Boyd v. Dist. of Columbia

1

ANAJE BOYD, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 22-3741 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

January 29, 2024

Re Document No.: 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Anaje Boyd brings the instant suit against the District of Columbia (“Defendant” or “the District”), alleging claims of hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-1401.01, et seq. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 4. The District now moves to dismiss Boyd's retaliation claims, arguing that she failed to administratively exhaust her Title VII claim and that she has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under either Title VII or the DCHRA.^[1] See Def.'s Mem. P&A Supp. Mot. Dismiss Am. Compl. (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 11-1. For the reasons discussed below, the District's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

The events giving rise to Boyd's complaint began in April of 2020. At that time, Boyd was working as “a firefighter and an emergency medical technician” for the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (“DC FEMS”)-a position she had held since 2011. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2. Boyd alleges that, on the night of April 25, she awoke during her shift to find her supervisor, Lt. Antwan Jordan, “standing over her.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 31. Lt. Jordan told Boyd that “she had just been relieved of duty and that her Officer in Charge . . . was looking for her ....with [her] sexy ass.” Id. ¶ 32. Lt. Jordan then left the room, but he returned shortly thereafter to ask whether Boyd had “left anything on the ambulance.” Id. ¶ 33. When she replied that she had “left her go-bag,” he responded, “so you didn't leave this?” Id. ¶¶ 33-34. As he said this, he “forcibly put his hand down [Boyd's] shirt into her bra and squeezed her right breast.” Id. ¶ 34. Boyd “grabbed his hand and tried to remove it from her breast but” to no avail. Id. Instead, Lt. Jordan “attempted to grab her left breast” as well, before leaving the room for a second time. Id. “[S]haken by the assault,” Boyd then left the fire station. Id. ¶ 35. After she had left, she “felt something in her bra,” which turned out to be “two twenty-dollar bills.” Id. ¶ 36.

The next day, Boyd reported the incident to Lt. Martin McMahon, her “general supervisor.” Id. ¶ 38. Specifically, she told Lt. McMahon that Lt. Jordan had “sexually harassed her” and that “she wished to file an [Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)] complaint.” Id. Lt. McMahon assured Boyd “that he was going to contact the EEO Office.” Id. ¶ 39.

On April 27, Boyd “filed a police report against Lt. Jordan with the Metropolitan Police Department.” Id. ¶ 40. That same day, she heard back from Lt. McMahon, who told Boyd that he had “attempted to contact the EEO office” but had been “instructed by Chief . . . Simister to contact Amy Mauro.” Id. ¶ 41. Lt. McMahon advised Boyd to reach out to Mauro, but it is not clear whether Lt. McMahon also did so himself. See id. ¶ 43. Lt. McMahon also explained that Mauro “was the Acting EEO officer” because the “previous Acting EEO officer had resigned.” Id. ¶¶ 42-43.

Acting in accordance with Lt. McMahon's “instructions,” Boyd sent an email to Mauro. Id. ¶ 44. Thereafter, the two had a conversation about Boyd's “complaint of sexual harassment and assault.” Id. ¶ 45. Boyd also told Mauro that she had filed a police report, to which Mauro responded with apparent “irrit[ation]” based on her “aggressive and curt” tone. Id. According to Boyd, throughout their conversation, Mauro did not inform Boyd that she was not, in fact, an EEO counselor. Id. ¶ 46. Nor did she “notify . . . Boyd of any other process or procedure for reporting harassment.” Id. ¶ 47. Instead, Mauro “affirmatively misled and improperly advised . . . Boyd that she could not pursue an EEO complaint” because she had already filed a police report. Id. ¶¶ 48-49. According to Mauro, this meant that Boyd needed to “wait” to file an EEO charge and “that there could not be an investigation into her harassment complaint while the criminal process was ongoing.” Id. ¶ 49. Taking Mauro at her word, Boyd “did not pursue a complaint of harassment at the time.” Id. ¶ 50.

Over a year passed. Then, in July of 2021, Boyd had a discussion with one of her coworkers, who suggested that Boyd speak with Cpt. Melonie Barnes, an “Investigator in the Office of Internal Affairs.” Id. ¶ 67. Boyd reached out to Cpt. Barnes, who assured Boyd that she would “look into the status” of Boyd's complaint of harassment. Id. ¶¶ 68-70. Over the course of that month, Boyd and Cpt. Barnes exchanged a few text messages regarding the status of Lt. Jordan's criminal proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 73-74. Then, in early August, Boyd emailed Cpt. Barnes to request an “exit letter” so that she could “bring [her] complaint to the [DC] [O]ffice of [H]uman [R]ights.” Id. ¶ 76. During a subsequent phone call, Cpt. Barnes told Boyd that “she had not contacted . . . Boyd previously because . . . Boyd's case was still under investigation.” Id. ¶ 78. She also told Boyd that Boyd “could not file an EEO complaint until the criminal investigation was over, and once it concluded, DC FEMS would commence an investigation into her claims of harassment.” Id. ¶ 80.

Following their conversation, Boyd sent Cpt. Barnes an email asking Cpt. Barnes to explain “where in the fire department policy, rules or procedure[s]” it stated that Boyd could not file an “EEO complaint until the [criminal] trial is complete.” Id. ¶ 81. Cpt. Barnes responded with an email explaining that, unless Boyd had already filed an EEO complaint and “been through the counseling process” and “mediation,” she had not “started the EEO process per the DC Office of Human Rights.” Id. ¶ 82. Boyd replied, in relevant part, that she had been “under the impression” that she had filed an EEO complaint when she spoke to Mauro in April of 2020. Id. ¶ 83. Boyd also explained that she had not taken further action following her conversation with Mauro because Mauro had advised her that “no investigation could take place until the [criminal] case was over.” Id. Cpt. Barnes responded by informing Boyd that she was not aware of “any documentation from . . . Mauro or Lt. McMahon” stating that Boyd “want[ed] to file an EEO case.” See id. ¶ 84. She also told Boyd that she should “[r]each out to the [Assistant U.S. Attorney] that's prosecuting your case and ask her if you can file an EEO case now.” Id. And, although Cpt. Barnes later followed up with resources Boyd “may find helpful” while the criminal case was proceeding, Cpt. Barnes never provided information regarding “the DC FEMS policy that . . . allegedly [explained why] Boyd could not file an EEO complaint until her criminal case was over.” Id. ¶ 85.

Almost a year later, on June 27, 2022, Lt. Jordan was convicted of sexually abusing Boyd. Id. ¶ 86. Three days later, Boyd contacted an EEO counselor “to discuss her complaint of sexual harassment.” Id. ¶ 87. On July 25, “Boyd received an exit letter stating that [she] could file a complaint with [the] D.C. Office of Human Rights.” Id. ¶ 89. Three days after receiving her exit letter, “Boyd filed a discrimination complaint with the D.C. Office of Human Rights.” Id. ¶ 90. And on September 9, Boyd “filed a charge of discrimination” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. ¶ 91. Ten days later, the EEOC sent Boyd a “Notice of Right to Sue.” Id. ¶ 92.

Following her receipt of the EEOC's Notice, Boyd filed a complaint in this court, see Compl., ECF No. 1, which she later amended, see Am. Compl. Boyd's amended complaint alleges four counts of sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the DCHRA, D.C. Code § 2-1401.01, et seq. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 94-129. The District moved to dismiss Boyd's amended complaint, see Def.'s Mot., and the motion is now ripe for consideration, see Mem. Supp. Pl.'s Opp'n Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.'s Opp'n”), ECF No. 13-1, Def.'s Reply Pl.'s Opp'n Mot. Dismiss Am. Compl. (“Def.'s Reply”), ECF No. 15.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint” under that standard; it asks whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This means that a plaintiff's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, see id., nor must a court presume the veracity of legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. How...