Braggs v. Dunn

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner ofthe Alabama Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO)

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

September 2, 2020

PHASE 2A OPINION AND ORDER ON MONITORING OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT REMEDY

Previously, this court found that the State of Alabama provides inadequate mental-health care in its prisons in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Braggs v. Dunn, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (M.D. Ala. 2019) (Thompson, J.); Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (Thompson, J.). The issue now before the court is the development of a plan to monitor compliance with the court's orders to remedy that constitutional violation. The court will adopt in large part the defendants' plan--substantial portions to which the plaintiffs have agreed--with some alterations. Most significantly, the court will adopt the defendants' overarching proposal that, in light of their own admission that they lack the capacity to self-monitor, outside experts will initially monitor compliance and will draw on their expertise to develop many of the details of the monitoring plan. See Defs.' Response (doc. no. 2295) at 14. Those outside experts will train and eventually hand control over to an internal monitoring team, building the capacity of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) to regulate itself. The court hopes that this monitoring scheme will help the ADOC attain timely, meaningful, and sustainable compliance with the court's remedial orders on mental-health care and bring this litigation to an end as soon as is reasonably possible.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs in this class-action lawsuit are ADOC inmates who have mental illness and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, which represents mentally ill inmates in Alabama. The defendants are the ADOC Commissioner and the ADOC Associate Commissioner of Health Services, who are both sued in only their official capacities. In a liability opinion, this court found that ADOC's mental-health care was, "[s]imply put, ... horrendously inadequate." Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1267. The court laid out seven factors contributing to the Eighth Amendment violation, in addition to the "overarching" problems of understaffing and overcrowding. Id. at 1267-68. After two months of mediation to develop a comprehensive remedial plan, it became apparent that the remedy was too large and complex to be addressed all at once. The court therefore severed the remedy into the various contributing factors, to be addressed seriatim. See Phase 2A Revised Scheduling Order (doc. no. 1357).

The court has now issued remedial opinions and orders regarding, among other things, understaffing, see Braggs v. Dunn, No. 2:14cv601-MHT, 2018 WL 985759 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 2018) (Thompson, J.), and inpatient treatment, see Braggs v. Dunn, No. 2:14cv601-MHT, 2020 WL 2789880 (M.D. Ala. May 29, 2020) (Thompson, J.). The court has also issued several remedial orders temporarily adopting the parties' stipulations regarding other contributing factors, see, e.g., Braggs, v. Dunn, No. 2:14cv601-MHT, 2018 WL 2168705 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 25, 2018). In March 2020, based on the parties' agreement that their stipulations temporarily satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), the court issued an interim injunction extending these orders until, at the latest, December 30, 2020. See Interim Injunction (doc. no. 2793). The issue of whether the stipulations satisfy the requirements of the PLRA beyond that date is set for a hearing in September, and the court will defer judgment as to whether the measures are warranted until that hearing has occurred.

Throughout the process of resolving each remedial issue, the question of monitoring compliance with the court's orders has repeatedly arisen. The issue of monitoring "raises important questions regarding, on the one hand, the duty of courts to avoid overly intruding into the executive matter of prison administration, and on the other hand, the duty of courts to ensure that the constitutional violations they find are effectively remedied in a timely fashion." Phase 2A Order on Monitoring (doc. no. 1927) at 2-3. In pursuit of the proper balance of these important interests, the court opted to resolve the issue of monitoring separately from all substantive remedial orders and on a global scale, rather than as to each individual order.¹ See id.

The court also suggested to the parties that the scheme for court monitoring should include not only 'external' monitoring by experts (an 'external-monitoring team' or EMT) but eventual 'internal' monitoring by ADOC itself (an 'internal-monitoring team' or IMT). In other words, for part of the period of monitoring, the court substituted internal monitoring for external monitoring. As explained in more detail later, the model would divide the traditional period of monitoring into three parts, bringing ADOC into the process earlier and in a more substantive role than usual. In the first phase, the EMT will assess and monitor ADOC's compliance with the court's remedial orders; next, the EMT, as part of its monitoring, will train the ADOC, through its IMT, how to monitor itself; and, finally, ADOC, through its IMT, will monitor itself.

The court adopted this model in the hope that it would facilitate a more effective, less intrusive process and avoid an indeterminate period of external monitoring. External monitoring and internal monitoring complement each other: external monitors offer an outside perspective on ongoing issues, while internal monitors have more familiarity with and investment in the remediation efforts. External monitoring will also provide valuable information for ADOC, allowing it to more effectively implement its own system of internal monitoring.

The court further believed that self-monitoring would help ADOC develop internal buy-in, resulting in more active cooperation and timely compliance. This method invites ADOC to be directly involved in the monitoring effort, encouraging collaboration and investment in reform rather than an adversarial posture. The internal monitoring team will work with and learn from the external monitoring team, building ADOC'scapacity and making the eventual termination of court oversight more seamless.

Finally, in light of the fact that the ultimate goal of this litigation is not just monitoring of ADOC but adequate monitoring by ADOC, this model should build ADOC's internal capacity and help it sustain compliance over the long term. Ultimately, the court hopes that this hybrid monitoring process will finally bring to an end the history of repeated litigation ADOC has confronted over its mental-health care since the 1970s, as described in the final section of this opinion. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants have agreed to this model, should the court order external monitoring.

When the court reached the monitoring issue, it first gave the defendants an opportunity to propose an overall plan and allowed the plaintiffs to respond. See Defs.' Proposed Monitoring Plan (doc. no. 2115); Pls.' Response (doc. no. 2133). The court then held a hearing on the defendants' proposed monitoring plan in which it heard testimony from plaintiffs' correctional psychiatryexpert Dr. Kathryn Burns; plaintiffs' correctional administration expert Eldon Vail; Executive Director of the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program James Tucker; ADOC Associate Commissioner for Health Services Ruth Naglich; ADOC Commissioner Jefferson Dunn; and four individuals the defendants proposed as the external monitoring team: Larry Linton, MargaRita Pauley, psychiatrist Dr. Robert Stern, and psychologist Dr. David Clayman.

In April 2019, following the hearing and the parties' subsequent briefing on the monitoring issue, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a findings letter regarding unsafe conditions in ADOC facilities, including due to understaffing, overcrowding, and violence. See DOJ Findings Letter (Pls.' Ex. 2739); SPLC Letter to Governor Ivey and Commissioner Dunn (doc. no. 2472). The parties subsequently filed a joint motion--which the court granted--to stay all matters under submission in this litigation, including the monitoring issue, for 90 days to allow the parties topursue a global resolution, via mediation, between the parties as well as with DOJ. See Joint Notice and Mot. to Stay (doc. no. 2560); Order (doc. no. 2569). This stay was twice extended upon joint motions of the parties to allow for further mediation. See Order (doc. no. 2608); Phase 2A Revised Scheduling Order (doc. no. 2720). On March 25, 2020, the parties informed the court during an on-the-record conference call that they had been unable to reach an agreement on the monitoring issue in their negotiations and that the issue was thus again submitted to the court for resolution. See Phase 2A Revised Scheduling Order (doc. no. 2784). Today's opinion fully resolves the remedial monitoring issue.

Though the remedies for all seven factors contributing to the constitutional violation have not yet been reduced to final orders with PLRA findings, and though there remain some additional remedial issues for resolution (for example, segregation and inpatient treatment), the court need not wait to issue those orders prior to resolving the monitoring issue. This is becausethe court's order today is not specific to any particular remedial measures in that it does not set up the means of measuring compliance; rather, the court's order establishes an overarching monitoring structure and scheme, the details of which the court leaves to be filled in by the experts, as both sides agree is appropriate.

II. THE MONITORING SCHEME

The parties are to be commended for reaching significant areas of agreement on the...