Boyd v. Sutton

1

DEAN C. BOYD PLAINTIFF v. SYLVIA SUTTON, ET AL. DEFENDANTS

No. 4:22CV138-NBB-JMV

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division

May 9, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DISMISSING CASE AS FRIVOLOUS UNDER THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

NEAL B. BIGGERS SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the court on the pro se prisoner complaint of Dean C. Boyd, who challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed this suit. The plaintiff has brought the instant case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal cause of action against “[e]very person” who under color of state authority causes the “deprivation of any rights privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants assaulted and harassed him during his stay at Allegiance Specialty Hospital of Greenville, LLC (“ASH”) from February 14, 2020, through March 3 2020. Defendants Veronica Bell and Misty Hughes have moved for summary judgment; the plaintiff has not responded to the motion, and the deadline to do so has expired.

The defendants have raised the issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel^[1] in the instant motion, as the plaintiff has filed at least six suits regarding alleged abuse during his stay at ASH. For the reasons set forth below, the motion by the defendants for summary judgment will be granted, and the instant case will be dismissed as frivolous under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.^[2]

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the “materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only) admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) and (c)(1). “The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden.” Beck v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5^th Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Beck, 204 F.3d at 633; Allen v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5^th Cir. 2000); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5^th Cir. 1998).

Substantive law determines what is material. Anderson, 477 U.S at 249. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id., at 248. If the non-movant sets forth specific facts in support of allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327. “Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Federal Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5^th Cir. 1992).

The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Allen, 204 F.3d at 621; PYCA Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management Dist., 177 F.3d 351, 161 (5^th Cir. 1999); Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5^th Cir. 1995). However, this is so only when there is “an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5^th Cir. 1994); see Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5^th Cir. 1998). In the absence of proof, the court does not “assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).

The very purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Advisory Committee Note to the 1963 Amendments to Rule 56. Indeed, “[t]he amendment is not intended to derogate from the solemnity of the pleadings[;] [r]ather, it recognizes that despite the best efforts of counsel to make his pleadings accurate, they may be overwhelmingly contradicted by the proof available to his adversary.” Id. The non-moving party (the plaintiff in this case), must come forward with proof to support each element of his claim. The plaintiff cannot meet this burden with “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986), “conclusory allegations,” Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 871-73, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3180 (1990), “unsubstantiated assertions,” Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92 (5^th Cir. 1994), or by a mere “scintilla” of evidence, Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082 (5^th Cir. 1994).

It would undermine the purposes of summary judgment if a party could defeat such a motion simply by “replac[ing] conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188 (1990). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must determine whether the nonmoving party's allegations are plausible. Matsushita, supra. (emphasis added). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (discussing plausibility of claim as a requirement to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, once the court “has determined the relevant set of facts and drawn all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the record, [the ultimate decision becomes] purely a question of law.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (emphasis in original). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on the motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 380.

Undisputed Material Facts

The court notes that Dean C. Boyd has six cases^[3] arising out of a single nucleus of operative facts that were simultaneously pending before this court (two of which have been very recently decided):

► Boyd v Sutton, 4:22CV138-NBB-JMV (the instant case); ► Boyd v. S&SManagement Group, LLC, 4:22CV65-NBB-DAS;

► Boyd v. Allegiance Specialty Hospital, et al., 4:22CV101-GHD-DAS (recently dismissed as frivolous under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel)

► Boyd v. Hughes, 4:23CV35-GHD-RP;

► Boyd v. Hughes, 4:23CV36-NBB-DAS; and

► Boyd v. Sutton, 4:21CV159-GHD-DAS (recently dismissed on the merits). Though the defendants in this case made multiple arguments in support of summary judgment, the court will address only res judicata (and the related doctrine of collateral estoppel).

The instant action was filed on January 21, 2022, in the Circuit Court of Washington County, Mississippi. Doc. 2. It was then removed to this court. Doc. 1. Dean C. Boyd alleges that he was a patient at Allegiance Specialty Hospital of Greenville, LLC (“ASH”) from February 14, 2020, through March 3, 2020. Id. He alleges that Advert Security Company (“Advert”) employees, as well as medical practitioners and staff employed by ASH, a medical doctor in private practice, and a guard employed by the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) participated in a campaign to harass and assault him during his stay at the hospital, culminating in an unprovoked assault on him on March 3, 2020 (when he was to be transferred from ASH back to the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman). Id. The plaintiff described his allegations as a “Mississippi State Tort Negligent Medical Malpractice Claim/Action,” though he couches his claims in the body of his complaint in terms of violation of federal constitutional law Id.

All six cases listed above (including the instant case) involve Boyd's stay at ASH and abuse he allegedly suffered at the hands of Advert, ASH, and MDOC employees. One of those cases was recently decided on the merits: Boyd v. Sutton, 4:21CV159-GHD-DAS (“Boyd-159”).^[4] Another, based on the holdings in Boyd-159, was dismissed under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel: Boyd v. Allegiance Specialty Hospital, et al., 4:22CV101-GHD-DAS (“Boyd-101”). In accordance with the final judgment in Boyd-101, the Clerk of the Court filed the memorandum opinion and final judgment from that case as a “Notice” in the instant case (to alert the court to the possible application of res judicata and collateral estoppel to this case). See Doc. 14 (Notice of Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, Three PLRA Strikes, and Possible Sanctions.)^[5] Having reviewed these documents and the pleadings in this case, including the instant motion for summary judgment, the court...