Boyle v. Lumpkin

JAMES FRANKLIN BOYLE, Petitioner, v. BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director,¹ Texas Department of Criminal Justice,Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.

No. 4:20-CV-190-A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION

April 9, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by petitioner, James Franklin Boyle, a state prisoner confined in the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, against Bobby Lumpkin, director of that division, respondent. After having considered the pleadings, state court records, and relief sought by petitioner, the court has concluded that the petition should be denied.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner stands convicted in Palo Pinto, Texas, Case Nos. 15782, 15783, 15795, and 15882, on two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, indecency with a child, and tamperingwith a witness. The jury assessed a 99-year sentence for each of his aggravated-sexual-assault convictions, a 50-year sentence for his tampering conviction, and a 20-year sentence for his indecency conviction, in addition to a $5000 fine in each case. (Mem. Op. 1-2, doc. 37-24.) The trial court ordered that his 99-year sentences run consecutively to his 20-year sentence. Petitioner's convictions were affirmed on appeal and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his petition for discretionary review. (Electronic R., doc. 37-1.) Petitioner also filed four post-conviction state habeas-corpus applications challenging his convictions, which were denied by the Texas Court of Criminal without written order. (SHR-01² 3-20, doc. 37-33 & Action Taken, doc 37-29; SHR-02 3-21, doc. 37-38 & Action Taken, doc. 37-34; SHR03 3-22, doc. 37-43 & Action Taken, doc. 37-39; SHR04 3-20, doc. 37-48 & Action Taken, doc. 37-44.) This federal habeas petition followed.³

Petitioner's jury trial commenced on April 4, 2017, during which testimony reflected that during the summer of 2015 petitioner was providing free childcare in his home for multiple children, including J.P., M.P., and N.C., boys between the agesof 5 and 8. The boys enjoyed going to petitioner's house, where there were other children to play with and where they fished and swam in the river, played video games, and rode bikes and four-wheelers. There were also occasions when the boys spent the night at petitioner's house. J.P., M.P., and N.C. eventually made outcrys that petitioner abused them sexually. After criminal charges were brought against petitioner in the boys' cases, several of petitioner's family members threatened N.C.'s mother, C.C., to drop the charges or she would be sued or charges would be brought against her.

II. ISSUES

From what the court can gleen from the avalanche of petitioner's pleadings and the state court records, petitioner's claims fall within the following general categories:

(1) trial records;

(2) speedy trial;

(3) impartial jury;

(4) prosecutorial misconduct;

(5) abuse of discretion by the trial court; and

(6) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

(Pet. 6-7, 16-17, 26-27, 36-37, doc. 1; Mot. 13-15, doc. 3; Mot. to Dismiss 2-3, doc. 13; Mot. to Dismiss 14-15, doc. 14; Mot. to Amend 2, doc. 20.) Petitioner's grounds for relief, which are vague and multifarious, are addressed as thoroughly as practicaland to the extent exhausted in state court as best the court can determine. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

III. RULE 5 STATEMENT

Respondent believes that petitioner has sufficiently exhausted his state remedies as to the claims raised as respondent interprets them and that the petition is neither barred by limitations nor subject to the successive-petition bar. (Resp't's Answer 10, doc. 35.)

V. LEGAL STANDARD FOR GRANTING HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

A § 2254 habeas petition is governed by the heightened standard of review provided for by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under the Act, a writ of habeas corpus should be granted only if a state court arrives at a decision that is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court or that is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record before the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100-01 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). This standard is difficult to meet and "stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings." Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.

Additionally, the statute requires that federal courts give great deference to a state court's factual findings. Hill v.Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). Section 2254(e)(1) provides that a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct. The presumption of correctness applies to both express and implied factual findings. Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 2004); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001). Absent express findings, a federal court may imply fact findings consistent with the state court's disposition. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 314 (1963); Pondexter v. Dretke, 346 F.3d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 2003); Catalan v. Cockrell, 315 F.3d 491, 493 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002). It is the petitioner's burden to rebut the presumption of correctness through clear and convincing evidence, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Furthermore, when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state's highest criminal court, denies relief without written order, typically it is an adjudication on the merits, which is likewise entitled to this presumption. Richter, 562 U.S. at 100; Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In such a situation, a federal court "should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision providing" particular reasons, both legal and factual, "presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning," and give appropriate deference to that decision. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191-92 (2018). If there is no related state-court decision providing the court's reasoning, a federal court assumes that the state court applied the proper clearly established federal law to the facts of the case and then determines whether its decision was contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of that law. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1); Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 604 (5th Cir. 2006).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Free Copy of Trial Transcripts

Petitioner claims that as an indigent defendant he had no transcripts or court records in preparation of his petition for discretionary review, his petition for writ of certiorari, his state habeas application, or this federal habeas petition. (Pet. 6, 16, 26, 36, doc. 1.)

An indigent inmate has no automatic right to copies of court records free of charge. See Kunkle v. Dretke, 352 F.3d 980, 985-86 (5th Cir. 2003). And, it is well-settled that the state is not "required to furnish complete transcripts so that the defendants . . . may conduct 'fishing expeditions' to seek out possible errors at trial." Jackson v. Estelle, 672 F.2d 505, 506 (5th Cir. 1982). Instead, in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956), the Supreme Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require that states provide indigent defendants with a trial transcript free of charge only when it is necessary for meaningful review ondirect appeal.

In this case, the record reflects that petitioner was provided a copy of his state court records for review by the appellate court after his first appellate attorney filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw. (COA Order, doc. 37-23.) Thus, on this record, it appears that he had adequate access to his state court records in pursuit of his direct appeal. He did not however have any right to a free copy of his court records for use in his state or federal post-conviction collateral proceedings. See Bonner v. Henderson, 517 F.2d 135, 136 (5th Cir. 1975); Colbert v. Beto, 439 F.2d 1130, 1131 (5th Cir. 1971).

B. Speedy Trial

Petitioner claims that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. In his state habeas proceedings, petitioner asserted that he was arrested on or about August 7, 2015, but was not "taken to trial" until April 2017. (SHR01 10, doc. 37-33; SHR04 14, doc. 37-48.)

The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and applies to state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-26 (1973). In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court prescribed several factors to be considered when evaluating a speedy-trial claim: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant'sassertion of his right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). None of these factors is either necessary or sufficient to find a speedy-trial violation; "[r]ather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Id. at 533. The speedy-trial inquiry therefore involves a "difficult and sensitive" balancing of these factors under the particular circumstances of each case. Id. at 530.

Deferring to the state habeas court's implied factual findings on the issue and assuming the state court engaged in a Barker analysis, petitioner fails to establish that the state court's denial of relief is objectively unreasonable. Although the delay in this case may be presumptively prejudicial, it is impossible from the record to determine the reason(s) for the delay or whether the delay is attributable to the state or the defense. The record does indicate however that petitioner's case was set for trial on June 6, 2016, and on November 7, 2016, in Case No. 15882 and in each instance defense counsel moved for a...