Boyce v. Obaisi, Case No. 13 C 5746

ANTHONY BOYCE (#R-52162), Plaintiff, v. SALEH OBAISI, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 13 C 5746

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

September 16, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:

Plaintiff Anthony Boyce, an Illinois state prisoner, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Boyce claims that Defendants, correctional officials and health care providers at the Stateville Correctional Center, violated his constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his safety and medical needs. More specifically, Boyce contends that Defendants failed to take adequate measures to protect him from multiple attacks by fellow inmates, as well as denied him needed medical care following the purported assaults.

Both the correctional staff ("the IDOC Defendants") and health care providers employed by Wexford Health Sources Inc. ("the Wexford Defendants") have filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For the following reasons, the Court grants the Defendants' summary judgment motions and dismisses this lawsuit in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

I. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1

Boyce's responses to Defendants' motions for summary judgment suffer from a number of deficiencies as required by Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1. Because Boyce isproceeding pro se in this matter, each set of Defendants served him with a "Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment," as required by Local Rule 56.2 (N.D. Ill.). (R. 163, 154.) The notices explained in detail the consequences of failing to respond properly to motions for summary judgment and statements of material facts under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56 and Local Rule 56.1 (N.D. Ill.). Indeed, the Court admonished Boyce about summary judgment filing requirements only a year ago in another case involving medical care. See Boyce v. Carter, Case No. 12 C 5372 (N.D. Ill.), Memorandum Opinion and Order of September 8, 2014 (St. Eve, J.), at pp. 2-5.

Despite these admonitions, Boyce's submissions called "Oppositions" to Defendants' statements of fact contain multiple instances of legal arguments, improperly supported factual propositions, contradictions with prior sworn testimony, and assertions of fact about matters concerning which Boyce cannot properly testify. A plaintiff's pro se status does not excuse him from complying with federal and local procedural rules. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009). Indeed, Boyce is no stranger to pro se litigation having filed at least nine civil rights actions in this district alone. See Boyce v. Kelly, No. 12 C 3840; Boyce v. Carter, No. 12 C 5372; Boyce v. Gray, No. 13 C 2967; Boyce v. Martella, No. 13 C 6526; Boyce v. Johnson, No. 13 C 6832; Boyce v. Lemke, No. 14 C 0108; Boyce v. Obaisi, No. 14 C 0418; and Boyce v. Madigan, No. 15 C 7580.

In general, Local Rule 56.1 "is designed, in part, to aid the district court, 'which does not have the advantage of the parties' familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,' in determining whether a trial is necessary." Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Local Rule 56.1(a) requires the moving party to provide "a statement of material facts as to whichthe moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law." Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014). "The non-moving party must file a response to the moving party's statement, and, in the case of any disagreement, cite 'specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.' "Id. (citation omitted); see also L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(A). In addition, legal arguments, suppositions, and conclusions of law are not "facts." See Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 382 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008) ("It is inappropriate to make legal arguments in a Rule 56.1 statement of facts") (citations omitted); Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006) ("statement of material facts ... filled with irrelevant information, legal arguments, and conjecture" was improper).

With these standards in mind, Boyce's broad denials of Defendants' statements of fact lack any specificity as to exactly which details Defendants have allegedly misstated in their respective statements of facts, or precisely where support for Boyce's position can be found. In his Local Rule 56.1 statements, Boyce disputes whole sections of Defendants' statements of facts without any specificity. In response to the Wexford Defendants' statement of facts, for example, Boyce writes one sentence challenging fifteen statements of fact followed by another single broadside contesting seventeen statements of fact: "(32) through paragraphs (46). Plaintiff disputes. Obaisi and Defendants are trying to separate themselves from liability. Plaintiff rights was [sic] violated. See plaintiff's declaration, paragraphs 9, 10, 17, 20, 28, 34, 41, 42, 43." "(47) through (63). Plaintiff disputes on the grounds of pltff's declaration, see paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 20, 28, 29, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43. Plaintiff rights was violated." (R. 181, p. 7.) These "responses" do not comply with the Local Rules and are not responsive in any meaningful way.

In addition, the Court will not consider Boyce's statements of additional facts because they are not factual assertions, but rather consist of a series of open-ended legal questions, all beginning in "whether:" (1) "Whether Duvall could've called medical personnel to assist in obtaining plaintiff medical treatment; (2) Whether Duvall had knowledge of plaintiff['s] serious medical needs," etc. See Boyce's Opposition to IDOC Defendants' Statement of Facts (R. 180) at pp. 10-13; Boyce's Opposition to Wexford Defendants' Statement of Facts (R. 181), at pp. 9-11. Even if the Court could find a way to frame Boyce's statements of legal issues as "facts," those additional facts are unsupported by citations to the record. Accordingly, the Court will not consider Boyce's alleged additional "facts" because, construed broadly, they are not "statement[s], consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." See Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C); see also Boyce v. Carter, Case No. 12 C 5372 (N.D. Ill.), Memorandum Opinion and Order of September 8, 2014, at pp. 4-5.

Furthermore, the Court will not consider Boyce's disagreements with Defendants' factual assertions where he either simply asserts that a fact is "irrelevant," or where he disputes a statement of material fact from Defendants but does not contradict with evidence. "[T]hat is how summary judgment works: properly supported statements of material fact are deemed to be undisputed unless the opposing party produces admissible, contradictory evidence." Huon v. Mudge, 597 Fed. App'x 868, 870 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also Tindle v. Pulte Home Corp., 607 F.3d 494, 495-96 (7th Cir. 2010). "And factual disputes about immaterial matters are irrelevant." Huon, 597 Fed. App'x at 870.

Boyce has failed to set forth most of his additional actual facts in a separate statement, as required by Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C). Numerous paragraphs of Boyce's 56.1(b)(3)(B)responses make factual assertions that go well beyond the facts asserted in the corresponding paragraphs of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement. The Court will not consider any extraneous factual assertions because Boyce was required to assert any additional facts in a separate Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement. See Ciomber, 527 F.3d at 643-44.

The Court further notes that unsupported statements in a legal brief are not evidence that the Court can consider at summary judgment. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 n.6 (1984); United States v. Chapman, 694 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2012); Gross v. Knight, 560 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2009). In other words, "[u]nder settled law, facts asserted in a brief but not presented in a Local Rule 56.1 statement are disregarded in resolving a summary judgment motion." Beard v. Don McCue Chevrolet, Inc., No. 09 C 4218, 2012 WL 2930121, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 18, 2012). Also, the Court will not consider Boyce's attempts to challenge the validity of medical records and entries in the medical records because he does not present any contrary evidence. See Richmond v. Dart, No. 11 C 0065, 2012 WL 6138751, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2012); Johnson v. Hart, No. 10 C 0240, 2011 WL 5509546, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2011).

Further, Boyce cannot testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. Boyce, for example, cannot refute Dr. Obaisi's representation that he does not personally review medical request slips unless Boyce can produce an evidentiary foundation for challenging that statement. Similarly, Boyce cannot assert that the Wexford Defendants secretly meet to discuss grievances in the absence of some basis for that assertion. In addition, a layperson may not testify about matters involving medical, technical, or other specialized knowledge.¹ See Fed. R. Evid. 701, 702.

Moreover, litigants cannot create "sham issues of fact" with evidence that contradicts their sworn depositions. See Janky v. Lake County Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2009). "[S]ummary judgment may only be defeated by pointing to admissible evidence in the summary judgment record that creates a genuine issue of material fact." United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace,...