Bowman v. Top Gun of Va., Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Timothy J. Sullivan, United States Magistrate Judge

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jurel Daquone Leo Bowman's (“Bowman”) Motion to Remand (“Motion”) (ECF No. 36).^[1] Having considered the submissions of the parties (ECF Nos. 36, 38 & 41), I find that a hearing is unnecessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the following reasons, the Motion will be denied.

I. Background

This lawsuit arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred in Prince George's County, Maryland on September 5, 2018. ECF No. 7 ¶ 9. On that date, Bowman was driving a tow truck, “traveling southbound on Route 301 by the train tracks south of Route 4” in Upper Marlboro, Maryland. Id.¶ 11. Bowman alleges that his tow truck was struck in the rear by a truck owned by Defendant Top Gun of Virginia, Inc. (“Top Gun”). Id. According to Bowman, Top Gun's truck “was loaded with loose aggregate that is heavy and shifts.” Id. ¶ 12. The impact caused Bowman's truck to strike the tanker truck stopped in front of his vehicle. Id. ¶ 11. Bowman was injured. Id. ¶¶ 24-26.

Bowman filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland. ECF No. 7. His Complaint names the following defendants: Top Gun, Ramiro Ambriz (“Ambriz”) (the driver of Top Gun's truck), Matthew Towle (“Towle”) (Top Gun's operations manager), and James Wilcoxon (“Wilcoxon”) (Top Gun's Chief Executive Officer and Director) (collectively, the “Defendants”). Id. ¶¶ 2-6.

Defendants timely removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441, on August 27, 2021. ECF No. 1. Defendants allege that there is complete diversity between the parties and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. Id. at 2. According to Defendants' Notice of Removal, at the time that the Complaint was filed and at the time of removal, Bowman was a citizen of Maryland, Ambriz was a citizen of Virginia, Towle was a citizen of Virginia, Top Gun was a citizen of Delaware and Virginia, and Wilcoxon was a citizen of Maryland. Id. at 2-3. Defendants argue that although Wilcoxon is a citizen of Maryland, there is still complete diversity among the parties because Wilcoxon is either a nominal defendant or a defendant who has been fraudulently joined, and whose non-diverse citizenship can be disregarded for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 3-4.

Bowman timely notified the Court of his intent to file a motion to remand the case to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. ECF No. 12. By filing this notice, the time for Bowman to file his motion to remand was tolled until the Court entered a briefing schedule. See ECF No. 10 at 2. The Court granted Bowman leave to file the Motion during a telephone conference held on September 15, 2021, and subsequently entered a briefing schedule for the Motion. ECF Nos. 20 & 23. The parties complied with the deadlines in the briefing schedule, and Bowman's Motion is now ripe for resolution.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove a civil action to a federal district court when the plaintiff could have originally brought the case in federal court. A motion challenging the removal of an action may be premised on either a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a procedural defect apart from jurisdiction. Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008). The burden to establish federal jurisdiction falls on the removing party, with a removing party's jurisdictional allegations strictly construed in favor of remand. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (“If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.”). Ultimately, a party seeking removal must establish that the district court can exercise original jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims, which in most cases requires allegations supporting either federal question or diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, respectively. Id. (citing § 1441).

When considering a motion to remand, the Court must “strictly construe the removal statute and resolve all doubts in favor of remanding the case to state court, ” consistent with the reluctance of federal courts “to interfere with matters properly before a state court.” Rizwan v. Lender Servs. Inc., 176 F.Supp.3d 513, 515 (D. Md. 2016) (citing Barbour v. Int'l. Union, 640 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated by statute on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B)). “Nevertheless, because the decision to remand is largely unreviewable, district courts should be cautious about denying defendants access to a federal forum.” Jarrett v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. SAG-21-1514, 2021 WL 3288361, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 2, 2021).

The parties agree that this Court's subject matter jurisdiction must be premised on diversity. A federal district court has diversity jurisdiction when: (1) the amount in controversy

exceeds $75, 000; and, (2) “the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996); 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” A corporation's “principal place of business” is “the place where [its] officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010). A “state of incorporation” is the state by whose laws the corporation was created. Id. at 85 (citation omitted). Ambriz and Towle are citizens of Virginia. Top Gun is a citizen of both Virginia and Delaware.^[2] Bowman and Wilcoxon are citizens of Maryland. Because Bowman and Wilcoxon share Maryland citizenship, the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this case unless the Defendant can prove fraudulent joinder as to Wilcoxon.

B. Fraudulent Joinder

Under the fraudulent joinder doctrine, a complaint that names nondiverse defendants does not defeat diversity jurisdiction. Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 704 (4th Cir. 2015). Rather, the fraudulent joinder doctrine “effectively permits a district court to disregard, for jurisdictional purposes, the citizenship of certain nondiverse defendants, assume jurisdiction over a case, dismiss the nondiverse defendants, and thereby retain jurisdiction.” Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 1999).

“The party alleging fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden-it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim even after resolving all issues of law and fact in the plaintiff's favor.” Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999). The removing party must show either “‘outright fraud in the plaintiff's pleading of jurisdictional facts' or that ‘there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court.'” Id. (quoting Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1993)). Where, as here, the removing party relies on the “no possibility” formulation of the fraudulent joinder doctrine, the party seeking remand must show “only a possibility of a right to relief, ” a standard that heavily favors the party seeking remand. Johnson, 781 F.3d at 704 (quoting Marshall, 6 F.3d at 233); Hartley, 187 F.3d at 426 (explaining that “there need be only a slight possibility of a right to relief, ” and that “[o]nce the court identifies this glimmer of hope for the plaintiff, the jurisdictional inquiry ends”). “This standard is even more favorable to the plaintiff than the standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Id. at 424.

“[F]raudulent joinder is typically only found in cases of legal impossibility.” Flores v. Ethicon, Inc., 563 Fed.Appx. 266, 269 (4th Cir. 2014). In analyzing a plaintiff's claims to determine whether joinder was fraudulent, the Court is “not bound by the allegations of the pleadings, but may instead consider the entire record, and determine the basis of joinder by any means available.” Mayes, 198 F.3d at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted); but see Middel v. Middel, 471 F.Supp.3d 688, 692 (D. Md. 2020) (“[T]he jurisdiction of this Court depends on the state of the facts at the time the actions were brought.” (citing Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570-71 (2004)); Gomer v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. GLR-16-356, 2016 WL 5791226, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2016) (“When a plaintiff amends his complaint after removal, the court considers the original complaint rather than the amended complaint in determining whether

removal was proper.” (quoting Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 443 (4th Cir. 2005))); Allard v. Laroya, 163 F.Supp.3d 309, 312 (E.D. Va. 2016) (concluding that a court should not look beyond the pleadings when the plaintiff named a nondiverse defendant in its initial complaint in state court); Dotson v. Elite Oil Field Servs., Inc., 91 F.Supp.3d 865, 870 (N.D. W.Va. 2015) (“[W]hen ruling on a motion to remand based on fraudulent joinder, the Court cannot consider post-removal filings ‘to the extent that they present new causes of action or theories not raised in the controlling petition filed in state court.'” (quoting Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 700 (5th Cir. 1999))).

1. Bowman Has No. Possibility of Recovery Against Wilcoxon

Maryland adheres to the lex loci delicti rule to determine the applicable law in tort actions. Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 744 (2000). Under this rule, the “substantive tort law of the state where the wrong occurs governs.” Hauch v. Connor...