Branson v. Buckner

1

IN RE ROBERT J. BRANSON, Petitioner, v. MICHELE BUCKNER, WARDEN, SOUTH CENTRAL CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Respondent.

No. SD38312

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Southern District, In Division

October 29, 2024

Original Proceeding in Habeas Corpus

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, JUDGE

Introduction

In 2018, Robert J. Branson pleaded guilty to child molestation in the first degree under section 566.067 and was sentenced to life imprisonment for that crime. At the time of Branson's offense, child molestation in the first degree was a class B felony unless the victim was less than 12 years of age and the defendant had a prior conviction of an offense under Chapter 566, inflicted serious physical injury, displayed a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument in a threatening manner, or committed the crime as part of a ritual or ceremony, in which case the offense was a class A felony. § 566.067 RSMo (2006). While the victim in Branson's case was a child under the age of 12, the State never, at any point in the litigation, alleged any fact that would enhance Branson's offense to a class A felony. Nevertheless, Branson pleaded guilty to the crime as a class A felony and was sentenced to life imprisonment.^[1] Branson now seeks a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his life sentence exceeded what was allowed by law because the State only alleged and Branson only admitted the necessary elements for a class B felony.

The State acknowledges that it is not aware of any evidence that would support enhancing Branson's offense to a class A felony and that the record does not contain any allegations of such evidence. Despite this, the State argues Branson's claim is procedurally defaulted because Branson failed to raise his claim in his post-conviction proceedings.

While normally a petitioner's failure to raise a claim in a direct appeal or in a post-conviction relief motion bars the petitioner from later raising the claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, narrow exceptions exist, including where one receives a greater sentence than that permitted by law. State ex rel. Osowski v. Purkett, 908 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Mo. banc 1995). That exception applies here. The State, at no point, alleged any fact that would enhance Branson's offense to a class A felony. Branson, at no point, acknowledged committing any act that would enhance Branson's offense to a class A felony. The offense Branson was charged with and pleaded guilty to was classified as a class B felony by statute and the trial court could only sentence Branson within the range of punishment for a class B sentence. We grant Branson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and vacate the judgment.

Background and Procedural History

Branson was charged with several sex crimes, including the "class A felony" of child molestation in the first degree. At the time of Branson's offenses, child molestation in the first degree was a class B felony unless:

(1) The actor has previously been convicted of an offense under this chapter or in the course thereof the actor inflicts serious physical injury, displays a deadly weapon or deadly instrument in a threatening manner, or the offense is committed as part of a ritual or ceremony, in which case the crime is a class A felony; or

(2) The victim is a child less than twelve years of age and:

(a) The actor has previously been convicted of an offense under this chapter; or

(b) In the course thereof the actor inflicts serious physical injury, displays a deadly weapon or deadly instrument in a threatening manner, or if the offense is committed as part of a ritual or ceremony, in which case, the crime is a class A felony and such person shall serve his or her term of imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole.

§ 566.067 RSMo (2006). Neither the felony information nor the probable cause statement alleged Branson was a prior offender, inflicted serious physical injury, displayed a weapon or deadly instrument, or committed the offense as part of a ritual or ceremony.

On the day Branson's case was scheduled for trial, the State and Branson entered into a plea agreement whereby the State agreed to drop a number of charges if Branson entered an Alford^[2] plea to one count of the class A felony of first-degree child molestation with a victim under 12 years of age and two counts of second-degree statutory rape.^[3] Branson accepted the plea agreement and pleaded guilty to those charges.

At the plea hearing, Branson testified he understood he was pleading guilty to one count of first-degree child molestation with a range of punishment being 10 to 30 years in prison or life in prison. The State offered the following factual basis for the charges:

[O]n March 8th, 2011, detectives from the Phelps County Sheriff's Department were called to investigate allegations of child molestation, statutory rape, and statutory sodomy reported by [victim], who was then 11 years old. . . .

A CAC [interview] was conducted and during that the child victim disclosed that she had been molested by her father figure, who is [Branson] . . . and that she had been molested pretty much continuously since she had been five or six years old and that that molestation involved oral sex performed on her by [Branson.]

This factual basis did not allege any fact that would enhance the felony to a class A felony under section 566.067 RSMo (2006). The trial court accepted Branson's plea as knowing and voluntary and sentenced him to life imprisonment on the class A felony of first-degree child molestation and seven years on each of the two counts of the class C felony of second-degree statutory rape with the sentences running consecutively.

Following sentencing, Branson timely filed motions for post-conviction relief. Branson's amended motion alleged, among other things, Branson was denied his right to due process of law and a fair trial because "[l]ife without the possibility of probation or parole is cruel and unusual punishment as set forth in Section 566.067 RSMo 2016 and as applied to [Branson]." The motion court denied Branson's amended motion, finding Branson "waived and abandoned" that claim.

Branson appealed the motion court's judgment. See Branson v. State, 633 S.W.3d 871 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021). On appeal, Branson argued his sentence of life imprisonment was in excess of the statutory maximum allowed for the offense at the time Branson was alleged to have committed the offense. The State, in its brief, conceded there was an insufficient factual basis to sentence Branson to a class A felony under 566.067 RSMo (2006) and "at most" Branson had committed a class B felony, but argued the claim was waived because it was never raised in the amended motion. This Court affirmed the motion court's judgment because Branson's amended motion never raised the excessive-sentence argument he raised in his appeal and he did not request plain-error review.

Branson then filed a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, which was denied. Following that denial, he petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus and requested the cause be remanded for resentencing on the child-molestation count only.

Standard of Review

Under Rule 91.01(b), "[a]ny person restrained of liberty within this state may petition for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such restraint."^[4] "Habeas corpus is the last judicial inquiry into the validity of a criminal conviction and serves as a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness." State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. banc 2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Our review is "limited to determining the facial validity of confinement, which is based on the record of the proceeding that resulted in the confinement." State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal citations omitted).

Analysis

Branson argues he is entitled to habeas relief because the State did not allege any of the aggravating elements in the amended information and Branson did not admit or stipulate to any fact that would satisfy those elements to make the crime a class A felony. The State argues Branson's claim is procedurally barred because it should have been raised in either a direct appeal or a post-conviction motion.

Generally the failure to raise a claim in a direct appeal or in a post-conviction relief motion bars the petitioner from later raising the claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Zinna, 301 S.W.3d at 516. However, this bar can be overcome by showing a "[sentencing] defect, cause and prejudice, or extraordinary circumstances where manifest injustice would occur without relief."^[5] Williams v. Falkenrath, 676 S.W.3d 452, 456 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). Cases in which a person received a sentence greater than that permitted by law traditionally have been analyzed under the sentencing defect exception . Zinna, 301 S.W.3d at 517. Such claims may be raised in the first instance by direct criminal appeal, by post-conviction motion, or by habeas petition. Id. at 516-17.

Branson has demonstrated both a sentencing defect and extraordinary circumstances where manifest injustice would occur without relief. When a defendant pleads guilty to a charge that does not include a necessary element of a more serious version of the offense, the defendant cannot be sentenced as if he or she committed the more serious offense. State ex rel Dutton v. Sevier, 83 S.W.2d 581, 582-83 (Mo. banc 1935).^[6] A sentencing defect can occur where both the charging document and the trial court erroneously describe an offense to be a higher class of felony than provided by statute. In Osowski, for example, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted sodomy, a class C felony, pursuant to a plea...