Brantley v. United States

1

AMAAD JAMAAL BRANTLEY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:11cr58

Civil Action No. 2:16cv383

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division

May 18, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Raymond A. Jackson United States District Judge

Before the Court is Amaad Jamaal Brantley's (“Petitioner”) Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Motion”). ECF No. 506. This opinion has been amended to consider the merits of Petitioner's claim in compliance with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's (“Fourth Circuit”) ruling in United States v. Brantley, No. 16-7759, 2021 WL 3183680, at *1 (4th Cir. July 28, 2021).^[1] The Government opposed the motion, ECF No. 781, and Petitioner replied. ECF No. 784. Having reviewed the Motion and filings, the Court finds that a hearing is not necessary. See 28 U.S.C § 2255(c). For the reasons set forth below Petitioner's § 2255 Motion is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 8,2011, Petitioner was named in a fifty-nine count Indictment and charged with eight Counts. Indict., ECF No. 3. On August 4, 2011, Petitioner pled guilty to Counts One and Nineteen pursuant to a written plea agreement. Guilty Plea Mins., ECF No. 203; Plea Agreement, ECF No. 204. On January 5, 2012, the Court adjudged Petitioner and found him guilty of both counts. ECF Nos. 417. Petitioner was convicted of participating directly or indirectly in the affairs of an enterprise, engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count One) and Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Nineteen). J., ECF No. 425. Count Nineteen alleges that Petitioner violated § 924(c) by engaging in a crime of violence in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to 60 months on Count One and 84 months on Count Nineteen, to run consecutively with Count One. Id. On August 6, 2021, Petitioner was released from imprisonment.

According to Petitioner's Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), which incorporated the Statement of Facts that Petitioner agreed to as part of his plea agreement, Petitioner was a member of the Bounty Hunter Bloods/Nine Tech Gangsters (BHB/NTG) street gang in the Eastern District of Virginia. Presentence Invest. Report ¶ 16, ECF No. 430 (“PSR”); see also Statement of Facts, ECF No. 205. BHB/NTG is a criminal enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, including murder, kidnapping, robbery, maiming, assault with a dangerous weapon, and narcotics trafficking. PSR at ¶16. Between 2005 and 2007, Petitioner was involved in several criminal acts in support of the BHB/NTG criminal enterprise, including purchasing and trafficking “crack cocaine,” illegally possessing and shooting at a victim with a firearm, and attempting to rob a rival gang member. Id. ¶¶ 22-27,33.

On June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant Motion to vacate his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). ECF No. 506. The United States moved to dismiss Petitioner's Motion on July 21, 2016. ECF No. 525. On July 26, 2016, Petitioner filed a response to the United States' motion to dismiss. ECF No. 532. On July 27, 2016, the Government replied. ECF No. 533. On October 28, 2016, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Petitioner's § 2255 Motion to Vacate as untimely and granting the Government's motion to dismiss. Mem. Op. & Order Deny'g Mot. Vacate, ECF No. 549. On December 23, 2016, Petitioner appealed. Notice Appeal, ECF No. 561. On July 28, 2021, the Fourth Circuit vacated this Court's Order denying Petitioner's § 2255 motion and remanded for this Court to consider the merits of Petitioner's claims in light of the Fourth Circuit's decision in In re Thomas, 988 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 2021), which it decided after this Court's original decision. Brantley, 2021 WL 3183680, at *1.

On remand, Petitioner filed an Unopposed Motion to Suspend Briefing and Hold the Case in Abeyance in light of the Fourth Circuit's pending decision in United States v. Manley, 52 F.4th 143 (4th Cir. 2022). ECF No. 736. On December 1, 2021, the Court granted the parties' motion and stayed the case. ECF No. 747. On October 26, 2022, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in Manley. See 52 F.4th at 153. On November 28, 2022, the Court lifted the stay and ordered the parties to file supplemental briefings on Petitioner's Motion. ECF No. 774. On January 13, 2023, the Government filed its supplemental response in opposition to Petitioner's Motion. ECF No. 781. On January 27, 2023, Petitioner replied in support of his original Motion, claiming that his conviction on Count Nineteen is void after United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019). Supp. Mot., ECF No. 784 at 1. Therefore, the matter is now ripe for judicial determination.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Section 2255

Section 2255 allows a federal prisoner “claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . [to] move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2008). In a § 2255 motion, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his or her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See Miller v. United States, 261 F.2d 546, 547 (4th Cir. 1958). Additionally, pro se filers are entitled to a more liberal construction of their pleadings. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94 (2007).

When deciding a § 2255 motion, the Court must promptly grant a hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Motions under § 2255 generally “will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.” Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1947). For this reason, issues already fully litigated on direct appeal may not be raised again under the guise of a collateral attack. United States v. Dyess, 730 F.3d 354, 360 (4th Cir. 2013). Issues that should have been raised on direct appeal are deemed waived, procedurally defaulted, and cannot be raised on a § 2255 motion. United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490,492 (4th Cir. 1999).

However, an individual may raise a procedurally defaulted claim if he or she can show (1) “cause and actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which he complains” or (2) that “a miscarriage of justice would result from the refusal of the court to entertain the collateral attack.. . [meaning] the movant must show actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 492-93. To demonstrate cause and prejudice, a petitioner must show the errors “worked to [his or her] actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting [his or her] entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims should generally be raised in a collateral motion instead of on direct appeal and constitute sufficient cause to review a procedurally defaulted claim. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424,435 (4th Cir. 2008); Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 493.

B. Crimes of Violence under § 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

At issue here is Petitioner's conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A) and 2 for Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Violent Crime. Petitioner's conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A) and 2 is only valid if it is predicated on a “crime of violence.” The controlling federal statute defines “crime of violence” in two alternative ways: (1) through the § 924(c)(3)(A) “force clause,” requiring that the predicate offense categorically includes the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” as an element of the offense; or (2) through the § 924(c)(3)(B) “residual clause,” requiring that the predicate offense “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force” may be used during the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). In United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), the Supreme Court held § 924(c)'s residual clause unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, Petitioner's § 2255 motion can only succeed if he demonstrates that the predicate crime underlying his § 924(c) conviction is not a “crime of violence” under the force clause.

To answer this question, courts employ either the categorical approach or the modified categorical approach. See United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 263-64 (4th Cir. 2019). Under the categorical approach, courts will “consider only the crime as defined, not the particular facts in the case.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir.), cert, denied,---U.S.-----, 140 S.Ct. 304,205 L.Ed.2d 196 (2019). “(I]n cases involving statutes that set out elements in the alternative and thus create multiple versions of the crime, [courts] consider the statute divisible and apply the modified categorical approach.” United States v. Diaz, 865 F.3d 168, 2017 WL 3159918, at *4 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). The modified approach serves “as a tool to identify the elements of the crime of conviction when a statute's disjunctive phrasing renders one (or more) of them opaque.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 513 (2016). In carrying out the modified categorical approach, courts may examine a limited class of documents, including indictments and jury instructions, to determine which part of the statute the defendant violated. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254,257 (2013).

C. VICAR-18 U.S.C. § 1959

18 U.S.C. § 1959...