BP v. Mayor

141 S.Ct. 1532

209 L.Ed.2d 631

BP P.L.C. et al., Petitioners

v.MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE

No. 19-1189

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued January 19, 2021

Decided May 17, 2021

Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, DC, for the petitioners.

Brinton Lucas for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioners.

Victor M. Sher, San Francisco, CA, for the respondents.

Peter D. Keisler, C. Frederick Beckner III, Sidley Austin LLP, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Thomas G. Hungar, Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, David C. Frederick, Brendan J. Crimmins, Daniel S. Severson, Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C., Kannon K. Shanmugam, Counsel of Record, William T. Marks, Tanya S. Manno, E. Garrett West, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Kathleen Taylor Sooy, Tracy A. Roman, Crowell & Moring LLP, Martha Thomsen, Megan Berge, Baker Botts L.L.P., Matthew J. Peters, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, Theodore V. Wells, Jr., Daniel J. Toal, Adam P. Savitt, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Philip H. Curtis, Nancy G. Milburn, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Shawn Patrick Regan, Hunton Andrews, Kurth LLP, New York, NY, Matthew T. Heartney, John D. Lombardo, Arnold & Porter, Kaye Scholer LLP, Ann Marie Mortimer, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Los Angeles, CA, John B. Isbister, Jaime W. Luse, Tydings & Rosenberg LLP, Michelle N. Lipkowitz, Thomas K. Prevas, Saul Ewing, Arnstein & Lehr LLP, Baltimore, MD, Nathan P. Eimer, Pamela R. Hanebutt, Lisa S. Meyer, Eimer Stahl LLP, Chicago, IL, Robert E. Dunn, Eimer Stahl LLP, San Jose, CA, Ryan J. Walsh, Eimer Stahl LLP, Madison, WI, Sean C. Grimsley, Jameson R. Jones, Daniel R. Brody, Bartlit Beck LLP, Denver, CO, Steven M. Bauer, Margaret A. Tough, Latham & Watkins LLP, Shannon S. Broome, Hunton Andrews, Kurth LLP, San Francisco, CA, Scott Janoe, Baker Botts L.L.P., Houston, TX, for petitioners.

Dana P. Moore, Baltimore City Law Department, Baltimore, MD, Victor M. Sher, Matthew K. Edling, Michael Burger, Martin D. Quinones, Quentin C. Karpilow Sher Edling LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Justice GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case began when Baltimore's mayor and city council sued various energy companies for promoting fossil fuels while allegedly concealing their environmental impacts. But the merits of that claim have nothing to do with this appeal. The only question before us is one of civil procedure: Does 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) permit a court of appeals to review any issue in a district court order remanding a case to state court where the defendant premised removal in part on the federal officer removal statute, § 1442, or the civil rights removal statute, § 1443 ?

I

Three years ago, Baltimore's mayor and city council (we refer to them collectively as the City) filed suit in Maryland state court. The City's complaint included a number of state-law causes of action, but most centered on the defendants’ alleged failure to warn about the dangers of their products—and the injuries the City says it suffered as a result.

Soon after the City filed suit, the defendants removed the case to federal court. In support of their action, the defendants invoked a variety of federal statutes. Most relevant for our purposes, they pointed to a provision that promises a federal forum for any action against an "officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office." 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

This statute authorized the removal of the City's suit, the defendants said, because some of their challenged exploration, drilling, and production operations took place at the federal government's behest. The companies also identified a number of other statutes that they believed independently supported removal: the federal-question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ; the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 92 Stat. 657, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b) ; the admiralty jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 ; and the bankruptcy removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1452.

Once the case arrived in federal court, the City filed a motion seeking to have it remanded back to state court. The City argued that none of the companies’ grounds for removal justified retaining federal jurisdiction. In an extensive order, the district court reviewed each of the defendants’ cited bases for removal before ultimately agreeing with the City and remanding the case to state court.

Normally that would have ended the matter. Since at least 1949, federal appellate courts have generally lacked the power to review a district court order remanding a case to state court. See Act of May 24, 1949, § 84, 63 Stat. 102. But like most rules, this one has accrued exceptions with time. In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress created an exception allowing appellate review for cases " ‘removed pursuant to’ " 28 U.S.C. § 1443, a provision that guarantees a federal forum for certain federal civil rights claims. See § 901, 78 Stat. 266. So before a civil rights case is returned to state court, a federal court of appeals usually can intervene to test the soundness of the district court's remand order.

In 2011, Congress added a similar exception for suits against federal officers or agencies removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442. See Removal Clarification Act, § 2, 125 Stat. 545–546. Here, too, Congress has deemed it appropriate to allow appellate review before a district court may remand a case to state court. All told, then, the law as it stands today provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).

After the district court ordered the City's case remanded to state court, the defendants sought to appeal—and this much everyone seemed to agree they were free to do. After all, the defendants had relied on the federal officer removal statute found in § 1442 when they removed the case to federal court—and the current version of § 1447(d) permits an appeal in just these circumstances. The real trouble began only when it came to the scope of the defendants’ appeal. The Fourth Circuit read § 1447(d) as authorizing it to review only the part of the district court's remand order discussing § 1442. As a result, the court of appeals refused to consider whether the district court may have erred when it rejected the defendants’ other grounds for removal. Finding (only) the district court's § 1442 analysis sound, the Fourth Circuit proceeded to affirm. 952 F.3d 452 (2020).

This ruling highlighted a circuit split. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has reasoned that § 1447(d) extends appellate review to the whole of an " ‘order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443.’ " See Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co. , 792 F.3d 805, 811 (2015). On that reading of the statute, appellate review is not confined to a defendant's removal arguments under the federal officer and civil rights removal statutes. Instead, a court of appeals may review the merits of all theories for removal that a district court has rejected. Because the courts of appeals disagree over the scope of their appellate authority under § 1447(d), we agreed to take this case to resolve the question. 591 U. S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 222, 207 L.Ed.2d 1165 (2020).

II

A

When called on to interpret a statute, this Court generally seeks to discern and apply the ordinary meaning of its terms at the time of their adoption. Niz-Chavez v. Garland , 593 U. S. ––––, ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1474, 1479–1480, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2021). Here, the relevant portion of § 1447(d) provides that "an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal."

To our minds, the first telling clue lies in the statute's use of the term "order." Whether we look to the time of § 1447(d) ’s adoption or amendment, a judicial "order" meant then what it means today: a "written direction or command delivered by ... a court or judge."¹ So an "order remanding a case" was (and is) a formal command from a district court returning the case to state court. In this case, the district court's remand order rejected all of the defendants’ grounds for removal. For good reason too. Normally, federal jurisdiction is not optional; subject to exceptions not relevant here, "courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction" assigned to them. Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs , 571 U.S. 69, 72, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013). So the district court wasn't at liberty to remove the City's case from its docket until it determined that it lacked any authority to entertain the suit. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill , 484 U.S. 343, 356, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988). From this it would seem to follow that, when a district court's removal order rejects all of the defendants’ grounds for removal, § 1447(d) authorizes a court of appeals to review each and every one of them. After all, the statute allows courts of appeals to examine the whole of a district court's "order," not just some of its parts or pieces.

Of course, § 1447(d) extends appellate review only to some orders—those remanding a "case ... removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443." But it's hard to see how that qualification changes the calculus. To remove a case, a defendant must comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Essentially, that statute requires the defendant to provide affected parties and courts with a notice stating its grounds for removal. §§ 1446(a), (d). The combination of these actions "effect[s] the removal." § 1446(d). To remove a case "pursuant to" § 1442 or § 1443,...