Bratset v. Davis Joint Unified Sch. Dist.

LAURA BRATSET, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DAVIS JOINT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-0035 KJM DB PS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

May 20, 2019

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff Laura Bratset is proceeding pro se in this action. Therefore, the matter was referred to the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending before the court are plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and defendant Winters Joint Unified School District's ("WJUSD") cross-motion for summary judgment.¹ Plaintiff's second amended complaint alleges that the defendant violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., with respect to the education of plaintiff's minor child, ("Student").

For the reasons stated below, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied and defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment be granted.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Laura Bratset, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on January 6, 2016, by filing a complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis was denied on March 24, 2016, and on April 5, 2016, plaintiff paid the applicable filing fee. (ECF Nos. 3 & 4.) On April 18, 2016, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (ECF No. 8.) On December 12, 2016, the undersigned issued an order dismissing plaintiff's first amended complaint and granting plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 44.)

Plaintiff filed a second amended compliant on April 27, 2017. (ECF No. 50.) Defendant WJUSD filed a motion to dismiss on May 19, 2017. (ECF No. 55.) On December 19, 2017, the undersigned issued findings and recommendations recommending that defendant's motion to dismiss be denied with respect to plaintiff's challenge to the December 8, 2015 decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH"). (ECF No. 73.) Those findings and recommendations were adopted in full by the previously assigned District Judge on February 2, 2018.² (ECF No. 75.)

On February 16, 2018, defendant filed an answer. (ECF No. 77.) Defendant lodged a copy of the administrative record on June 27, 2018. (ECF No. 97.) Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on October 1, 2018. (ECF No. 109.) Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on October 5, 2018. (ECF No. 110.) The parties filed their respective oppositions on October 26, 2018. (ECF Nos. 112 & 113.) Defendant filed a reply on November 2, 2018. (ECF No. 115.) Plaintiff filed a reply on November 6, 2018. (ECF No. 117.) The motions were taken under submission on December 4, 2018. (ECF No. 118.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

The goal of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., is "'to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education [or 'FAPE'] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs andprepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.'" A.G. v. Paradise Valley Unified School Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 2008)). "The free appropriate public education required by the Act is tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child by means of an 'individualized educational program' (IEP)." Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982) (quotation and citation omitted).

"The IEP is a written document that states the child's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, creates measurable annual goals for the child, describes the child's progress toward meeting the annual goals, and explains the services that will be provided to the child to help him advance toward attaining his particular goals." Timothy O. v. Paso Robles Unified School Dist., 822 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2016). "To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances." Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County School Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).

"Each IEP is crafted by a team of the individuals most critical to a child's success, including parents, teachers, and school officials." Rachel H. v. Department of Education Hawaii, 868 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 2017). The formulation of the IEP should be "a cooperative process between parents and schools that culminates in the creation of an [IEP] for every disabled student." M.M. v. Lafayette School Dist., 767 F.3d 842, 851 (9th Cir. 2014).

"In the event a student's parents believe that the district is not complying with the IDEA's procedural or substantive requirements, statutory safeguards entitle the parents to 'an impartial due process hearing' conducted either by the state or local educational agency.'"³ Cupertino Union School District v. K.A., 75 F.Supp.3d 1088, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Ojai Unified School Dist. V. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1993)). "Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision" reached by a due process hearing decision "shall have the right to bring acivil action with respect to the complaint . . . in a district court of the United States."⁴ 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).

After the commencement of such a civil action, the court "(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." Id. "[C]omplete de novo review of the administrative proceeding is inappropriate." Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2007). And "the burden of persuasion rests with the party challenging the ALJ's decision." L.M. v. Capistrano Unified School Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2009).

"Because Congress intended states to have the primary responsibility of formulating each individual child's education, this court must defer to their 'specialized knowledge and experience' by giving 'due weight' to the decisions of the states' administrative bodies.'" Hood v. Encinitas Union School Dist., 486 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 888 (9th Cir. 2001)). "'How much deference to give state educational agencies, however, is a matter for the discretion of the courts.'" J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified School Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1987)). Nonetheless, the amount of deference given should increase when the administrative decision is "'thorough and careful[.]'"⁵ Ashland SchoolDist. v. Parents of Student R.J., 588 F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Seattle School Dist., No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1499 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Capistrano, 556 F.3d at 908 ("A district court shall accord more deference to administrative agency findings that it considers 'thorough and careful.'"). Moreover, courts "are not free 'to substitute [our] own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which [we] review.'" Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 887-88 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206).

ANALYSIS

The court previously advised plaintiff that this action was proceeding on plaintiff's challenge to the December 8, 2015, OAH decision addressing the following specific questions:

1. Did [WJUSD] fail to offer Student a FAPE in the February 14, 2014, individualized education program by failing to:

a. Include present levels of academic achievement and functional performance;

b. Include annual measurable goals relating to the special education services offered;

c. Include objective strategies to evaluate progress toward goals;

d. Include a description of how progress toward meeting annual goals would be measured;

e. Include a statement of when progress reports would be provided;

f. Consider less restrictive placement options than a special day class;

g. Offer an appropriate placement in the least restrictive environment; and

h. Provide a means by which to measure whether or not Student would obtain educational benefit?

2. Did [WJUSD] fail to offer Student a FAPE in the February 13, 2015 IEP, completed on April 14, 2015, by failing to:

a. Consider Student's privately obtained reading assessment;

//// b. Offer Student one-to-one instruction as proposed by an independent assessor; and

c. Include the name of the specific reading program that would be provided?⁶

(ECF No. 73 at 10.) Rather than apply the above format and address these specific issues, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment asserts ten sequentially numbered arguments.⁷ (Pl.'s MSJ (ECF No. 109) at 3-5.⁸)

However, plaintiff's second argument—that WJUSD obstructed justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519—was previously dismissed from this action. (Pl.'s MSJ (ECF No. 109) at 3; ECF No. 73 at 6-13; ECF No. 75.) Plaintiff's seventh and eighth arguments concern the conduct of Davis Joint Unified School District ("DJUSD"). (Pl.'s MSJ (ECF No. 109) at 4.) DJUSD, however, was previously dismissed from this action after plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with the court's prior orders. (ECF No. 73 at 12.) And plaintiff's ninth and tenth arguments are collateral attacks on prior rulings of this court. (Pl.'s MSJ (ECF No. 109) at 4-5.)

The undersigned will analyze below those remaining relevant arguments—plaintiff's claims 1, 3-6—as they pertain to the December 8, 2015, OAH decision.⁹ For clarity, theundersigned will refer to the arguments consistent with the number assigned by plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Claim No. 1. Whether Plaintiff Received a Fair and Unbiased Hearing

Plaintiff appears to argue that the ...