Bracewell v. State

1

Debra Bracewell v. State of Alabama

No. CR-21-0242

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

August 23, 2024

Appeal from Covington Circuit Court (CC-78-26)

COLE JUDGE

Debra Bracewell appeals the circuit court's decision to sentence her to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole following a resentencing hearing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

Facts and Procedural History

"Late in the evening on August 14, 1977, Bracewell, who was 17 years old at the time, and her husband Charles Bracewell,¹ who was at least 10 years her senior entered a gasoline station/convenience store owned and operated by Rex Carnley. Once inside, Charles brandished a gun and demanded money from Carnley, and Bracewell, at Charles's direction, walked behind the checkout counter and retrieved a pistol Carnley kept in a drawer under the cash register. Bracewell then stood on the rungs of a stool behind the counter and shot Carnley in the back of the head from approximately 18 inches away. Charles took the pistol from Bracewell, and Bracewell left the store. Charles then shot Carnley seven more times and took over $ 1,000 in cash from Carnley's person. Bracewell subsequently confessed to the murder, was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed during the course of a robbery, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. ²

"

"¹ There is some dispute in the record as to whether Bracewell and Charles were, in fact, legally married.

" ² Bracewell was originally convicted of capital murder in 1978 and was sentenced to death. That conviction and sentence were ultimately reversed on the authority of Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), and Beck v State, 396 So.2d 645 (Ala. 1980). See Bracewell v State, 401 So.2d 119 (Ala.Crim.App.1978), rev'd, 401 So.2d 123 (Ala. 1979), on remand to, 401 So.2d 124 (Ala.Crim.App.1980), judgment vacated by Bracewell v Alabama, 449 U.S. 915, 101 S.Ct. 312, 66 L.Ed.2d 143 (1980), on remand to, 401 So.2d 130 (Ala.Crim.App.1981). Bracewell was again convicted of capital murder on retrial in 1981 and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole."

Bracewell v. State ("Bracewell I"), 329 So.3d 29, 31 (Ala.Crim.App.2019) (opinion on original submission).

Over 30 years after Bracewell began serving her sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Miller, which held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution "forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455. In Miller's wake, the Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama Legislature developed standards for sentencing a juvenile for a capital offense:

"In striking down mandatory sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for juveniles who commit capital murder, the Court did not hold that juveniles are categorically exempt from such a sentence. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455. 'Although Miller did not foreclose a sentencer's ability to impose life without parole on a juvenile, the Court explained that a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect "'irreparable corruption.'"' Montgomery [v Louisiana], 577 U.S. [190, 195], 136 S.Ct. [718, 726 (2016)] (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80, 132 S.Ct. 2455, quoting in turn, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)). Thus, 'Miller "mandates ... that a sentencer follow a certain process -considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics" -- before "meting out" a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.' Click[v. State], 215 So.3d [1189,] 1192 [(Ala.Crim.App.2016)] (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483, 132 S.Ct. 2455).

'"[A] judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles."' Click, 215 So.3d at 1192 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483, 132 S.Ct. 2455). Consequently, '[a] hearing where "youth and its attendant characteristics" are considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not.' Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 210, 136 S.Ct. at 735 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455). The Court explained that '[t]he hearing ... gives effect to Miller's substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.' Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 210, 136 S.Ct. at 735.

"When Miller was decided, Alabama's capital-murder statute provided for two possible sentences -- life in prison without the possibility of parole or death. See § 13A-5-39(1), Ala. Code 1975. Juveniles, however, were not eligible for a sentence of death; therefore, the only sentence available for a juvenile convicted of capital murder was life in prison without the possibility of parole. See Ex parte Henderson, 144 So.3d [1262, 1266-84 (Ala. 2013)]; Miller v. State, 148 So.3d 78 (Ala.Crim.App.2013). In the wake of Miller, both the Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama Legislature acted to amend our capital-murder statutes so as to provide juveniles with individualized sentencing and an opportunity to have a sentence imposed that includes the possibility of parole.

"First, in Ex parte Henderson, our Supreme Court was asked to order the dismissal of capital-murder indictments against two juveniles because Alabama law at the time mandated a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Ex parte Henderson, 144 So.3d at 1262-84. The Alabama Supreme Court recognized that the Miller decision 'was not a categorical prohibition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for juveniles, but rather required the sentencer to consider the juvenile's age and age-related characteristics before imposing such a sentence.' Ex parte Henderson, 144 So.3d at 1280. 'Miller mandates individualized sentencing for juveniles charged with capital murder rather than a "one size fits all" imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.' Ex parte Henderson, 144 So.3d at 1280. However, the Henderson Court 'recognize[d] that a capital offense was defined under our statutory scheme as one punishable by the two harshest criminal sentences available: death and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.' Ex parte Henderson, 144 So.3d at 1280. To ameliorate the unconstitutional portion of Alabama's capital sentencing scheme as it applied to juveniles, the Alabama Supreme Court '[s]ever[ed] the mandatory nature of a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile to provide for the ... possibility of parole.' Ex parte Henderson, 144 So.3d at 1281.

"After severing from the statute the mandatory nature of a sentence of life in prison without parole for juveniles convicted of capital offenses, the Alabama Supreme Court established factors courts must consider when deciding whether life in prison with the possibility of parole would be an appropriate sentence for a juvenile. Id. at 1283-84. Specifically, the Court held

"'that a sentencing hearing for a juvenile convicted of a capital offense must now include consideration of: (1) the juvenile's chronological age at the time of the offense and the hallmark features of youth, such as immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile's diminished culpability; (3) the circumstances of the offense; (4) the extent of the juvenile's participation in the crime; (5) the juvenile's family, home, and neighborhood environment; (6) the juvenile's emotional maturity and development; (7) whether familial and/or peer pressure affected the juvenile; (8) the juvenile's past exposure to violence; (9) the juvenile's drug and alcohol history; (10) the juvenile's ability to deal with the police; (11) the juvenile's capacity to assist his or her attorney; (12) the juvenile's mental-health history; (13) the juvenile's potential for rehabilitation; and (14) any other relevant factor related to the juvenile's youth.'

"Ex parte Henderson, 144 So.3d at 1284. See also Foye v. State, 153 So.3d 854, 864 (Ala.Crim.App.2013). The Court 'recognize[d] that some of the factors may not apply to a particular juvenile's case and that some of the factors may overlap.' Ex parte Henderson, 144 So.3d at 1284.

"After the Alabama Supreme Court decided Ex parte Henderson, the Alabama Legislature amended our capitalsentencing statutes to comply with the guidelines of Miller. First, the Legislature amended § 13A-5-2(b) to provide that '[e]very person convicted of murder shall be sentenced by the court to imprisonment for a term, or to death, life imprisonment without parole, or life imprisonment in the case of a defendant who establishes that he or she was under the age of 18 years at the time of the offense, as authorized by subsection (c) of Section 13A-6-2.' The Legislature redefined a capital offense as, '[a]n offense for which a defendant shall be punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, or in the case of a defendant who establishes that he or she was under the age of 18 years at the time of the capital offense, life imprisonment, or life imprisonment without parole, according to the provisions of this article.' § 13A-5-39(1), Ala. Code 1975. The Legislature also provided:

"'If the defendant is found guilty of a capital offense or offenses with which he or she is charged and the defendant establishes to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was under the age of 18 years at the time of the

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