Branham v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.

Page 762

225 F.Supp.2d 762

Frank BRANHAM, Bernice Dancy, Cherise Hubbard, Chris Jenkins, Terry Hill Martin, and Keith Rutledge, Plaintiffs, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a Delaware Corporation, Kevin Theon, Angela Weathersby, Judy Byrnes, Ed Miller, Rick Pitchard, Supervisor, and agents and employees of Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., Jointly and Severally, Defendants.

No. 01-CV-73784-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

September 27, 2002.

H. Wallace Parker, Satch U. Ejike, Bloomfield Hill, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Charles C. DeWitt, Jr., Cathleen C. Jansen, DeWitt, Balke, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This race/religious discrimination in employment action is presently before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed (1) due to their failure to exhaust administrative remedies, (2) because the statute of limitations has expired, and/or (3) by application of the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiffs have responded to Defendants' Motion, to which Response Defendants have replied.

Having reviewed and considered the parties' Briefs and supporting documents, and having discussed this matter with counsel for the parties at the Scheduling Conference held in this case, the Court has determined that oral argument is not necessary. Therefore, pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(e)(2), this matter will be decided "on the briefs." This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's ruling.

II. UNDISPUTED FACTS

A. THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY OF THE SIX PLAINTIFFS

All six Plaintiffs in this action, Frank Branham, Bernice Dancy, Cherise Hubbard, Chris Jenkins, Terry Hill Martin and Keith Rutledge are African-Americans who, at one time or another between 1996 and 1999 either worked for, or applied for work with, Defendant Home Depot, Inc.

Defendant Home Depot hired Plaintiff Frank Branham on May 25, 1998. His employment was terminated on December 8, 1999. Branham did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the MDCR regarding his termination.

Plaintiff Bernice Dancy was hired by Home Depot on February 26, 1996. Dancy resigned from Home Depot for "personal reasons" on April 3, 1997. Dancy did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the MDCR regarding her termination.

Plaintiff Cherise Hubbard was never employed by Home Depot. She claims that she applied for a job as a "Team Leader" with Home Depot and that Home Depot offered her the job, but three days later, on December 3, 1999, the offer of employment was rescinded because of her "personal commitment to a religion or religious practice." (See Complaint, ¶ 11(d).) Hubbard did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the MDCR regarding her termination.

Home Depot also never employed Plaintiff Chris Jenkins; Jenkins was employed by National Blinds & Wallpaper, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Home Depot. National Blinds hired Jenkins on January 14, 1999. Jenkins alleges that he was the victim of discrimination when his employer failed to promote him Jenkins filed a charge of discrimination against Home Depot with the MDCR on February 28, 2000. However, he voluntarily withdrew the charge on July 25, 2000. He never filed a charge against National Blinds.

Defendant Home Depot hired Plaintiff Terry Hill Martin on February 17, 1997. Martin's employment was terminated on August 11, 1997. Defendants allege that the reason for Martin's termination was job abandonment. Martin did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the MDCR regarding her termination.

Plaintiff Keith Rutledge was hired by Home Depot on March 25, 1997. Home Depot terminated Rutledge's employment on August 28, 1997 for a time clock violation. Rutledge did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the MDCR regarding his termination.

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case was originally filed in this Court on December 18, 2000. (See Defendants' Ex. 1). In their Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Home Depot and four individual Home Depot managers/supervisors discriminated against them in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. They also alleged a common law claim of "negligent supervision."

After filing their Complaint, however, Plaintiffs took no action whatsoever to prosecute their claims. Therefore, on May 15, 2001, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause, ordering Plaintiffs show good cause in writing as to why the action should not be dismissed for "lack of prosecution." (See Defendants' Ex. 2). Plaintiffs failed to respond to the Show Cause Order. As a result, on May 30, 2001, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint "without prejudice to the right, upon good cause shown, to reopen the action within thirty (30) days". (See Defendants' Ex. 3). Plaintiffs did not request to reopen the case within the thirty day time period designated by the Court and did not otherwise respond to the dismissal order.

Instead, three months later, on August 20, 2001, Plaintiffs re-filed the very same Complaint that this Court had dismissed in Oakland County Circuit Court. (See Defendants' Ex. 4). Defendants subsequently removed the action to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, and it was assigned to this Court in accordance with Local Rule 83.11.

Defendants now move for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiffs' claims are barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, because of the expiration of the period of limitations, and/or by application of the doctrine of res judicata.

III. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper "`if the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Three 1986 Supreme Court cases—Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)—ushered in a "new era" in the standards of review for a summary judgment motion. These cases, in the aggregate, lowered the movant's burden on a summary judgment motion.¹ According to the Celotex Court,

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

After reviewing the above trilogy, the Sixth Circuit established a series of principles to be applied to motions for summary judgment. They are summarized as follows:

* The movant must meet the initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" as to an essential element of the non-movant's case. This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.

* The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."

* The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.

* The trial court has more discretion than in the "old era" in evaluating the respondent's evidence. The respondent must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Further, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent's claim is plausible.

Betkerur v. Aultman Hospital Association, 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir.1996). See also, Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir.1989). The Court will apply the foregoing standards in deciding Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in this case.

B. PLAINTIFFS' TITLE VII CLAIMS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS MUST BE DISMISSED

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' Title VII claims against Defendants Theon, Weathersby, Byrnes, Miller and Pitchard must be dismissed. In Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir.1997), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, notwithstanding the language of Title VII, individual supervisors and managers, who do not otherwise qualify as "employers" may not be held liable under the Act.² Based upon an examination of the statutory scheme and remedial provisions of Title VII, the Wathen court concluded that Congress did not intend to provide for individual employee/supervisor liability under the federal statute. Rather, the court determined that the term "agent" was included in the statutory language merely "to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute." 115 F.3d at 406. See also, Hall v. State Farm Ins. Co., 18 F.Supp.2d 751, 760-61 (E.D.Mich.1998), aff'd, 1 Fed. Appx. 438, 2001 WL 45124 (6th Cir.2001) (unpublished decision).

The foregoing Sixth Circuit precedent establishes that Plaintiffs' Title VII claims against the individual Defendants are not legally cognizable. Therefore, these claims will be dismissed.

C. PLAINTIFFS' TITLE VII CLAIMS AGAINST HOME DEPOT ARE BARRED BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO EXHAUST THEIR...