Bridges v. The Methodist Hosp.

1

JENNIFER BRIDGES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE METHODIST HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:23-CV-1699

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division

September 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GEORGE C. HANKS, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This is a civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) by over 100 healthcare professionals who were let go for refusing to inoculate themselves against COVID-19 in violation of their employers' mandatory immunization policies. Plaintiffs have sued their former employers (“the Methodist Hospital defendants” or “Methodist”) and two Texas state officials (“the Government defendants”). (Dkt. 86 at pp. 25-26). Both sets of defendants have filed motions to dismiss. The defendants' motions (Dkt. 57; Dkt. 87) are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED AS MOOT IN PART.^[1]

For the reasons outlined in this opinion, all of Plaintiffs' claims under federal law (Counts I-IV and Count VIII of their live complaint) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims under Texas state law (Counts V-VII of their live complaint), and those claims are REMANDED to the 284th Judicial District Court of Montgomery County, Texas, where this case was originally filed and assigned case number 23-04-05209.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April of 2021, during the global COVID-19 pandemic, Methodist implemented a mandatory COVID-19 immunization policy for all of its employees and vendors. (Dkt. 86 at pp. 103-04). Plaintiffs refused to comply with the immunization policy and were let go or had their vendor privileges terminated. (Dkt 86 at pp. 10-25, 92-93, 116-17).

Plaintiffs have now sued Methodist and the Government defendants under Section 1983 and various state-law causes of action. They ground their Section 1983 claims in their contention that “an individual has the federally secured right to refuse the administration of an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) drug (e.g., Pfizer BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine) biologic, or device without incurring a penalty or losing a benefit to which they are otherwise entitled.” (Dkt. 86 at p. 27). By “Emergency Use Authorization drug” or “EUA drug,” Plaintiffs mean a drug that has been introduced into interstate commerce under the authority of the “emergency use” provisions of 21 U.S.C § 360bbb-3. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services to authorize “an emergency use of a product” that is “intended for use in an actual or potential emergency” but “is not approved, licensed, or cleared for commercial distribution ....” See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(a). The emergency-use provisions may be, and in the case of the COVID pandemic were, invoked on the basis of a determination by the Secretary of Health and Human Services that there is a public health emergency involving a disease that may be attributable to a biological agent. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b). (Dkt. 86 at p. 7). Plaintiffs argue that there is a Constitutionally relevant distinction between mandatory use of a “licensed vaccine” and mandatory use of an “EUA drug” like the COVID-19 vaccine. (Dkt. 86 at p. 27) (emphasis in Plaintiffs' complaint).

Plaintiffs originally filed this lawsuit in Texas state court, and Methodist removed it to this Court under the federal-question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Dkt. 1). Plaintiffs have amended their pleading three times in this Court. (Dkt. 12; Dkt. 72; Dkt. 86).

RULE 12(b)(6)

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests a pleading's compliance with this requirement and is “appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). A complaint can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if its well-pleaded factual allegations, when taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not state a claim that is plausible on its face. Amacker v. Renaissance Asset Mgmt., LLC, 657 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2011); Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). As the Fifth Circuit has further clarified:

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. This includes the basic requirement that the facts plausibly establish each required element for each legal claim.

However, a complaint is insufficient if it offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Coleman v. Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756, 763-64 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Furthermore, “a complaint may be dismissed if it clearly lacks merit-for example, where there is an absence of law to support a claim of the sort made.” Thurman v. Medical Transportation Management, Inc., 982 F.3d 953, 956 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court's review is limited to the complaint; any documents attached to the complaint; any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint; and matters subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Allen v. Vertafore, Inc., 28 F.4th 613, 616 (5th Cir. 2022); George v. SI Group, Inc., 36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022).

ANALYSIS

Since the COVID pandemic began, at least two lawsuits materially identical to this one have been filed in this District and dismissed on the pleadings. See Bridges v. Houston Methodist Hospital, 543 F.Supp.3d 525 (S.D. Tex. 2021) aff'd, No. 21-20311, 2022 WL 2116213 (5th Cir. June 13, 2022); Pearson v. Shriners Hospitals for Children, No. 3:23-CV-387, 2024 WL 3022397 (S.D. Tex. June 7, 2024).^[2] The Court similarly concludes that Plaintiffs, despite amending their pleading multiple times, have failed to state a legally cognizable federal claim.

-Section 1983

Plaintiffs bring all but one^[3] of their federal claims under Section 1983. (Dkt. 86 at pp. 117-21). Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights and instead was designed to provide a remedy for violations of federal statutory and Constitutional rights. Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2008). “To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”^[4] Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 980 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1993).

If the source of the alleged right is a federal statute, then “[i]t is essential to a private enforcement action under § 1983 . . . that the federal statute in question unambiguously give rise to privately enforceable substantive rights.” Johnson v. Housing Authority of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in Johnson); see also Thurman, 982 F.3d at 956 (“[F]ederal law must provide an unambiguously conferred right with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.”) (quotation marks omitted). “The inquiry in this context is virtually the same as that involved in private rights of action implied directly from a federal statute rather than by way of § 1983.” Johnson, 442 F.3d at 359. “It is presumed Congress did not intend to create a private enforceable right; the burden is on the plaintiff to show otherwise.” Southwestern Bell, 529 F.3d at 260; see also Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he plaintiff has the relatively heavy burden to show Congress intended private enforcement, and must overcome the presumption that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action.”).

“[I]n the end, very few statutes are held to confer rights enforceable under § 1983.” Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360. Moreover, a Section 1983 claim may not be brought to enforce an administrative regulation, as “federal rights are created by Congress, not agencies of the Executive Branch[.]” Thurman, 982 F.3d at 955; see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001) (“Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not.”).

Plaintiffs assert that the rights they seek to vindicate through Section 1983 stem from the following sources:

530. The CDC COVID Vaccination Program Provider Agreement, and the implementing statutes and regulations found at 45 CFR §46, the Belmont Report, 21 U.S.C. §360bbb-3, Article VII of the ICCPR Treaty, Federal Wide Assurance, the EUA Scope of Authorization letter, and the Fourteenth Amendment clearly and unambiguously create rights enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Dkt. 86 at pp. 117-21.

Plaintiffs also invoke 10 U.S.C. § 980; the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e (“the PREP Act”); and the Spending Clause. (Dkt. 86 at pp. 76, 121-22).

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States that they may enforce through Section 1983. To begin with, several of the sources of rights cited by Plaintiffs-namely, 45 C.F.R. § 46; the Belmont Report; Article VII of the ICCPR Treaty; the Federal...