Bradley v. Dentalans.com

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DEBORAH BRADLEY, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, . Plaintiff, v. DENTALPLANS.COM et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 20-1094-BAH

United States District Court, D. Maryland

June 6, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Brendan A. Hurson, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Deborah Bradley (“Plaintiff') brings this case on behalf of herself and others similarly situated against Defendants DentalPlans.com (“DentalPlans”) and Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company (“Cigna”) (collectively “Defendants”). ECF 42. Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs motion for class certification, ECF 107,^[1] and DentalPlans's motion for summary judgment, ECF 116. The parties have fully briefed each motion and have provided exhibits supporting their memoranda of law.^[2] See ECFs 111, 121, 113, 115, 124 127, 129. On April 29, 2024, Plaintiff and DentalPlans were ordered to submit additional briefing regarding the motion for summary judgment. ECF 133. Plaintiff and DentalPlans responded. ECFs 136, 137. The Court has reviewed all relevant filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). Accordingly, for the reasons stated below Plaintiffs motion for class certification, ECF 107, is GRANTED, and DentalPlans's motion for summary judgment, ECF 116, is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

DentalPlans operates a “direct-to-consumer marketplace” that sells “dental savings plans” that allow customers to receive discounts on dental treatments. ECF 116-1, at 7; ECF 111-4, at 3. At least one of these dental savings plans is provided by Cigna. See ECF 111-11 (Cigna dental savings plan membership agreement). Plaintiff placed a call to DentalPlans in November 2018, intending to sign up for a dental savings plan. ECF 124-9, at 2. The representative to whom Plaintiff spoke confirmed Plaintiffs phone number and then asked Plaintiff if she consented to .DentalPlans “contacting] [her] with an automatic dialing system or a prerecorded message.” ECF 113-2; ECF 111, at 21. Plaintiff requested clarification, asking about the. purpose of the automated calls. ECF 113-2; ECF 111, at 21. “The representative responded, ‘to keep you updated with any plan information,' and confirmed that only DentalPlans would be calling.” ECF 111, at 21 (quoting ECF 113-2, at 4). Plaintiff agreed to receive the calls as described by the representative. Id.; ECF 113-2, at 4. Plaintiff proceeded to successfully sign up for a Cigna dental discount plan through DentalPlans during the phone call. ECF 124-9, at 2.

The representative to whom Plaintiff spoke during this initial sign-up process utilized a sales script during the call. See ECF 111, at 19; ECF 113-1, at 11-12. The script calls for DentalPlans's agents to (1) “collect[] the consumer's name and telephone number,”; then (2) ask if the caller would “like to receive plan updates and promotions via text message”; before (3) asking for the caller's consent to “contact [them] using an[] automated telephonic dialing system and/or prerecorded message”; and finally, (4) informing the caller that they “are not required to agree as a condition of purchasing any products and or services.” ECF 111, at 19 (quoting ECF 113-1, at 11-12). This script is used by DentalPlans for all incoming calls from non-customers, though the actual conversations vary naturally depending on the caller's response. Id.

Nearly a year after Plaintiff s initial call to DentalPlans, in September 2019, Plaintiff called DentalPlans again to inquire about the specifics of her plan. ECF 116-1, at 28; ECF 113-4, at 3-23. While on the phone, the DentalPlans representative discussed the potential renewal of Plaintiff s plan. ECF 113-4, at 16-20. Plaintiff explained that she did not want her plan to auto-renew, and the agent told her she would be notified before her plan expired. Id. This is the last phone call Plaintiff had with any live person at DentalPlans. See ECF 113-5, at 2 (log of calls between DentalPlans and Plaintiff showing that Plaintiff did not speak with any other agents).

As Plaintiffs plan's expiration date grew near, DentalPlans began placing calls to her phone using a prerecorded voice to inform her that her membership was ending soon and that she could renew her plan. See ECF 124, at 13; ECF 113-5, at 2 (showing log of calls made to Plaintiff using machine); ECF 124-9, at 2 (“DentalPlans has called my cell phone number dozens of times with prerecorded-voice messages[] to try to get us to reup or renew the Cigna plan.”). Plaintiff chose not to renew her plan and ignored the calls. ECF 129-10, at 8. Her plan expired on December 1,2019. Id.

Plaintiff continued to receive prerecorded calls from DentalPlans after her plan expired. ECF 113-5, at 2 (showing calls placed to Plaintiffs number after December 1,2019). These calls, characterized by DentalPlans as “winback” calls, attempted to “win back” Plaintiff s business by . .encouraging her to repurchase her Cigna plan with DentalPlans. See ECF 111 -4, at 14 (“Winback . is, their plan has expired, and we're contacting them to renew their plan after expiration,”). According to DentalPlans's records, Plaintiff received ten of these calls between December 3, 2019, and February 26,2020, when the calls stopped. ECF 113-5, at 2. DentalPlans estimates that it placed winback calls to 57,240 former customers during the time period relevant to this case. ECF 113-3, at 6.

Plaintiff grew increasingly frustrated with the prerecorded calls from DentalPlans. ECF 111-2, at 5. Ultimately, she filed this lawsuit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, alleging that Defendants had violated the statute by placing unauthorized telemarketing calls to her and the proposed class of former DentalPlans customers.^[3]ECF 43.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

“When a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion for Class Certification are both pending in a case, the Court has discretion to decide the question of summary judgment before reaching the issue of class certification.” Ginwright v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 280 F.Supp.3d 674, 679 (D. Md. 2017). Because the analysis of the summary judgment motion “sheds light on issues relevant to the disposition” of the motion for class certification, the Court will consider the motion for summary judgment first. See id. at 679-80.

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).

“Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine factual dispute exists.” Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Jireh House, Inc., 603 F.Supp.3d 369,373 (E.D. Va. 2022) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986)). “A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718F.3d308,313 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp, of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986)). Accordingly, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).

The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and .draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650,657 (2014) (per curiam); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007), and the Court “may not make credibility . determinations or weigh the evidence,” Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 603 F.Supp.3d at 373 (citing Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007)). For this reason, summary judgment ordinarily is inappropriate when there is conflicting evidence because it is the function of the factfinder to resolve factual disputes, including matters of witness credibility. See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 442 (4th Cir. 2006); Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002).

At the same time, the Court must “prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774,778-79 (4th Cir. 2003)). “The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party as well as conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion.” Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 603 F.Supp.3d at 373 (citing Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. 2020)).

B. Motion for Class Certification

“In seeking class certification under Rule 23, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the requirements for class-wide adjudication have been met.” Krakauer v Dish Network, LLC, 925 F.3d 643,654 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27,33 (2013)). Rule 23 enumerates four “threshold requirements applicable to all class actions, commonly . referred to as ‘numerosity,' ‘commonality,' ‘typicality,' and ‘adequacy.'” Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)). The Fourth Circuit also reads into Rule 23 an implied requirement of “ascertainability,”...