Boyd v. State

540 P.3d 1228

Glen Edward BOYD, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.STATE of Arizona, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0684

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

FILED December 5, 2023

Bowman and Brooke, LLP, Phoenix, By Alexander J. Egbert, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix, By Rebecca A. Banes, Nancy J. Davis, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

OPINION

BROWN, Judge:

¶1 House Bill 2466 ("the Bill"), effective May 27, 2019, revived certain causes of action for victims of sexual abuse that would otherwise be time-barred and permitted such actions to be filed by December 31, 2020. Plaintiff Glen Boyd appeals the superior court's order dismissing his complaint against defendants State of Arizona ("the State"), the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections ("ADJC"), and former ADJC correctional officer Jennifer Loe. The primary issues before us are: (1) whether Boyd complied with A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) (requiring service of a notice of claim within 180 days after it accrues), and (2) whether A.R.S. § 12-821.01(E) required him to wait 60 days after filing his notice of claim before filing the complaint. Because Boyd filed his notice of claim and complaint within the timeframe authorized by the legislature, we vacate the order in part and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶2 As alleged in his complaint, in 2001 Boyd (age 16 at the time) was in ADJC custody at a facility where Loe worked as a correctional officer. Loe sexually abused him around that time, both at the facility and, after his release, at her apartment. Two other ADJC employees then threatened Boyd and directed him not to talk to Loe or "make up any lies" about her. This abuse was reported to authorities, who contacted Boyd to help them in their investigation. Boyd was unaware of the investigation's results until he served a subpoena on ADJC in 2021 and learned Loe had been arrested and charged for abusing Boyd.

¶3 On or about December 20, 2020, Boyd filed a notice of claim alleging sexual abuse by Loe, improper threats by the two other ADJC employees, and negligent conduct by the State and ADJC given that he was in their care and custody. Boyd then submitted his complaint to prison authorities for mailing on December 29, 2020, essentially repeating the allegations in his notice of claim. The State does not dispute Boyd's assertion that his complaint was treated as filed at that time. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 5.1(b)(4) ("If a party is incarcerated and another party contends that the incarcerated party did not timely file a document, the court must treat the document as filed on the date it was delivered to prison authorities to deposit in the mail.").

¶4 In August 2021, Loe moved to dismiss Boyd's claims, asserting they were barred by A.R.S. § 12-514, which states that an action for damages based on injuries due to sexual conduct or contact committed against a minor must be filed within 12 years after the victim turns 18. After filing an answer, the State moved for judgment on the pleadings, questioning whether Boyd had served a notice of claim, but primarily asserting his lawsuit was barred because he did not wait at least 60 days to file suit under A.R.S. § 12-821.01(E) (deeming a notice of claim denied 60 days after filing unless expressly denied earlier). The State also argued Boyd's claims against ADJC should be dismissed because it is a nonjural entity.

¶5 Boyd did not controvert the State's argument that his notice of claim was untimely. Instead, he argued that in November 2020 he was informed about a new law in Arizona that granted him until December 31, 2020, to file a complaint against the defendants. He claimed he would have missed that deadline if he had waited 60 days after serving the notice of claim.

¶6 The superior court granted Loe's motion to dismiss and found that dismissal of the claims against her rendered the other pending motions moot. Boyd timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Zubia v. Shapiro , 243 Ariz. 412, 414, ¶ 13, 408 P.3d 1248, 1250 (2018). In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, we assume the facts alleged in the complaint are true and will affirm the dismissal if the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof. Hopi Tribe v. Ariz. Snowbowl Resort Ltd. P'ship , 245 Ariz. 397, 400, ¶ 8, 430 P.3d 362, 365 (2018).

¶8 Boyd argues the superior court erred by failing to recognize the Bill revived his claims against the defendants. The State does not attempt to defend the ruling that Boyd's claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations. Instead, the State contends his lawsuit should be barred because his notice of claim was untimely. For her part, Loe did not file an answering brief. In our discretion, we treat that failure as conceding the court erred in granting her motion to dismiss. See Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259, ¶ 9, 330 P.3d 1013, 1016 (App. 2014) ("When debatable issues exist and an appellee fails to file an answering brief, we may consider such failure a confession of reversible error.").

A. Notice of Claim: 180-Day Clause

¶9 We review de novo the interpretation of statutes, which "requires us to determine the meaning of the words the legislature chose to use." S. Ariz. Home Builders Ass'n. v. Town of Marana , 254 Ariz. 281, 286, 522 P.3d 671, 676 (2023). "We do so neither narrowly nor liberally, but rather according to the plain meaning of the words in their broader statutory context, unless the legislature directs us to do otherwise." Id. We interpret the statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related provisions. See Fann v. State , 251 Ariz. 425, 434, ¶ 25, 493 P.3d 246, 255 (2021).

Statutes addressing the same subject matter should be harmonized when possible. Lagerman v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys. , 248 Ariz. 504, 507, ¶ 13, 462 P.3d 1009, 1012 (2020).

¶10 Arizona law requires a person with a claim against a public entity to file a notice of claim "within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues." A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Under the notice of claim statute, a cause of action "accrues when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition that caused or contributed to the damage." A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B). The damaged party must then file the lawsuit "within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward." A.R.S. § 12-821. The same discovery rule applies to filing a notice of claim and a complaint. Dube v. Likins , 216 Ariz. 406, 422, ¶ 5, 167 P.3d 93, 109 (App. 2007) (supplemental opinion).

¶11 The Bill provides two exceptions to this one-year filing period. First, the Bill added a new statute of limitations, codified at § 12-514, that allows minor victims of sexual conduct or sexual contact to bring their claims "within twelve years after the plaintiff reaches eighteen years of age and not afterward." 2019 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 259, § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.). In other words, § 12-514 gives victims of sexual abuse until age 30 to bring a claim. Second, the legislature included an applicability provision in the Bill that provides a one-time exception for individuals who would otherwise be barred from asserting a claim, explained in Section 3(B) as follows:

Notwithstanding any other law , a cause of action for damages described in subsection A, paragraph 1 of this section that involves sexual conduct or sexual contact and that would be time barred under section 12–514, Arizona Revised Statutes, as added by this act, or that would otherwise be time barred because of an applicable statute of limitations, a claim presentation deadline or the expiration of any other time limit is revived and may be commenced before December 31, 2020 .

2019 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 259, § 3 (1st Reg. Sess.) (emphasis added).

¶12 The State argues that irrespective of the Bill and § 12-514, Boyd had to file his notice of claim within 180 days of when his cause of action accrued. See A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). And although not argued in the superior court, the State contends Boyd's claim accrued on May 27, 2019, when the Bill became effective. According to the State then, Boyd's notice of claim was untimely because it was filed in December 2020, and thus after the State's asserted November 23, 2019, deadline.

¶13 The Bill provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other law," a cause of action that would be time-barred by: (1) § 12-514, (2) any applicable statute of limitations, (3) a claim presentation deadline, or (4) the expiration of any other limit, "is revived and may be commenced before December 31, 2020." 2019 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 259, § 3 (1st Reg. Sess.) (emphasis added). The phrase "notwithstanding any other law" makes it plain that the revival period for filing a cause of action controls over any otherwise conflicting law. See id. ; City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc. , 242 Ariz. 139, 144, ¶ 16, 393 P.3d 919, 924 (2017) (reasoning that by using "notwithstanding any other statute," the legislature had "expressly and definitely" declared one statute controlled over another conflicting statute).

¶14 The State views the language more narrowly, asserting that "[n]otwithstanding any other law" does not apply to the last clause of the Bill ("and may be commenced before December 31, 2020"). But that clause and the immediately preceding clause ("a claim presentation deadline or the expiration of any other time limit is revived") are listed in a series and have no punctuation between them. The State's reading thus contradicts established punctuation principles. See Szeto v. Ariz. Pub. Serv....