Bralo v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.

SERGE BRALO, Plaintiff, v. SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 13-60948-Civ-Brannon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

DATED: March 19, 2014

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Spirit Airline's ("Spirit") Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 38). Plaintiff Serge Bralo ("Bralo") filed a Response (DE 49), and Spirit, a Reply (DE 59). The Court denied Spirit's Motion prior to trial (DE 77). This Order memorializes the Court's ruling.

Bralo filed a four-count Complaint (DE 1) against Spirit in April 2013 following its termination of his employment in July 2012. Spirit seeks summary judgment on Count I (Family Medical Leave Act Interference), Count II (Family Medical Leave Act Retaliation), Count III (Americans with Disabilities Act Discrimination), and Count IV (Florida Civil Rights Act Discrimination). For the following reasons, Spirit's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

I. Undisputed Facts¹

Bralo worked for Spirit for approximately 14 years in various capacities, most recently as an aircraft maintenance supervisor. (DE 1). A core function of Bralo's maintenance supervisor position was ensuring passenger safety; in Bralo's words, "there's a lot of lives involved." (DE 38-4 at 8-9). The written job description for an aircraft maintenance supervisor identifies the "day to day execution and improvement of maintenance processes" as a main area of responsibility. (DE 38-3 at 1-2). Two "main purposes" of the position are "work[ing] collectively with Lead Mechanics to ensure maintenance is accomplished in compliance with Company policies and manuals" and "ensur[ing] Lead Mechanics are continuously surfacing and resolving issues that prevent the performance of work from being performed efficiently." (DE 38-3 at 1-2, 9-10). Bralo's job involved "eyes on" supervision to make sure his subordinates were performing their duties properly. (DE 38-4 at 10).

When necessary, Bralo acted as a working supervisor who worked alongside his subordinates, including climbing on and working off aircraft stands and in aircraft compartments, frequently walking, climbing ladders, bending, stooping under aircraftengines, walking up and down aircraft, standing, and lifting up to 50 pounds. (DE 38-3 at 1-2, 5-6; DE 38-4 at 8-10, 28-29).

Spirit maintenance supervisors and aircraft mechanics must be FAA certified in airframe and powerplant maintenance. (DE 38-3 at 1, 4). Bralo, a Spirit maintenance supervisor, supervised approximately six aircraft mechanics. (DE 38-4 at 7). Bralo and his subordinates were responsible for servicing 45 to 60 planes every day, a situation Bralo described as "fast paced" and "quite a challenge," especially when any of his six subordinates was absent. (DE 38-4 at 7-8, 11). Whether Bralo would have to perform the physical aspects of his maintenance supervisor position was unpredictable, and Bralo would replicate physical aspects of his subordinates' work anywhere from 2-3 times per week to 2-3 times per day. (DE 38-4 at 8). Bralo's treating physician's assistant, Patricia Tucker, reported that Bralo's job "require[d] a lot of physical activity including climbing under equipment, etc.," causing her to delay her release of Bralo back to work because "returning is very likely to worsen his condition and cause a setback in his recovery." (DE 38-3 at 8; DE 38-4 at 29). The consequences of being short-staffed in the maintenance facility and delaying an airplane's departure included the possibility of customer complaints, FAA fines, and citations. (DE 38-4 at 10-11).

Bralo knew from his management training that Spirit outsourced its FMLA leave functions to Aetna Life Insurance Company ("Aetna"), and Bralo knew how to—and did— self-initiate a request for FMLA leave with Aetna in March 2012. (DE 38-4 at 13-14). Aetna approved Bralo for FMLA leave from March 2 to May 4, 2012. (DE 38-4 at 18).² On March 8 and 12, 2012, Dora Nails, an Aetna Benefits Coordinator, sent Bralo FMLA noticesexplaining his FMLA benefits and rights. (DE 38-3 at 16-33). On March 27, 2012, Aetna retroactively approved Bralo's FMLA leave request from March 2 to March 25, 2012 and sent him another FMLA determination notice. (DE 38-3 at 34-35; DE 38-4 at 15). On April 30, 2012, Aetna approved an extension of Bralo's FMLA leave to May 4, 2012, and sent him a FMLA extension determination notice advising that (1) he might be required to provide a fitness-for-duty certification before being allowed to return to work, and (2) if he did not return to work at the end of his authorized FMLA leave, he might be terminated. (DE 38-3, at 36-37; DE 38-4 at 116). That same day, Bralo called Aetna and confirmed that he would return to work on May 5, 2012. (DE 38-3 at 38). Bralo never asked Aetna for any FMLA leave beyond May 4, 2012. (DE 38-4 at 3, 17).

On May 4, 2012, Ms. Tucker faxed a doctor's note³ to Spirit's leave coordinator, Aggie Lang. (DE 38-3 at 39; DE 38-4, at 19, 38). Bralo did not return to work on May 5, 2012. (DE 38-3 at 39; DE 38-4 at 18). Bralo believed he would get additional FMLA leave automatically and without a request so long as he provided detailed medical records. (DE 38-4 at 16, 36)

On May 14, 2012, Ms. Tucker faxed a second doctor's note to Spirit which stated "Serge may return to work 5/20/12 @ limited duty; reduce schedule to accommodate physical therapy; lifting limited to 201bs; avoid repetitive bending/stooping." (DE 38-3 at 40; DE 38-4 at 4-5, 38). This note did not specify the duration or frequency of Bralo's physical restrictions or the time needed for physical therapy; it contained no description of any medical condition, nor did it identify Bralo's then-current diagnosis or physical evaluation; it did not relate any medical condition to or explain the medical necessity for Bralo's past or future leaves ofabsence or describe any medical condition. (DE 38-4 at 21, 22-23, 29). Bralo did not return to work on May 20, 2012, or at any time thereafter. (DE 38-3 at 38; DE 38-4 at 21, 24). Spirit had no medical information regarding Bralo's need for leave or need for accommodation other than the May 4 and May 14, 2012, doctor's notes. (DE 38-4 at 19, 20, 22, 38).

In mid-June, Ms. Lang sent Bralo a letter requesting documentation (1) supporting his leave from May 5 to May 14, (2) identifying the FMLA deficiencies in the May 14 doctor's note, (3) requesting a completed fitness-for-duty certification, and (4) warning Bralo that his failure to provide the medical information "may result in the termination of your employment." (DE 38-3 at 41-44; DE 38-4 at 25). Ms. Lang's letter sought the same medical information requested by and provided to the EEOC and the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity by Bralo's counsel. (DE 38-3. at 47-59; DE 38-4 at 34-35). The request for a fitness-for-duty certification was pursuant to Spirit's uniform practice to seek such certifications in any case where it appears the employee may not be able to perform essential job functions. (DE 38-4 at 39).

Bralo did not send Ms. Lang's letter to his physicians or ask his physicians to provide the requested medical information. (DE 38-4 at 25). Instead, Bralo's counsel wrote to Ms. Lang on June 21, 2012, requesting an extension of time within which to "fully respond" to the June 14 request for medical information. (DE 38-3 at 57-59; DE 38-4 at 26-27).

On June 25, 2012, Ms. Lang left Bralo a voicemail giving him an extension of time to June 29, 2012, to respond to her June 14 request for medical information. (DE 38-3 at 56-60; DE 38-4 at 30-31, 32, 39). On June 28 and 29, 2012, Ms. Lang called Bralo to reiterate the deadline. (DE 38-4 at 31, 39). Neither Bralo nor his attorney ever provided the medicalinformation requested. (DE 38-4 at 31; 34; 39). Bralo felt it was Spirit's obligation to find an accommodation for his physical restrictions. (DE 38-4 at 22-23).

By letter dated July 3, 2012, Spirit terminated Bralo's employment for failing to engage in the interactive process and provide requested medical information. (DE 38-3 at 45-46). Ms. Lang was the sole decision maker regarding Bralo's termination. (DE 38-4 at 40). Bralo has no personal knowledge that he was terminated for any reason other than those stated in Ms. Lang's July 3, 2012, letter. (DE 38-4 at 33).

Finally, for at least the last year of his employment with Spirit, the only residential address Bralo provided to Spirit was 302 Lighthouse Drive, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, 33410. (DE 38-4 at 40). Spirit sent Bralo his 2012 W-2 to that address; Bralo received that W-2 and used it to file his 2012 tax returns, along with his 2011 year-end investment account statement (issued in 2012), and his 2011 credit-union year-end interest income statement. (DE 38-3 at 61-64).

II. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If there is a genuine dispute as to any material facts, those "most be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). There is only a genuine issue of fact for trial when the record, taken as a whole, would "lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

B. Count 1: FMLA Interference

Spirit's motion is denied as to Count 1 because there is a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Bralo was denied an FMLA benefit to which he was entitled. Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199, 1206-7 (11th Cir. 2001).

An employee seeking FMLA leave "must communicate the reason for leave to the employer"—"unless the employer already knows that the employee has an FMLA-approved reason for leave." Lee v. U.S. Steel Corp., 450 F....