Brandon v. Bd. of Educ.

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WANDA BRANDON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:22-cv-00635-SRC

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

June 21, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STEPHEN R. CLARK, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COVID-related restrictions continue to abate, but for some, the socioeconomic and legal fallout remains. Restrictions impermissibly infringing on constitutional rights, like the right to freely exercise one's religion, spread across the country like a virus, as evidenced by the number of court decisions finding them unconstitutional. But for this virus a cure exists: the federal courts stand open to ensure “steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws” when plaintiffs seek to vindicate constitutional and statutory rights that may have suffered invasion see The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Forty-three educators and school staff members seek that vindication here. Against the school board, the superintendent, and the chief of human resources, these Plaintiffs raise multiple federal and state-law claims challenging the implementation of a vaccination policy. Defendants move to dismiss all claims.

I. Background

The Court accepts the following well-pleaded facts of the amended complaint as true for purposes of deciding the motion to dismiss. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Plaintiffs are 43 current and former employees of the St. Louis Public School District- some of whom are certified teachers and some of whom are not-who each object to receiving COVID-19 vaccines for religious reasons. Doc. 24 at ¶¶ 1, 12-54. Plaintiffs name as Defendants: the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis; Kelvin Adams, who was at all relevant times the Superintendent of the St. Louis Public School District; and Charles Burton, who was at all relevant times the Chief Human Resources Officer for the St. Louis Public School District. Id. at ¶¶ 55-57. Defendants (collectively “the District”) “are responsible for creating, adopting, approving, ratifying, and enforcing the policies . . . of [the] Board.” Id. at ¶ 58.

Defendant Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, a body corporate under the laws of Missouri that operates the St. Louis Public School District, has the authority to make rules for the regulation and management of the public schools. Id. at ¶ 61 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 162.621). In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board of Education exercised its statutory authority by adopting a policy in August of 2021 requiring all employees and staff either to receive a COVID-19 vaccination or to obtain an exemption by October 15, 2021. Id. at ¶ 59. That policy reads, in part,

By October 15, 2021, all individuals covered by this policy must either (a) establish that they are fully vaccinated, including timely receipt of all booster vaccine doses recommended by the CDC; or (b) obtain an approved exemption as an accommodation as set forth below. Covered individuals who do not fulfill one of these two requirements by October 15, 2021 shall be placed on unpaid leave and/or subject to discipline, up to and including termination. Individuals covered under this policy that [sic] obtain an approved exemption shall be subject to COVID-19 testing on Monday and Thursday each week.

Id. at ¶ 59 (emphasis omitted); Doc. 24-1 at p. 1.

The Policy also explained the exemption-application process for individuals seeking accommodations based on a disability, a medical condition, or religious beliefs. As to religiousbased exemptions, the Policy explained:

The District provides reasonable accommodations, absent undue hardship, to employees with sincerely held religious beliefs, observances, or practices that conflict with getting vaccinated. If you believe you need an accommodation regarding this policy because of a sincerely held religious belief, you are responsible for requesting a reasonable accommodation from the Human Resources Department. You must use and submit the form(s) provided by the District in order to be eligible for an exemption.

Doc. 24 at ¶ 64; Doc. 24-1 at p. 2. The Policy contemplates that individuals who obtained an exemption would continue to work as normal, “subject to COVID-19 testing” twice a week. Doc. 24 at ¶ 65; Doc. 24-1 at p. 1. The District granted the majority-i.e., between 40 and 50- of all exemption requests based on disabilities and medical conditions. Id. at ¶ 79-80. Those who received these exemptions continued working subject to the testing requirement, except that the District allegedly did not require testing until weeks after it granted the exemptions. Id. at ¶ 81-82, 138.

In contrast, the District denied all requests for religious exemptions. Id. at ¶¶ 71-72. Because of their sincerely held religious beliefs, Plaintiffs object to receiving COVID-19 vaccines that “used fetal cell line[s]” derived from the tissue of aborted fetuses in their research-and-development or production stages. Id. at ¶¶ 114-15. As it happened, all available vaccines at the time allegedly used such cell lines, so Plaintiffs sought exemptions. Id. at ¶ 115. The District received between 150 and 200 religious-exemption requests-and categorically denied all of them, apparently without the benefit of individualized review. Id. at ¶¶ 71-72, 78, 87.

Burton, the Chief Human Resources Officer, and Karla Dozier, Director of Employee Relations, allegedly decided to deny all requests for religious exemptions, Id. at ¶ 78, even though Adams, the Superintendent, had previously asserted at a Board meeting that the human resources department would review all religious-exemption requests “on an individual basis,” Id. at ¶ 86. After submitting requests, Plaintiffs received substantially identical “Religious Vaccine Exemption Response” letters in September of 2021. The letters stated, in relevant part:

As a public entity, the St. Louis Public School District . . . must balance the constitutional obligation to provide a free public education to “all persons in this state within ages not in excess of twenty-one years . . .,” against the individual state and federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. Art. IX, Sec 1(a), Mo. Const.... [T]here is insufficient information for the District to grant your request for a sincerely held religious exemption. In addition, the balance of competing constitutional interests weigh in favor of the rights of students ineligible to receive the vaccine. At this time, this decision is not subject to review; however, the District may consider additional information not previously presented with the original exemption request.

Id. at ¶ 99; Doc. 24-4 (second ellipsis and underline in original). The District eventually suspended without pay and/or terminated between 100 and 127 of those who applied for a religious exemption because they continued to refuse to receive vaccines after the District denied their requests. Id. at ¶ 127. Defendant Adams allegedly issued statements of charges against the teacher-Plaintiffs beginning on October 15, 2021, “indicating he was suspending them without pay and was seeking their termination with the board.” Doc. 24 at ¶ 129. In October of 2021, the District terminated the Plaintiffs who were not certified teachers as well. Id. at ¶ 134. The District denied the religious-exemption requests of Plaintiffs Wendy Huddleston and Jamell Wren but later granted them medical accommodations. Id. at ¶ 135.

In January of 2022, the District changed course and granted “most” of the religiousexemption requests. Id. at ¶ 145. The District sent to each teacher-Plaintiff whom the District suspended without pay a letter titled “Exemption Approval, Return to Work, and New Statement of Charges” indicating that the District was “now able to grant your request for sincerely held religious exemption.” Id. at ¶ 146. The District sent to each non-certified Plaintiff, whom the District terminated, a letter titled “Exemption Approval and Reappointment.” Id. at 148. The District re-hired all non-certified Plaintiffs except Angel Scott and Tomeka Slaughter. Id. at ¶ 150. The District did not pay teacher-Plaintiffs during their suspension, nor did it back-pay the rehired, non-certified Plaintiffs from the date of their termination to the date of their reappointment. Id. at ¶¶ 147, 149.

II. Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to give “a short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” To meet this standard and to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). This requirement of facial plausibility means the factual content of the plaintiff's allegations must “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co., 911 F.3d 505, 512 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The Court must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2010).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must liberally construe a complaint in favor of the plaintiff. Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 862 (8th Cir. 2010). However, if a claim fails to allege one of the elements necessary to recovery on a legal theory, the Court must dismiss that claim...