Brantley v. United States

JOHN BRANTLEY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. 3:19-cr-0009-CAR-CHW

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Athens Division

March 29, 2022

Proceedings Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Charles H. Weigle, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is Petitioner John Brantley's motion to under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. (Doc. 78). In grounds one and two, respectively Petitioner asks this Court to amend his sentence to account for credit for time served prior to the imposition of his sentence and to find his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to ask for credit for time served at sentencing. (Id., p. 4-5). Because Petitioner's request for credit for time served is not cognizable in a Section 2255 action, it is RECOMMENDED that ground one of Petitioner's motion be DISMISSED. Because Petitioner cannot show ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the failure to ask for credit for time served, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's ground two be DENIED.

Procedural History

On January 4, 2018, Petitioner was arrested following a traffic stop during which he and a co-defendant were found to be in possession of methamphetamine and a firearm. (Doc. 52, p 78). A grand jury originally indicted Petitioner for two counts relating to the traffic stop, including possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. (Doc. 1). Petitioner entered federal custody on August 1, 2019, and remained in custody until the resolution of his case. (Docs. 33; 74, p. 1). He was received into federal custody on a writ from Dodge State Prison, where Petitioner was serving a parole revocation on a state sentence. (Doc. 74, ¶ 7).

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner waived indictment and proceeded on a superseding information. (Docs. 49, 50). The information charged only the original possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine count, to which Petitioner pleaded guilty on January 7, 2020. (Docs. 50, 53). Pursuant to the presentence investigation report and Petitioner's specific history, Petitioner's sentencing guideline range was 188 months to 235 months. (Doc. 74, ¶ 91). On October 20, 2020, Petitioner was sentenced to serve 188 months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons followed by three years on supervised release and pay a $100 mandatory assessment. (Doc. 76).

Petitioner now files a Section 2255 motion asking that he receive credit for time served from January 4, 2018, to September 18, 2019, and contending that his defense counsel was ineffective for not asking for credit for time served at sentencing. (Doc. 78, p. 4-5, 11). Petitioner is presently incarcerated in federal prison in Bennettsville, South Carolina. (Doc. 78-1).

Discussion

1. Petitioner's request for credit for time served in ground one is not appropriately raised in a Section 2255 motion and should be dismissed.

In ground one of his Section 2255 motion, Petitioner claims that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is not giving him 20 months of credit toward his sentence for time served in state custody from January 4, 2018 until September 18, 2019, the date Petitioner alleges the “Feds picked the case up.” (Doc. 78, p. 4). Petitioner further argues this time should be credited because he was never released or bonded out from custody. (Id.) Petitioner also states that his lawyer never asked the Court to consider or deduct the time he had served when imposing sentence. (Id.) Petitioner's suggested remedy for the alleged error is for his sentence to be vacated and reimposed to account for the 20 months of time served he believes he is owed. (Id., p. 11). As explained below, Petitioner's motion, to the extent it relates to the calculation or execution of his sentence, is not cognizable in a Section 2255 motion, but instead is proper in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court cannot construe and consider Petitioner's ground one under Section 2241 because Petitioner has failed to meet the necessary exhaustion and jurisdictional requirements. Furthermore, it does not appear that Petitioner is entitled to credit for time served that he seeks. Therefore, Petitioner's ground one claim should be dismissed.

A motion related to the calculation or execution of a sentence is properly filed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 only after the exhaustion of administrative remedies, because the granting of credit for time served is “in the first instance an administrative, not a judicial function.” United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Flanagan, 868 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989)). The calculation of a term of imprisonment, including credit for time served in official detention prior to the date of sentencing, is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585. Such calculations are an administrative function entrusted to the BOP, which “initially possesses the exclusive authority. . . to compute sentence credit awards after sentencing.” Rodriguez v. Lamer, 60 F.3d 745, 747 (11th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992). This means that the sentencing court is not vested with the authority to calculate credit for time served. United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1259 (11th Cir. 2010). Petitioner has failed to show his exhaustion efforts in this case. Nothing in Petitioner's motion demonstrates any attempt to address this issue with the BOP or to exhaust any administrative remedy available to him. See (Doc. 78).

Even if Petitioner could show that he has exhausted the available administrative remedies, the proper forum for a petition under Section 2241 is a court in the district where the Petitioner is confined. United States v. Pruitt, 417 Fed.Appx. 903, 904 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1991)). It appears from the record that Petitioner is currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution in Bennettsville, South Carolina, located within the District of South Carolina. (Doc. 78-1). Any petition regarding the calculation or execution of his sentence should be filed in that district.

Even if the sentencing court did have jurisdiction to award Petitioner the credit he requests, it does not appear from the record that Defendant is entitled to credit for time served because the time from January 4, 2018, his arrest date, until September 18, 2019, the date Petitioner says that Respondent assumed prosecution of the case, includes time Petitioner was serving on his state sentences. See (Doc. 74, ¶ 7). Petitioner's state parole was revoked on January 16, 2018, for 2010 and 2013 state superior court cases. (Id., ¶¶ 51, 56, 59). The sentence for the 2010 case expired on September 18, 2019. (Id., ¶ 51). A period of probation on the 2013 state superior court case began the following day and will expire on September 26, 2023. (Id., ¶¶ 56, 59). Petitioner was sentenced in this case on October 20, 2020. (Doc. 76).

A term of imprisonment “commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to ... the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). A defendant may receive credit for time served in official detention prior to the date his sentence commences “as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(1), but such credit is available only if the time “has not been credited against another sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).

Although Petitioner was in federal custody during the time between his transfer to federal custody and sentencing in this case, Petitioner continued to receive credit towards his state sentence for the time spent in detention for which he now seeks credit. Because the time between January 4, 2018, and September 18, 2019, appears credited to the state sentence he was already serving at the time, it cannot also be credited towards his federal sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).

2. Petitioner cannot show defense counsel was ineffective by failing to request credit for time served at sentencing.

In his second ground for relief, Petitioner argues that his attorney was ineffective for not asking for credit time served at Petitioner's sentencing. (Doc. 78, p. 5). Petitioner alleges that he talked to his attorney about asking for credit for time served and argues that his attorney failed to even address it at sentencing. (Id.) Petitioner asserts that his attorney should have asked for the time “to be considered under the 5G1.3(b) sentencing guidelines” because Petitioner never bonded out and the crime for which he was arrested, charged, and sentenced was relevant conduct. (Id.) As discussed above, the 20 months that Petitioner requests is attributable to a parole revocation in his 2010 state case and that time cannot also be counted towards his federal sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Even under his U.S.S.C. § 5G1.3(b) theory, Petitioner cannot show that his sentence would have been different had his attorney requested credit for time served at the sentencing hearing. Petitioner's requested relief in ground two should therefore be denied.

Regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 669 (1984), requires a showing that (1) “counsel's performance was deficient, ” and that (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To satisfy the first prong, “the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. This means that “the Court must apply a ‘strong...