Boyd v. Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Office

CARL BOYD

v.CALCASIEU PARISH SHERIFF'S OFFICE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:10-cv-1463

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

Dated: May 2, 2013

JUDGE PATRICIA MINALDI

MAG. JUDGE KATHLEEN KAY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 25], filed by the defendant, Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Office ("Calcasieu"). The plaintiff, Carl Boyd, did not file a response.¹ For the reasons stated herein, Calcasieu's motion will be GRANTED.

FACTS

In this case, the plaintiff asserts that several Calcasieu Parish police officers used excessive force in breaking up a fight between himself and Justin Bravo, and then engaged in a conspiracy to cover up the incident.² He claims relief for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988, and also asserts state battery and negligence claims.³ The plaintiff also alleges that Sheriff Tony Mancuso, the deputies' supervisor, failed to properly train and/or supervise the deputies who injured him; failed to haveproper and safe regulations in place; and instead created policies, customs, and usages that contributed to the plaintiff's alleged injuries.⁴

The relevant uncontested facts are as follows: On September 26, 2009, Corporal Joshua Couch and Deputy Joshua Lewis of the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Office were dispatched to the Tobacco Plus Store at 2217 Highway 90 in response to a disturbance.⁵ Upon arrival, the two deputies noticed that the plaintiff and Bravo (an acquaintance of the plaintiff) were fighting in the backseat of a vehicle.⁶ In the course of trying to break up the fight, the plaintiff alleges that the deputies used excessive force.⁷ The deputies aver that they had to make a quick decision in separating two individuals who were drunk and refused to stop fighting each other.⁸

At the time of the altercation, Calcasieu had no policies or procedures in place that allowed the use of excessive force, racial profiling, unlawful arrests, or that allowed failure to adhere to the reasonableness standard afforded by the Fourth Amendment.⁹ Further, all deputies employed by Calcasieu, including Corporal Joshua Couch and Deputy Joseph Lewis, were trained regularly on recent developments in the law, and were required to successfully complete basic training from an accepted law enforcement academy.¹⁰

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the pleadings, including the opposing party's affidavits, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment is initially responsible for demonstrating the reasons justifying the motion for summary judgment by identifying portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). The court must deny the moving party's motion for summary judgment if the movant fails to meet this burden. Id.

If the movant satisfies this burden, however, the nonmoving party must "designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In evaluating motions for summary judgment, the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no genuine issue for trial, and thus a grant of summary judgment is warranted, when the record as a whole "could not lead a rational finder of fact to find for the non-moving party..." Id.

II. EFFECT OF NON-MOVANT NOT FILING SUMMARY JUDGMENT RESPONSE

The Western District of Louisiana's Local Rule 56.2 requires a party's opposition to a motion for summary judgment to include a "separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to which there exists a genuine issue to be tried." LR56.2 Additionally, "[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be admitted, for purposes of the motion, unless controverted as required by this rule." Id. As the plaintiff hasfailed to file a response to Calcasieu's motion for summary judgment at all, all material facts set forth in its statement of material facts are deemed admitted.

LAW & ANALYSIS

I. EXCESSIVE FORCE

Boyd alleges that the deputies intentionally slammed him to the ground in a careless and grossly negligent manner, using more force than was required.¹¹ As a result, Boyd's head struck the raised portion of concrete which allegedly caused him bodily harm, including a laceration above his eyebrow, internal bleeding, a blood clot, and a massive stroke which resulted in paralysis of the left side of Boyd's body.¹²

A. The Deputies Used Objectively Reasonable Force

To succeed in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he suffered an injury; (2) the injury resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive, and (3) such force was objectively unreasonable. Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F. 3d 391, 396 (5th Cir.2004). As explained by the Supreme Court in the case Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989),

Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of '"the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' " against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id., at 8, 105 S.Ct., at 1699, quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 22-27, 88 S.Ct., at 1880-1883. Because "[f]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application," Bell v.Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), however, its proper application requires

careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S., at 8-9, 105 S.Ct, at 1699-1700 (the question is "whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of ... seizure").

The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 20-22, 88 S.Ct., at 1879-1881. . . . With respect to a claim of excessive force, the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: "Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers," Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d, at 1033, violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the "reasonableness" inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-139, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723-1724, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978); see also Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 21, 88 S.Ct., at 1879 (in analyzing the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, "it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard"). An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. See Scott v. United States, supra, 436 U.S., at 138, 98 S.Ct., at 1723, citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871 - 72 (1989).

After considering all the evidence on the record, this court finds that the deputies used a reasonable amount of force under the circumstances. The deputies were called to the scene of the incident to find two men fighting inside a car.¹³ The record shows that the deputies and other individuals repeatedly asked Boyd to step out of the car; however, Boyd did not show any signsof complying with their orders.¹⁴ Further, because Boyd was visibly intoxicated, this entitled the deputies to be more alert and cautious.¹⁵ If the deputies did not intervene and subdue Boyd, he posed a serious risk to public safety as evidenced by his attempt to choke Bravo.¹⁶ A reasonable officer in such a circumstance could have thought that physically forcing Boyd to the ground was justified in order to protect Bravo, the deputies, the general public, and Boyd himself. See Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1290 - 91 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding police officer did not use excessive when they tackled the plaintiff after she refused to stop moving after the police officer instructed her to do so); see also Therrien v. Town of Jay, 483 F. Supp. 2d 19, 26 - 27 (D. Me. 2007) (holding the officer did not use excessive force in quickly and forcefully taking the intoxicated plaintiff down to the ground); Garcia v. Greco, 05 CIV...