Boyd v. Commonwealth

1

Eric William Boyd, Appellant v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing

No. 498 C.D. 2022

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

June 21, 2023

OPINION NOT REPORTED

Submitted: February 24, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge, HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STACY WALLACE, Judge

Eric William Boyd (Licensee) appeals from the order dated April 18, 2022 and entered April 19, 2022 in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court) denying his appeal of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation Bureau of Driver Licensing's (DOT) 18-month suspension of his operating privilege under Section 1547(b)(1)(ii) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(ii), commonly referred to as the Implied Consent Law,^[1] based on Licensee's refusal to submit to a chemical blood test. Licensee argues DOT failed to meet its burden of proving he refused the chemical test because he was not provided a meaningful opportunity to consent to the chemical test. Upon review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

By notice mailed May 31, 2021, DOT warned Licensee that his driving privilege would be suspended for 18 months, effective July 5, 2021, due to his refusal to submit to chemical blood testing on May 15, 2021. Licensee timely appealed to the trial court, which conducted a de novo hearing on February 14, 2022.

At the hearing, Warwick Township Police Department's Sergeant Aaron Richwine (Sergeant Richwine) testified. Trial Ct. Op. at 4. The parties stipulated that Sergeant Richwine validly stopped Licensee in Warwick Township for driving under the influence (DUI). Id. Sergeant Richwine read Licensee the Implied Consent warnings^[2] and Licensee initially agreed to submit to a blood draw. Id. Sergeant Richwine transported Licensee to a medical center for the blood draw. Sergeant Richwine testified that while waiting for the nurse to arrive, Licensee began to waver about his consent. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 14a, 16a. Specifically, Licensee mentioned he was unsure about the blood draw and indicated he may want to speak to his attorney. Id. at 14a, 16a. However, he then agreed, again stating that he was consenting to the blood draw. Id. at 14a.

When the nurse entered the room, she requested Sergeant Richwine provide her a case number for her chart. Trial Ct. Op. at 4. Sergeant Richwine informed the nurse that he could not yet provide a case number but offered to text her the case number upon his receipt. Id. The nurse stated that she could not conduct a blood draw if Sergeant Richwine did not provide her a case number because she claimed she would have no way of determining which blood came from which defendant. Id. Sergeant Richwine showed the nurse Licensee's license and told her the tubes were labeled with Licensee's name. Id. Sergeant Richwine informed the nurse that he had 22 years of experience as a police officer and had never previously provided a case number to obtain a blood draw. Id. At the hearing, Sergeant Richwine testified to prior issues with this nurse and indicated that he had complained to the nurse's supervisor about her. Id.

After Sergeant Richwine and the nurse's interaction, Licensee became argumentative and reluctant to provide blood. Id. Licensee indicated that the issue between the nurse and Sergeant Richwine had to be fixed. Id. Licensee stated he would not consent to the blood draw. Id. Sergeant Richwine attempted to assure Licensee the tubes were not going to be mixed up, and he had nothing to be concerned about. R.R. at 15a. After this, Sergeant Richwine and Licensee had no further interaction. Trial Ct. Op. at 4.

In addition to Sergeant Richwine's testimony, DOT submitted a packet of materials to the trial court, which included the record of Licensee's conviction for a previous DUI, and the DL-26 form. Id. Licensee did not testify at the hearing. Id.

The trial court denied Licensee's suspension appeal on April 18, 2022, entered April 19, 2022. In its opinion, the trial court noted it found Sergeant Richwine's testimony credible and indicated Licensee's "prior self-serving statement that he was unnerved or reluctant or unable or even incapable of submitting to the blood test because of the nurse's reluctance to administer the test" was insufficient to meet his burden of proving he was unable to submit to the required testing protocols. Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4. Further, the trial court pointed out that neither the police nor medical personnel imposed any additional conditions upon Licensee that fell outside the scope of the Implied Consent Law. Id. The trial court found relevant that nothing in the record indicated there was no alternative way of insuring the proper identification of the vial of blood beyond the police case number. Id. at 14. Additionally, the trial court found Licensee demonstrated a general unwillingness to submit to testing that was not based solely on the nurse's reluctance to administer the blood draw. Id. Ultimately, the trial court concluded Licensee's conduct constituted a refusal to submit to the chemical test. Id. Licensee now appeals to this Court.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Licensee asserts the trial court erred in denying his suspension appeal because DOT did not meet its burden of proving he refused the chemical test as he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to submit to the chemical test. Licensee's Br. at 9. Licensee contends that he "was indeed, faced with a precondition to taking the test. His pre-condition was to acquiesce to the risk that his blood would be in jeopardy of getting mixed up." Id. at 11. Licensee argues that because he overheard the nurse telling Sergeant Richwine that his blood could be in jeopardy of getting mixed up if she was not provided a case number for her chart, his refusal to take the test was reasonable. Id. at 12. We disagree.

In reviewing the trial court's decision, we are limited to "determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, whether errors of law have been committed, or whether the trial court's determinations demonstrate a manifest abuse of discretion." McCloskey v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 722 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). Whether a licensee's conduct constitutes a refusal under the Implied Consent Law is a question of law that depends on the factual determinations of the trial court. Broadbelt v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 903 A.2d 636, 640 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (citation omitted); Hudson v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 830 A.2d 594, 599 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). As fact-finder in license suspension appeals, the trial court determines the credibility and weight assigned to the evidence presented. Factor v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 199 A.3d 492, 497 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citation omitted). We will not second-guess the trial court's credibility determinations on appeal. Id.

To sustain a license suspension, DOT bears the burden of establishing: (1) a police officer arrested a licensee and the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the licensee was operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance; (2) the officer asked the licensee to submit to a chemical test; (3) the licensee refused to take the chemical test; and (4) the officer specifically warned the licensee that refusing the test would result in DOT revoking his or her driver's license. Banner v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 737 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Pa. 1999). The only element at issue in this case is whether DOT met its burden of proving that Licensee refused to submit to chemical testing.

When a police officer reads the Implied Consent warnings from a DL-26 form to a licensee, the licensee is sufficiently apprised that if he refuses to submit to the chemical test, his operating privilege will be suspended. Quigley v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). Once the police officer provides the Implied Consent warnings to the licensee, the officer has done all that is legally required to ensure the licensee is fully advised of the consequences of his failure to submit to chemical testing. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Scott, 684 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1996). Beyond reading the warnings, an officer must also "provide a licensee with a meaningful opportunity to comply with the Implied Consent Law." Park v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 178 A.3d 274, 281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citation omitted).

Once DOT satisfies its burden of showing that the licensee was offered a meaningful opportunity to submit to chemical testing and refused, the burden shifts to the licensee to prove that he was physically incapable of taking the chemical test or that his refusal was not knowing or conscious. Kollar v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 7 A.3d 336, 339 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). "[A]nything less than an unqualified, unequivocal assent," to submit to chemical testing constitutes a licensee's refusal. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Renwick, 669 A.2d 934, 938 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). Notably, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognizes that a licensee's subjective beliefs do not provide a sufficient justification for refusing to comply with the Implied Consent Law. Park v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 178 A.3d 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citing Scott, 684 A.2d 539).

Licensee argues he was not provided a meaningful opportunity to submit to chemical testing, asserting his situation is akin to the scenario in Brown v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 738 A.2d 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). In Bro...