Braddy v. United States

REGINALD BRADDY, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

Criminal No. 03-CR-14-104

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

February 6, 2019

(JUDGE MANNION)

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the court is petitioner Reginald Braddy's ("Braddy") Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence, filed on April 30, 2018. (Doc. 632). The petitioner's motion is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 and is based upon ineffective assistance of counsel claims. For the reasons discussed below, the court will DENY the motion without the need for an evidentiary hearing.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Following a 4-day trial from May 22 - 26, 2016, a jury found Braddy, and his co-defendant Fontaine Horton, guilty on all counts of a Superseding Indictment, (Doc. 402), charging him with drug related offenses.Subsequently, Braddy filed a Motion for a New Trial, (Doc. 548), as well as a Motion to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment. (Doc. 549). On July 7, 2016, the court issued a Memorandum, (Doc. 554), and Order, (Doc. 555), denying both of Braddy's Motions. The court then conducted a sentencing hearing and sentenced Braddy to 235 months in prison. (Doc. 612). Braddy filed a timely notice of appeal. On December 6, 2017, the Third Circuit affirmed Braddy's conviction and sentence. See United States v. Braddy, 2017 WL 6033419 (3d Cir. 2017).

On April 30, 2018, Braddy timely filed his instant Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255. (Doc. 632). Braddy's motion has been fully briefed by the parties.

II. STANDARD

When a district court judge imposes a sentence on a defendant who believes "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, [the defendant] may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. §2255, ¶1; see United States v. Eakman, 378 F.3d 294, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2004).

The rule states that "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is notentitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion and direct the clerk to notify the moving party." See United States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 165 n. 15 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating district courts have the power to dismiss petitions sua sponte during the Rule 4 stage of habeas proceedings).

A §2255 motion "is addressed to the sound discretion of the district court." United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585, 591 (3d Cir. 1980). "[A] motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 is the proper procedure for a federal prisoner to raise a collateral attack on his or her federal sentence for any error that occurred at or prior to sentencing." Paulino v. U.S., 2010 WL 2545547, *2 (W.D.Pa. June 21, 2010) (citations omitted). "In order to prevail on a §2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence, a Petitioner must show '(1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid.'" U.S. v. Bates, 2008 WL 80048, *2 (M.D.Pa. Jan. 7, 2008) (quoting Mallet v. U.S., 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6^th Cir. 2003)). "The petitioner bears the burden of proof under §2255 and must demonstrate his right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." U.S. v. Ayers, 938 F.Supp.2d 108, 112 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted). Braddy's instant claims fall within the purview of §2255 since they challenge the effectiveness of his counsel. Bates, 2008 WL 80048, *3 ("Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be brought in the first instance by way of a §2255 motion regardless of whether the movant could have asserted the claim on direct appeal.") (citing Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690(2003)).

Additionally, "Section 2255 does not afford a remedy for all errors that may have been made at trial or during sentencing", "[r]ather, Section 2255 is implicated only when the alleged error raises 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Williams v. United States, 2016 WL 6892375, *2 (M.D.Pa. Nov. 22, 2016) (internal citations omitted).

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant "the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) established a two-prong test to evaluate the effectiveness of the assistance of counsel. In the first prong, the defendant must show "that counsel's performance was deficient," id., 687, and must prove this by "showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. In addition, the defendant must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id., 687-88.

A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be consideredsound trial strategy.

Id., 689.

In the second prong, a defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance "prejudiced the defense," because "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id., 687. "It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, cf. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 866-867 (1982), and not every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding." Id., 693. Rather, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id., 694. Thus, to state a successful claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must show "both that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (2003). "A failure to make the required showing on either prong defeats a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Ayers, 938 F.Supp.2d at 113 (citing in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700).

III. DISCUSSION

This court has jurisdiction over Braddy's motion under §2255 pursuantto pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 2241.

In his §2255 Motion, Braddy raises six claims, essentially alleging that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during his trial and his appeal. The court will address Braddy's claims seriatim.

1. Claim One

Braddy claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the district court violated his right to self-representation and that the court failed to conduct a Faretta inquiry. Braddy also contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue regarding his right to self-representation in his appeal.

In its July 7, 2016 Memorandum, (Doc. 554), the court thoroughly discussed Braddy's claim that he was entitled to a new trial because he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. (Doc. 548). In his instant motion, as in his motion for a new trial, Braddy argues that he requested to represent himself, but the court failed to conduct a Faretta inquiry to determine whether or not he properly waived his right to counsel.² See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).

In the context of his motion for a new trial, the court denied Braddy's motion on the Sixth Amendment ground. The court, found, after an extensiveanalysis, that Braddy's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was not violated. Now, Braddy is basically trying to re-litigate the same issue only couched in terms of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As the government points out, "[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be used to indirectly challenge prior rulings [in a case]." In United States v. Green, 2016 WL 11201635, *3 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 9, 2016), the court stated that "Section 2255 generally may not be employed to relitigate questions which were raised and considered on direct appeal," as those claims have been decided as a matter of law." (citing United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993) (Third Circuit noted that post-conviction motion to vacate sentence could not be used to re-litigate questions that were "raised and considered" on direct appeal or in motion for new trial); United States v. Orejuela, 639 F.2d 1055, 1057 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Once a legal argument has been litigated and decided adversely to a criminal defendant at his trial and on direct appeal, it is within the discretion of the district court to decline to reconsider those arguments if raised again in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §2255.")). Further, Braddy cannot use his "§2255 motion as a vehicle for contesting portions of the district court's decision [denying his motion for a new trial]." United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d at 105 n.4. The court also notes that Braddy could have raised his Sixth Amendment claim in his direct appeal to the Third Circuit but did not do so. (See Doc. 627-1).

Since this...