Brandon v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Elections

921 F.3d 194

Lewis A. BRANDON III; Joyce Johnson; Nelson Johnson ; Richard Alan Koritz; Sandra Self Koritz; Charli Mae Sykes; Maurice Warren II; Georgeanna Butler Womack, Plaintiffs - Appellants,andThe City of Greensboro, Plaintiff,

v. GUILFORD COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Defendant - Appellee,andMelvin Alston; Jean Brown; Hurley Derrickson; Stephen Golimowski; Wayne Goodson; Sharon Kasica; Jim Kee ; William Clark Porter; Earl Jones, Defendants,andRobert A. Rucho; Wade Trudy ; John Faircloth; Jon Hardister; Charles E. Jeter; Tim Moore; David Lewis; Erika Churchill, Respondents.

No. 18-1123

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: October 30, 2018

Decided: April 15, 2019

ARGUED: Allison J. Riggs, SOUTHERN COALITION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellants. J. Mark Payne, GUILFORD COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jaclyn A. Maffetore, SOUTHERN COALITION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellants. Taniya D. Reaves, GUILFORD COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Alan W. Duncan, Stephen M. Russell, Jr., MULLINS DUNCAN HARRELL & RUSSELL, PLLC, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Thacker joined. Judge Richardson wrote a dissenting opinion.

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

After eight voting citizens of Greensboro, North Carolina, ("Citizens") prevailed in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Guilford County Board of Elections, successfully challenging as unconstitutional a 2015 state law that redrew Greensboro City Council districts and obtaining a permanent injunction against the County Board’s enforcement of the law, they filed a motion for attorney’s fees, expert fees, and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e). The district court denied their motion, however, concluding that "special circumstances" justified the denial of fees because the County Board, even though responsible for enforcing the unconstitutional law, had no hand in enacting the law and did not defend it during the litigation. The court reasoned that because the County Board was an "innocent" or "non-responsible" party and the Citizens should have sued the State of North Carolina, any award assessed against the County Board would be "unjust."

The Citizens filed this appeal, arguing that the district court erred in denying their motion based on the County Board’s "innocence" or "non-responsibility." The Citizens point out that they were the prevailing party, having succeeded in demonstrating that the redistricting law was unconstitutional and in obtaining full relief with the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting the County Board’s enforcement of the law. They argue that under established precedent, a party enjoined from enforcing an unconstitutional law, even if it did not enact or defend the law, is legally responsible for attorney’s fees under § 1988 and § 10310(e). See Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes , 491 U.S. 754, 763, 109 S.Ct. 2732, 105 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (noting that "the party legally responsible for relief on the merits" is "clearly the party who should ... bear fee liability under § 1988" (emphasis added) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 164, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) )).

We agree with the Citizens. Civil rights fee-shifting statutes, such as those at issue here, are not meant to punish defendants for a lack of innocence or good faith but rather to "compensate civil rights attorneys who bring civil rights cases and win them." Lefemine v. Wideman , 758 F.3d 551, 557 (4th Cir. 2014). "Innocence" or a "lack of responsibility" for the enactment of an unconstitutional law is therefore not an appropriate criterion to justify denying a fee award against the party responsible for and enjoined from enforcing the unconstitutional law. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order denying the Citizens’ motion for attorney’s fees, expert fees, and costs and remand for the determination of an appropriate fee award.

I

The City of Greensboro and eight of its voting Citizens^* commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of a state-enacted local law — 2015 N.C. Session Law 138 ("the Redistricting Act") — that (1) changed Greensboro’s City Council from three at-large and five single-district members to eight single-district members; (2) drew the boundaries of the eight new districts; and (3) prohibited City Council or citizen-led referendums or initiatives from altering the structure of the City’s government. The plaintiffs named the Guilford County Board of Elections as the defendant, as the County Board was responsible for conducting municipal elections in Greensboro and had the duty of enforcing the Redistricting Act, making it a necessary party to any action challenging enforcement of the Act. See Wright v. North Carolina , 787 F.3d 256, 262–63 (4th Cir. 2015). In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the Redistricting Act violated the Equal Protection Clause and sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement. They did not, however, name the North Carolina General Assembly and the North Carolina Attorney General as defendants, believing them to be immune under the Eleventh Amendment, but those state representatives had notice of the action and chose not to intervene.

A month after this action was commenced, several Greensboro residents filed a motion to intervene as defendants to support the Redistricting Act, and the district court granted their motion. Several months later, these defendant-intervenors filed a motion to dismiss the action for failure to join necessary parties or, in the alternative, to require that those parties be joined, contending that the State of North Carolina, the North Carolina State Board of Elections, the State Board’s Executive Director, and the Governor were all necessary parties. Both the City of Greensboro and the Citizens opposed the motion, arguing that all of the parties sought to be joined were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and that none were necessary for the relief sought. The County Board took no position on the motion. The district court denied the motion, concluding that "while some of these persons and entities might well be proper parties ... none [were] necessary parties." The defendant-intervenors subsequently filed a motion to withdraw from the litigation, and the court granted their motion.

Following a bench trial, during which the County Board took no position on the constitutionality of the Redistricting Act, the district court found that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause and, by order dated April 13, 2017, permanently enjoined the County Board from enforcing it.

As prevailing parties, the eight Citizens, but not the City of Greensboro, then filed a motion under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e) for an award of attorney’s fees, expert fees, and costs. Following briefing, the district court denied the motion. The court, recognizing that prevailing parties "should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust," quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), concluded that this case presented "special circumstances" because the County Board neither enacted nor defended the unconstitutional law and was thus, in the court’s view, "an innocent party" in "key ways." The court also noted that the Citizens did not sue the State of North Carolina, which the court considered "the responsible entity here." Faced with the "dilemma" of having to "choose between two bad options — assessing attorney’s fees against a litigant who neither enacted nor defended the unconstitutional Act, or denying a fee award to the individual plaintiffs and their lawyers who prevailed on the merits of two equal protection claims, vindicating important constitutional rights" — the court elected to favor the County Board, concluding that "it would be unjust to require the County Board to pay the individual plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees." The court reasoned that "[a]n award of attorney’s fees against a defendant who was not responsible and did not defend the Act would, in these circumstances, provide a perverse incentive to plaintiffs to avoid suing responsible entities in favor of a non-responsible entity, especially if that entity is unlikely to contest relief."

From the district court’s order dated January 3, 2018, denying the Citizens’ motion for fees, the Citizens filed this appeal.

II

In enacting the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, Congress created an exception to the "American Rule" that each party to a lawsuit bear its own attorney’s fees, doing so in furtherance of the policy of facilitating access to judicial process for the redress of civil rights grievances. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976). The Act provides accordingly that in any proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Similarly, in 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e), Congress provided that, for actions enforcing the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, a court "may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee, reasonable expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses as part of the costs." Because the language of § 1988 and § 10310(e) are "phrased in identical terms," we apply "the same rule of decision under both of them." Bly v. McLeod , 605 F.2d 134, 138–39 (4th Cir. 1979).

While both statutes include in the authorization for fees the permissive "may allow," the Supreme Court has held that a prevailing party should "ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee ...