Braun v. State

Jeffrey Allan Braun, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A20-0815

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

August 30, 2021

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Stearns County District Court File No. 73-CR-07-11062

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chelsie Willett, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Renee N Courtney, St. Cloud City Attorney, Kevin M. Voss, Deputy City Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.

JESSON, JUDGE

In 2009, appellant Jeffrey Braun refused to submit to testing-that is, to provide a blood or urine sample-after being stopped for erratic driving. He subsequently pleaded guilty to criminal test refusal in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2 (2006). But in the twelve years following his plea, the law concerning driving while intoxicated (DWI) underwent seismic changes. See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). These changes led Braun to file a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that precedent prohibiting the criminalization of driving-while-impaired test refusal-absent a warrant or exigent circumstances-requires that his 2009 conviction be vacated. Because the rules derived from these cases do not apply retroactively to Braun's case, we do not vacate his conviction. But because the law as it existed in 2009 does not conclusively establish that the suspected presence of drugs in Braun's system creates, in and of itself, an exigent circumstance, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

In late August 2009, a trooper with the Minnesota State Patrol in St. Cloud received reports of erratic driving. After locating the car and observing the driver make an improper turn, the trooper executed a traffic stop. When the trooper approached, he identified appellant Jeffrey Braun as the driver with his 13-year-old son in the vehicle. Braun indicated that they were on their way to Fergus Falls. During their conversation, the trooper noticed that Braun was sweating excessively and had bloodshot eyes. He also exhibited quick hand and finger movements and at times spoke rapidly. Suspecting that Braun may be under the influence of a controlled substance, the trooper administered several field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test. Although Braun performed poorly on the field sobriety tests, he had an alcohol concentration of 0.00, which led the trooper to believe that Braun was under the influence of a stimulant. Braun was arrested and taken to a local hospital, where the trooper read him an implied-consent advisory. Braun indicated that he understood the consequences of refusing to provide a blood or urine sample and did not wish to speak to an attorney. Despite this, when asked if he would submit to testing, Braun refused. As a result, the state charged Braun with second-degree test refusal. Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2, .25, subd. 1(b) (2006).

Stipulating to the facts above, Braun pleaded not guilty to second-degree test refusal.^[1] In exchange, the state agreed to a reduced sentence. Based on the stipulated facts, the district court found Braun guilty of second-degree test refusal and sentenced him to 365 days' imprisonment, with 335 days stayed for six years of probation and credit given for seven days already served.

Ten years passed, during which the landscape of DWI law changed considerably. Encouraged by these changes, Braun filed a petition for postconviction relief in 2019, asking the court to vacate his 2009 conviction. He argued that precedent adopted after his conviction which prohibited criminalization of DWI test refusal-absent a warrant or exigent circumstances-applied retroactively and required vacation of his conviction.

The state disagreed, claiming that the potential dissipation of the drug believed to be in Braun's system created a valid exigent-circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. In response, Braun asserted that the exigent circumstance exception only applied when the defendant was suspected of being under the influence of alcohol, not drugs. Because the trooper believed Braun was under the influence of a stimulant, Braun claimed that no valid warrant exception applied. But the postconviction court was unpersuaded by Braun's arguments and denied his petition for relief.

Braun appeals.^[2]

DECISION

Much has changed in DWI law since Braun was found guilty of criminal test refusal. Therefore, to provide adequate context for Braun's claim, we find it instructive to trace the relevant progression of DWI-test-refusal caselaw from the time of Braun's arrest to the present. After establishing how the law has changed, we then consider the merits of Braun's petition.

The first major shift in DWI test-refusal law occurred in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 141, 133 S.Ct. at 1552. Applying Fourth Amendment principles, the United States Supreme Court recognized that although warrantless searches such as blood draws, are presumptively unreasonable, in some instances "exigent circumstances" allow law enforcement to conduct such searches. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148-50, 133 S.Ct. at 1558-59. But the Court also limited what qualified as a valid warrant exception, holding that alcohol dissipation does not, in and of itself, present an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless blood test for a person suspected of DWI. Id. at 156, 133 S.Ct. at 1536. Or, to place this holding in terms used by our previous caselaw, the dissipation of alcohol is not a "single-factor exigent circumstance." See, e.g., State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Minn 2008) ("We have described the test for single-factor exigent circumstances as one in which the existence of one fact alone creates exigent circumstances." (quotation omitted)); State v. Gray, 456 N.W.2d 251, 256 (Minn. 1990) (explaining that "in certain situations a single factor alone can create exigent circumstances").

Three years later, in Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Court returned to the issue of warrantless blood tests in DWI cases. 136 S.Ct. at 2160. Birchfield asked the Court to determine whether a defendant's refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test may be criminalized. Id. at 2166-67. Relying on the same Fourth Amendment principles highlighted in McNeely, the Court held that warrantless test refusal by a suspected impaired driver-like Braun-may be criminalized only when a warrant exception applies. Id. at 2184-85.

Following Birchfield, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the retroactivity of these decisions. First, in Johnson v. State, 916 N.W.2d 674, 684 (Minn. 2018) (Johnson I), the supreme court held that the rule announced in Birchfield applied retroactively. This was followed most recently by Johnson II, where the supreme court concluded that the rule announced in McNeely-that alcohol dissipation does not present a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrant exception-does not apply retroactively. Johnson, 956 N.W.2d at 626.

Against this backdrop, we turn to Braun's petition. In the proceedings before the postconviction court, which took place before the supreme court's Johnson II decision, Braun argued that the retroactive application of McNeely required vacation of his conviction. After all, there was only a single, exigent circumstance relied upon by the state: that the dissipation of drugs in Braun's system necessitated a warrantless search. And Braun further asserted that even if McNeely was not retroactive, controlling caselaw in 2009 did not recognize a single-factor exigent circumstance exception based upon the dissipation of drugs in one's system, only alcohol. At minimum, Braun asserted, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine the rate at which drugs dissipate in the body and whether this created a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless search.

The postconviction court denied Braun's request for relief, presciently reasoning that McNeely did not retroactively apply to his case. Johnson II, 956 N.W.2d at 626. Accordingly, the court relied on Minnesota precedent in effect in 2009-State v. Shriner- and concluded that the dissipation of drugs in Braun's system was sufficient to establish an exigent circumstance.

When a court denies a petition for postconviction relief, we review that decision for an abuse of discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). The postconviction court's application of the law, however, presents a legal question which we review de novo. Id. Because the supreme court confirmed in Johnson II that McNeely is not retroactive, the focus of our de novo review is the district court's application of Shriner to Braun's case. Johnson II, 956 N.W.2d at 626.

Shriner asked the supreme court to determine whether the dissipation of alcohol in the blood created exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless blood draw. 751 N.W.2d at 539. Although warrantless searches, such as blood draws, are presumptively unreasonable, where the "exigencies of the situation" would make obtaining a warrant objectively unreasonable, a warrantless search may be permissible. Id. at 541. Whether the circumstances are exigent typically depends on the totality of the circumstances. Id. But, in some instances, "the existence of one fact alone creates exigent circumstances." Id. at 542 (quotation omitted). If none of the single-factor circumstances are clearly implicated, then the courts apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test. Id.

To determine whether the...