Brass City Local v. City of Waterbury

207 Conn.App. 422

262 A.3d 181

BRASS CITY LOCAL, CONNECTICUT ALLIANCE OF CITY POLICE

v.CITY OF WATERBURY et al.

AC 43328

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 14, 2021

Officially released September 14, 2021

Daniel J. Foster, corporation counsel, for the appellant (named defendant).

Marshall T. Segar, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Bright, C.J., and Alvord and Devlin, Js.

ALVORD, J.

This appeal arises out of an action by the plaintiff, the Brass City Local, Connecticut Alliance of City Police, in which a three member panel of the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration (panel) rendered an arbitration award in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award, which was granted by the trial court. The defendant city of Waterbury¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court vacating the arbitration award. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitration award. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant entered into a collective bargaining agreement (agreement). Article III § 2 (b) of the agreement authorized the superintendent of police to make vacancy appointments of eligible persons "to positions on an acting basis, due to the non-existence of a civil service promotional list ... for a period no longer than nine (9) months." Subsection (b) of § 2 further provided that the defendant "may allow a person to continue in such a position for more than nine (9) months only if all eligible persons have already held the position for nine (9) months or have refused assignment to the position after it has been offered."

On May 16, 2016, the plaintiff filed a class action grievance alleging that the defendant had violated Article III § 2 (b) of the agreement on the ground that it failed to replace police officers holding acting basis appointments after nine months of service. Specifically, the grievance stated that "[t]here are several employees filling acting positions in excess of nine months ... [in] violation of [Article III § 2 (b) of the agreement] between the [defendant] and the [plaintiff]." The defendant denied the grievance. Pursuant to the grievance procedures set forth in the agreement, the matter was submitted to the panel. The agreement provided that the authority of the panel as arbitrators was "limited to the interpretation and application of the provisions" of the agreement and that the panel did not have "authority to add to, or subtract from, or otherwise modify" the agreement. The issue submitted to the panel was: "Did the [defendant] violate Article III § 2 (b) of the [agreement] when [it] failed to appoint acting positions for less than [nine] months and if so, what shall the remedy be?"

On February 28, 2017, the parties were heard and presented evidence before the panel.² Thereafter, at the request of the panel, the parties submitted posthearing briefs proposing remedies for the alleged violation of the agreement. In its July 31, 2017 posthearing brief, the plaintiff proposed the remedy of "back pay and benefits for those members affected [by the defendant's alleged violation of the agreement] on or after May 16, 2016, and not before." In its July 31, 2017 posthearing brief, the defendant proposed that, "if the grievance were sustained, it would be appropriate to order [it] (1) to cease and desist from the practice of maintaining persons in acting positions for more than nine months; and (2) to provide the [plaintiff] with written evidence of its cessation of this practice, including the names of all persons who held acting positions for longer than nine months, the positions held, and the beginning and end dates of their service in an acting capacity. ... However, awarding back pay to all persons who, by reason of rank alone, would have been eligible to apply for the open budgeted positions would constitute a total payment to [the plaintiff's] members far in excess of the total that those members could actually have earned in acting positions." Ultimately, the defendant maintained that, "even if the grievance were sustained, any financial remedy would be an unwarranted punitive penalty and would constitute an improper windfall to the [plaintiff] and its members."

On September 5, 2017, the panel sustained the plaintiff's grievance. Specifically, the panel decided: "The [defendant] did violate Article III [§] 2 (b) of the collective bargaining agreement when it failed to appoint acting positions for less than nine months. The [defendant] is ordered to stop the practice of maintaining persons in acting basis positions for more than nine months consistent with the terms of Article III [§] 2 (b). The [defendant] is further ordered to provide the [plaintiff] with written evidence that its practice has ended, including the names of all persons who have held acting basis positions for longer than nine months, the positions held, and the beginning and end dates of their service in an acting capacity." The panel found that "[a]n award of [monetary] damages is inappropriate."³

On October 4, 2017, the plaintiff filed in the Superior Court a one count complaint and a motion to vacate the arbitration award. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the panel had "exceeded [its] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made" in violation of General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4).⁴ Specifically, the plaintiff maintained that "the ... panel issued [its] award which chose a nonfinancial remedy stating that the privilege of working in a higher classification was the reward in this case." The plaintiff further maintained that "[t]he award issued by the panel ... did not address the gravamen of the grievance filed or evidence presented as remedy was not being sought for those who acted in a higher pay class but rather those that did not." Accordingly, the plaintiff requested that the arbitration award be vacated. The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitration award, in which it disagreed with the plaintiff's characterization of the arbitration award and argued that the panel "did decide the issues presented to them, they just didn't give the plaintiff the remedy it desired."

Thereafter, the parties submitted additional briefing in support of their respective positions. The plaintiff maintained that a financial remedy was appropriate because the agreement expressly provides: "When an employee performs, with the authorization of the Chief/ Superintendent or his or her designee, a substantial portion of the duties of a higher classification for a day, or a major portion thereof, he or she shall receive a normal day's pay for the higher classification." The defendant responded that this provision of the agreement was inapplicable because "[w]hat the plaintiff is seeking ... is not increased pay for officers who performed the duties of a higher classification ... [but] increased pay for all officers who did not perform the duties of a higher classification ... but were eligible to do so." (Emphasis added.) With respect to determining the applicable standard of judicial review of the panel's decision, the plaintiff argued that the submission to the panel was restricted and, thus, the panel's decision was subject to de novo review.⁵

In a February 27, 2019 memorandum of decision, the court, M. Taylor , J ., first concluded that the submission to arbitration was unrestricted because "there was no agreement in the submission of the parties to restrict the scope of the remedy imposed by the [panel]." As such, the court recognized three grounds for vacating an arbitration award, as set forth by our Supreme Court in Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co ., 273 Conn. 86, 94, 868 A.2d 47 (2005) : "(1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute ... (2) the award violates clear public policy ... [and] (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court further noted that § 52-418 (a) (4) provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated if "the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4). The court then proceeded to consider the plaintiff's arguments that the second and third grounds for vacating an arbitration award apply.

With respect to the third ground for vacating an arbitration award pertaining to the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418, the court stated that it "[could not] determine that the decision of the [panel] ... manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law [and] is an award that should be set aside pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Specifically, the court determined that "the conclusion of the panel to deny an award of damages was neither inconsistent with the plain language of the [agreement] nor was it inconsistent with logic and reason for it to deny payment for work not performed ...." With respect to the second ground for vacating an arbitration award pertaining to public policy, the court concluded that "ignoring relevant evidence should not form the basis of a violation of public policy." Specifically, the court stated that it "[could not] identify case law that would suggest that ignoring evidence in the record, absent misconduct, forms the basis for vacating an arbitration award."

Notwithstanding these conclusions, however, the court remanded the matter to the panel for further proceedings. The court determined: "It appears that the panel in this matter may have ignored important evidence⁶ in the record leading the panel to a...