Breton v. Cook

RANDY BRETON, SR., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER ROLLIN COOK, WARDENRODRIGUEZ, LIEUTENANT JOHN DOE, andCORRECTION OFFICERS JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, and JOHN DOE 3, Defendants.

3:20-cv-00247 (CSH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

MAY 13, 2021

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER ON AMENDED COMPLAINT AND RULINGS ON PENDING MOTIONS

HAIGHT, Senior District Judge:

Plaintiff Randy Breton, Sr., a sentenced inmate, commenced this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on allegations of unreasonable strip search and sexual assault during his intake into Northern Correctional Institution ("Northern"). He sues Department of Correction ("DOC") officials Commissioner Rollin Cook, Warden Rodriguez, Lieutenant John Doe, and Correction Officers John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3 in their individual and official capacities. Doc. 1 at 1. According to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, dated January 4, 2021, Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Garner Correctional Institution ("Garner").¹

On review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court dismissed all claims against Commissioner Cook and Warden Rodriguez but concluded that Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourth Amendment claims should proceed against Defendants Lieutenant John Doe, Correction Officer Doe 1, Correction Officer Doe 2, and Correction Officer Doe 3 (the "Doe Defendants") in their individual capacities. Doc. 7 at 3-4, 8. So that the clerk can effect service on the Doe Defendants, the Court further instructed Plaintiff to obtain the "full names and current addresses" of the Doe Defendants through discovery and file an amended complaint identifying them on or before December 18, 2020. Id. at 8. The Court informed Plaintiff that his failure to identify the Doe Defendants "will result in dismissal of all claims in this action." Id. The Court extended Plaintiff's deadline for filing the amended complaint identifying the Doe Defendants until January 18, 2021. Dkt. 11.

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed (1) a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Doc. 12 at 1-9; (2) a Motion to Appoint Counsel, Doc. 12 at 12-16; (3) a Motion for Discovery, Doc. 14; (4) a Motion to Amend the Complaint, Doc. 15; and (5) the instant Amended Complaint, Doc. 16. This Ruling resolves these pending motions and enters an IRO on Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

I. MOTION TO AMEND AND IRO ON AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff motions the Court to amend his complaint to include allegations that Commissioner Cook and Warden Rodriguez failed to "train security staff or [correction officers] not to assault inmates that [cooperate] with intake officers." Doc. 15 at 2.

Plaintiff further notes that his "[statement] of claim will remain the same as the [incident] unfolded with the intake [Doe Defendants]," but the Doe Defendants "will not be named for now." Id. In line with claims in his Motion for Discovery and Motion to Appoint Counsel,Plaintiff alleges that "Connecticut General Statute, Chapter 14, Sec. 1-210, Subsec. 18(C)" has prevented him from identifying the Doe Defendants through discovery and requests the assistance of an attorney to comply with the Court's order to do so. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff intends to amend his complaint again "once he has reviewed the video discovery that he requested . . . in his Motion for Discovery." Id. Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery and Motion to Appoint Counsel will be discussed in greater detail infra.

As an initial matter, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion to Amend to the extent that he seeks to file the instant Amended Complaint.² Since the complaint in this action has yet to be served, Plaintiff may amend his complaint as a matter of course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1). See, e.g., Nieves v. New York State Off. of Mental Health, No. 20-CV-9502 (CM), 2021 WL 76210, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2021) ("Plaintiff's complaint has not yet been served on Defendants, and he therefore does not need permission of the Court at this time to amend his complaint."). Thus, the Amended Complaint is the operative complaint in this action, and it is subject to this Court's initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

A. Standard of Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a prisoner's civil complaint and dismiss any portion that "(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); Abrams v. Waters, No. 3:17-CV-1659 (CSH), 2018 WL 2926294, at *2 (D. Conn. June 8, 2018).

A complaint is adequately pled if its allegations, accepted as true and liberally construed, could "conceivably give rise to a viable claim." See Green v. Martin, 224 F. Supp. 3d 154, 160 (D. Conn. 2016) (citing Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2005)). Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 570 (2007)); Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2017). A complaint states a claim that is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, the Court is not bound to accept "conclusory allegations." Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S at 557).

If a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, it is well-established that his complaint "must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 706 Fed. Appx. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)); see also Boykin v. KeyCorp., 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.") (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Nevertheless, even when reviewing a pro se complaint, a court may not "invent factual allegations" that the plaintiff has not pleaded. See Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). A pro se complaint that contains "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," is not sufficient to state a viable claim. Id. (citing Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).

B. Summary of Factual Allegations in Amended Complaint

The factual claims in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint largely track the allegations in his Initial Complaint, Doc. 1. On July 3, 2018, Plaintiff was brought from a transport van to the medical examination room at Northern. Doc. 16 at 5. After he was examined by a nurse as part of the intake process, the Doe Defendants escorted him to a holding cell for a strip search. Id. Before undressing Plaintiff, the "Doe officers" restrained him for alleged security reasons. Id. Correction Officer Doe 1 and Correction Officer Doe 2 pinned Plaintiff's wrists against the cell wall. Id. As the officers started to dress Plaintiff after the search, Correction Officer Doe 3, who was behind Plaintiff, did not put on Plaintiff's underwear boxers under his jumpsuit. Id. Correction Officer Doe 3 then pulled up the jumpsuit zipper so as to deliberately catch Plaintiff's genitals, causing Plaintiff pain and damage in the genital area. Id. at 5, 7. Plaintiff characterizes this conduct as "sexual assault." Id. at 7.

Several times after the incident, Plaintiff requested to see the medical staff for pain, but his request was refused, and he was ignored by staff for many days. Id. 7, 8. As a result, Plaintiff has lived with pain and claims that he requires surgery as his left testicle has swollen to the size of a grapefruit. Id. at 7. He alleges that Commissioner Cook and Warden Rodriguez are responsible for the Doe Defendants' conduct due to their failure to screen prison staff, train the Doe Defendants not to harm inmates, protect Plaintiff from sexual assault, and put safety policies in place. Id. at 7-9. However, Plaintiff acknowledges that Commissioner Cook and Warden Rodriguez "were not personally involved" in the Doe Defendants' alleged conduct. Id. at 8.

C. Discussion

The Court's IRO of the Initial Complaint noted that Plaintiff's claims for damages against any defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but he may recover damages against defendants in their individual capacities. Doc. 7 at 3; see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991) (stating that state officers are not "absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by the 'official' nature of their acts" and finding that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar § 1983 personal-capacity suits against state officials in federal court"); Minotti v. Lensink, 798 F.2d 607, 609 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The eleventh amendment immunity protects state officials sued damages in their official capacity."). The Court also liberally construed Plaintiff's allegations as raising claims under the Fourth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, this ruling briefly recites the constitutional standards relevant to Plaintiff's claims concerning his alleged unreasonable strip search and sexual abuse.

To determine whether an isolated search infringed on an inmate's Fourth Amendment right of bodily privacy and was thus unreasonable, a court must consider four factors: (1) the scope of the particular intrusion; (2) the manner in which it was conducted; (3) the justification for initiating it; and (4) the place in which it was conducted. Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). A strip search is...