Brady v. Brady

179 A.D.3d 1552

118 N.Y.S.3d 883

Myron O. BRADY, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Linda F. BRADY, Defendant–Appellant.

1315

CA 19–01273

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Entered: January 31, 2020

INCLIMA LAW FIRM, PLLC, ROCHESTER (CHARLES P. INCLIMA OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.

DIBBLE & MILLER, P.C., ROCHESTER (CRAIG D. CHARTIER OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF–RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, TROUTMAN, AND BANNISTER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff husband commenced this action seeking a divorce and, inter alia, a declaration regarding the parties' rights to their separate property in accordance with their prenuptial agreement (agreement). Defendant wife filed an amended answer with counterclaims, asserting, inter alia, that the agreement was unenforceable because it lacked consideration, was unconscionable and manifestly unfair, and was the product of duress, bad faith, and coercion. Subsequently, defendant, in essence, moved for summary judgment on her first and second counterclaims, seeking a declaration that the agreement was unenforceable on many of the grounds raised in those counterclaims, and also requested an order directing plaintiff to reacquire certain shares in Brady Farms, Inc. Defendant now appeals from an order denying her motion, and we affirm.

Contrary to defendant's contention, Supreme Court properly denied that part of her motion seeking a declaration inasmuch as she failed to sustain her initial burden of establishing that the agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law. Specifically, defendant failed to establish that the agreement was unenforceable due to lack of consideration inasmuch as the marriage itself was the consideration for the agreement (see De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 433, 117 N.E. 807 [1917] ; Rupert v. Rupert, 245 A.D.2d 1139, 1141, 667 N.Y.S.2d 537 [4th Dept. 1997], appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 661, 738 N.Y.S.2d 654, 764 N.E.2d 954 [2001], rearg. denied 97 N.Y.2d 726, 740 N.Y.S.2d 697, 767 N.E.2d 154 [2002] ). Further, "[a] duly executed [prenuptial] agreement is provided the same presumption of legality as any other contract" ( Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 231 A.D.2d 491, 491, 647 N.Y.S.2d 243 [2d Dept. 1996] ). Thus, where, as here, a prenuptial agreement has been signed by both parties and formally acknowledged, the agreement is presumed valid (see id. at 491–492, 647 N.Y.S.2d 243 ; see generally Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][3] ), and defendant had the burden to establish otherwise (see Carter v. Fairchild–Carter, 159 A.D.3d 1315, 1315–1316, 73 N.Y.S.3d 649 [3d Dept. 2018] ; Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 138 A.D.3d 30, 36, 25 N.Y.S.3d 90 [1st Dept. 2016], lv dismissed 27 N.Y.3d 1125, 36 N.Y.S.3d 880, 57 N.E.3d 73 [2016] ; Goldfarb, 231 A.D.2d at 492, 647 N.Y.S.2d 243 ). "Such agreements will be enforced absent proof of fraud, duress, overreaching or unconscionability" ( Carter, 159 A.D.3d at 1316, 73 N.Y.S.3d 649 ). Here, defendant failed to establish as a matter of law that the agreement was the product thereof (cf. Rabinovich v. Shevchenko, 93 A.D.3d 774, 775, 941 N.Y.S.2d 173 [2d Dept. 2012] ; see generally Bibeau v. Sudick, ...