, we affirm.

1. Facts and procedural posture.

Viewed in favor of the judgment, see Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the evidence shows that on June 4, 2016, at approximately 10:00 p.m., a police officer on patrol saw a car parked outside a 24-hour convenience store near State Route 225 in Murray County. The car was not in a marked parking space in front of the store and was instead parked on the side of the building where it could not be seen from inside the store. The officer went into the store and spoke with employees, who said that they did not know who was in the vehicle. The officer went back outside and found Bowler in the car. Bowler told the officer that he was tired and was going to rest for ten to fifteen minutes before driving to his home, which was located straight north on Highway 225 in Murray County near the Tennessee border. The officer told Bowler to get home safely and then left the area.

Four hours later, at 2:00 a.m. on June 5, the officer returned to the store and saw that the car was still parked in the same spot and that its windows were "fogged up." The officer approached the vehicle and spoke to Bowler, who was sweating profusely, breathing heavily, and acting nervously. At the officer's request, Bowler got out of the car and initially said that he was still there because his battery was dead, but then later told the officer that he was still there because he had gotten into an argument with his girlfriend and was "just blowing off some steam." Bowler told the officer that he lived in the town of Dawnville and then also said that he lived in the town of Eton; but the officer testified that those towns are located in different counties and are not close to each other. When the officer asked again where he lived, Bowler said he lived in Dawnville. The officer arrested Bowler for loitering, impounded his vehicle, conducted an inventory search of the car, and found a plastic baggie and a syringe filled with a substance that field-tested positive for methamphetamine.

Bowler was charged by accusation with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug related objects. He filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding that the officer had probable cause to arrest Bowler and that the impoundment and inventory search of the vehicle was authorized. Bowler waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial. The trial court conducted a stipulated bench trial based on the evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing and the state crime laboratory test results. The trial court found Bowler guilty of possessing methamphetamine and drug related objects. The court imposed a three-year sentence for the methamphetamine charge and a concurrent twelve-month sentence for the drug related objects offense, with three months to be served in jail and the remainder on probation. After Bowler's motion for a new trial was denied, this appeal followed.

2. Sufficiency of the evidence.

"In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt." Anderson v. State , 352 Ga. App. 275, 277 (1), 834 S.E.2d 369 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). The evidence recounted above authorized the trial court to find Bowler guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 278 (1) (b), (c), 834 S.E.2d 369 (sufficient evidence authorizing convictions of possession of methamphetamine and drug related object where methamphetamine discovered in a syringe).

3. Motion to suppress.

"In considering an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, this [c]ourt construes the evidence in favor of the trial court's ruling, and we ... will not reverse the trial court's order on a motion to suppress unless it represents an abuse of discretion." Boyd v. State , 290 Ga. App. 34, 658 S.E.2d 782 (2008) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress.

(a) Pat-down.

Prior to the arrest, the officer conducted a pat-down search of Bowler, during which he discovered women's underwear in Bowler's pants pocket. Bowler contends that the pat-down was not proper under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U. S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and that the evidence found during the pat-down should not be considered in determining whether probable cause existed. The state concedes that there was no basis for the pat-down, but asserts that even without the evidence obtained by the pat-down, the officer still had probable cause to arrest Bowler for loitering. Given the state's concession, we will not consider the evidence obtained during the pat-down in evaluating the existence of probable cause.

(b) Probable cause to arrest.

The United States Supreme Court repeatedly has explained that probable cause to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.

To determine whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause. Because probable cause deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances, it is a fluid concept that is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. It requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity. Probable cause is not a high bar.

Westbrook v. State , 308 Ga. 92, 95 (2), 839 S.E.2d 620 (2020) (citations and...