Brady v. State Judiciary

1

CARLIA BRADY, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER, JOHN DOE 1-5 AND JOHN DOE ENTITY 1-5, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-07895

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

April 28, 2023

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GEORGETTE CASTNER, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court by way of a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants State of New Jersey Judiciary (the “State Judiciary”) and Chief Justice Stuart Rabner (“Chief Justice Rabner”) (collectively “Defendants”). (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff Carlia Brady opposed the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 29), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 30). The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides the motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, and for good cause shown, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are from Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.^[1] Plaintiff was appointed as a New Jersey Superior Court Judge approximately seven years before this action. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 21.) Several months after her appointment, Plaintiff was arrested based on allegations that she was harboring a fugitive from law enforcement. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.)

On May 13,2015, Plaintiff was indicted on one count of second-degree official misconduct and two counts of third-degree hindering the apprehension or prosecution of another. (Id. ¶ 6.) The official misconduct charge was dismissed by the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division on March 1, 2016. (Id. ¶ 7.) The Appellate Division confirmed the dismissal of that charge on September 11, 2017. (Id. ¶ 8.) The remaining two counts of third-degree hindering the apprehension or prosecution of another were dismissed by the State on March 2, 2018. (Id. ¶ 9.)

As a result of her arrest and indictment, Plaintiff was suspended from her position as a Superior Court Judge from June 12 2013 to March 5, 2018. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff was not paid during her roughly five-year suspension. (Id.) Plaintiff was reinstated to active duty as a Superior Court Judge on March 6, 2018. (Id. ¶ 12.) Shortly thereafter, on May 4, 2018, the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) filed a disciplinary Complaint that charged Plaintiff with violating several canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct related to the dismissed criminal charges. (Id. ¶ 14.) On September 16, 2019, the ACJC concluded that Plaintiff had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended that she be removed from office. (Id. ¶16.)

On August 6, 2020, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the ACJC's findings that Plaintiff had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, but decided to suspend Plaintiff from her position as a Superior Court Judge for three months instead of removing her from office. (Id. ¶ 17.)

Plaintiff filed her initial complaint in this action on April 1, 2021, and an Amended Complaint on January 12, 2022. The action is against the State Judiciary and Chief Justice Rabner to “compel compliance with N.J. Const. Art. VI., § 6, Para. 6. (prohibiting a diminution of judicial salaries) and U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1 (prohibiting state deprivation of property without due process of law),” and to recover backpay for the five-year period when she was suspended from the bench. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.)

Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (“MTD,” ECF No. 27-1.) Plaintiff opposed Defendants' Motion (Opp'n, ECF No. 29), and Defendants submitted a Reply (Reply, ECF No. 30).

IL LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move at any time to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on either facial or factual grounds. Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).

A facial challenge asserts that “the complaint, on its face, does not allege sufficient grounds to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co. 67 F.Supp.2d 424, 438 (D.N.J. 1999). In analyzing a facial challenge, a court “must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould Electronics Inc., 220 F.3d at 176. “A court considering a facial challenge construes the allegations in the complaint as true and determines whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Arosa Solar Energy Sys., Inc. v. Solar, Civ. No. 18-1340, 2021 WL 1196405, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2021).

A factual challenge, on the other hand, “attacks allegations underlying the assertion of jurisdiction in the complaint, and it allows the defendant to present competing facts.” Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016). The “trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case” and “the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). “Therefore, a 12(b)(1) factual challenge strips the plaintiff of the protections and factual deference provided under 12(b)(6) review.” Hartig Drug Co., 836 F.3d at 268. Regardless of the type of challenge, the plaintiff bears the “burden of proving that the court has subject matter jurisdiction.” Cottrell v. Heritages Dairy Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 09-1743, 2010 WL 3908567, at *2 (D.N.J. Sep. 30, 2010) (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of a proceeding for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . including lack of jurisdiction due to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Nemeth v. Office of the Clerk of the N.J Superior Court, Civ. No. 19-16809, 2020 WL 2537754, at *2 (D.N.J. May 19, 2020). State sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment “is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.” Wright V. New Jersey/Dep 't of Educ., 115 F.Supp.3d 490, 494 (D.N.J. 2015). Once a challenge to jurisdiction is raised under Rule 12(b)(1), Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. See McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs Claims Against the State Judiciary and Chief Justice Rabner in His Official Capacity

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint asks this Court to direct Defendants “to adhere to N.J. Const. Art. VI., § 6, Para. 6 as well as U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1, and remit Plaintiffs backpay of salary” pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 22.) Plaintiff asserts that her “Declaratory Judgment Action seeks only equitable and prospective relief. Specifically . . . Plaintiff seeks recovery of her judicial salary (i.e., equitable relief) and an injunction preventing the New Jersey Judiciary's ongoing wrongful interference with Plaintiff s right to the possession of her judicial salary (i.e., prospective relief).” (Opp'n 10.)

1- The State Judiciary

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.” U.S. Const, amend. XI. “Under the Eleventh Amendment, ‘an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by [its] own citizens.'” Hyatt v. Cty. of Passaic, 340 Fed.Appx. 833, 836 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)). Moreover, “the Amendment afford states and state agencies immunity from suits brought by citizens in federal court, regardless of whether legal or equitable relief is sought.” Bhimnathwala v. N.J. State Judiciary, Fam. Div., Civ. No. 19-21389, 2020 WL 7237947, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2020) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984)), aff'dsub nom., 858 Fed.Appx. 558 (3d Cir. 2021).

Critical here, the Eleventh Amendment protects not only states, but also state agencies and state officials acting in their official capacities, “as long as the state is the real party in interest.” Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989); see Shahin v. Delaware, 563 Fed.Appx. 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2014) (“A suit against the States, their agencies, and their employees acting in an official capacity is also barred, because it is merely another way of pleading an action against the state.”); Hyatt, 340 Fed.Appx. at 836 (“Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state entities and officials if‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest.'”) (citation omitted). “The party asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity ‘bears the burden of proving its applicability.'” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Christy v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1995)).

As noted, the Eleventh Amendment bars not only suits against states themselves, “but also suits for damages against ‘arms of the State'-entities that, by their very nature, are so intertwined with the State that any suit against them renders the State the ‘real, substantial party in interest.'” Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). For purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, the State Judiciary is an arm of the state. See Greene v. Cty. of Essex, Civ. No. 20-14723, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234302 at *12 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2022) (“[T]he New Jersey Judiciary ... [is] indisputably a component of the State of New Jersey and therefore entitled...