Briggs v. City of Portland

SHELBY BRIGGS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF PORTLAND, Defendant

No. 2:16-cv-00374-JDL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

May 4, 2017

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant, the City of Portland, moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Counts I through VI of the complaint of plaintiff, Shelby Briggs, a City Community Health Promotion Specialist from January 2011 to June 2016, alleging gender discrimination (Counts I and II), retaliation (Counts III and IV), a violation of the Maine Whistleblowers' Protection Act (Count V), and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI). See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts I through VI of Plaintiff's Complaint ("Motion") (ECF No. 5) at 1. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the Motion be denied.

I. Applicable Legal Standards

The Supreme Court has stated:

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). This standard requires the pleading of "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes the truth of all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Román-Oliveras v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir. 2011). Ordinarily, in weighing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a court may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment." Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001). "There is, however, a narrow exception for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs' claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Factual Background

The complaint sets forth the following relevant factual allegations.¹

Plaintiff Shelby Briggs worked for the City of Portland's Department of Health and Human Services as a Community Health Promotion Specialist from January 2011 until June 2016. Plaintiff's Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") (ECF No. 1) ¶ 11. In that capacity, in 2013, she first encountered an individual referred to by the parties as "SL." Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. SL, who's legal name is Simon Langdon, and who went by "Kat" at the time of these events, was a transgender man transitioning to a woman. Motion ¶ at 1.

On September 10, 2013, the plaintiff began facilitating a re-entry and recovery program at the Portland Recovery Community Center ("PRCC"). Complaint, ¶ 13. SL entered the room and took a seat directly next to the plaintiff and began to make comments indicating that SL knew the names of the plaintiff's partner and daughter, and referred to the plaintiff's daughter as "hot." Id. ¶¶ 14, 15. The plaintiff told SL that such comments were inappropriate. Id. ¶ 16. SL continued speaking with the plaintiff and made a string of offensive comments, including saying that the plaintiff reminded SL of a counselor SL had in prison who was "a lying cunt"; referring to SL's sex offender conviction as "a victimless crime"; talking about a 10-year prison sentence in Florida and mentioning both that SL had sex with other inmates and the insertion of various items into SL's rectum; saying that SL was a member of the street gang the Latin Kings; recounting SL inserting items in SL's rectum for the sake of SL's prison counselor; and, bragging about SL's ability to fit various items, including cell phones and knives, into SL's rectum. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.

SL's admission about being a sex offender caused one member of the group to get up and leave, and following SL's description of SL's prison experience, caused the plaintiff to end the meeting. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20. SL's admission about being a sex offender was troubling because the PRCC prohibits sex offenders because it also hosts programs for youth. Id. ¶ 18. Further, although the meeting was a substance abuse recovery group, SL did not mention any substance abuse issues. Id. ¶ 19.

Immediately after the meeting, the plaintiff returned home and encountered her partner Chris, who informed her that SL had just sent him a series of messages through Facebook. Id. ¶ 21. The plaintiff looked at the pictures on the profile of the person contacting Chris and confirmed that SL was the same person whom she had just met at the meeting. Id. ¶ 22. The plaintiff thenchecked her own Facebook account and discovered that she too had been sent a "Friend Request" from SL, and immediately blocked SL from being able to view her Facebook page. Id. ¶ 23.

On the following day, September 11, 2013, the plaintiff informed her supervisors by email of the previous day's events. Id. ¶ 24. At a meeting with her supervisors the next day, the plaintiff's supervisor Bethany Sanborn told her that the supervisors could not ban sex offenders from attending PRCC's group sessions, and that the plaintiff should "take her emotion out of it." Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. The plaintiff reminded Sanborn that both women and children attended programming at the PRCC, to which Sanborn replied that the issue was one for PRCC's director, and instructed the plaintiff to address the issue to him. Id. ¶¶ 28 - 29.

Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff's other supervisor arrived, and the plaintiff updated her on her encounter with SL. Id. ¶ 30. Together, they met with the PRCC's director and management who agreed that SL would not be permitted at the PRCC because of the PRCC's preexisting ban on sex offenders. Id. ¶ 31. The plaintiff then asked Sanborn to inform partner organizations who did similar work to be aware of SL's presence at their meetings. Id. ¶ 32. Sanborn responded that she would need to speak with legal counsel but would get back to the plaintiff. Id. That afternoon, the plaintiff received a call from a co-worker expressing her outrage that the City was not offering the plaintiff any support or assistance after the plaintiff had reported harassment by SL. Id. ¶ 35.

Later that day, around 4 p.m., Sanborn contacted the plaintiff and asked her not to notify partner agencies regarding the SL incident, citing her conversation with an attorney who works at the police station, and stated that the plaintiff could call the police the following day and inform the police of the situation. Id. ¶ 36.

In addition to running certain meetings for the City of Portland, the plaintiff also attended a support group not affiliated with the City in her personal capacity. Id. ¶ 37. At one of thesepersonal group meetings a few weeks prior to September 11, 2013, the plaintiff recalled seeing SL, and also recalled seeing SL sitting next to a mother and her young children and playing with the children. Id. That evening, she privately contacted friends who attended this support group via Facebook, and informed them of SL's sex offender status, including a link to SL's publicly-available sex offender registration information. Id. In the message, she asked those she contacted not to inform SL that she had contacted them. Id. She did not contact members of any groups for which she worked in her capacity as an employee of the City of Portland. Id. On September 13, 2013, the plaintiff contacted a child sex crimes detective and conveyed the information that Sanborn had asked her to convey about the SL incident. Id. ¶ 40.

On September 13, 2013, the plaintiff was contacted by the PRCC and informed that SL had contacted the PRCC and had seen the plaintiff's private Facebook message of the night before. Id. ¶ 41. That same day, SL filed a complaint at the plaintiff's place of work stating that she "broke [their] confidentiality." Id. ¶ 43. SL posted on a public recovery discussion site that SL had met with the director of the India Street Public Health Clinic and the director had told SL that the plaintiff would be fired. Id. ¶ 45.

There was no confidentiality agreement at the group that both the plaintiff and SL attended, the mothers that she contacted had also seen SL at the group meeting, and the information that she disseminated about SL's sex offender status was publicly available. Id. ¶ 44.

On the afternoon of September 13, the plaintiff was contacted by Sanborn, who informed her that she was being placed on paid administrative leave pending an investigation into the plaintiff's alleged "breach of confidentiality." Id. ¶ 46. The plaintiff relayed to Sanborn that she was afraid of SL; that SL was desperately trying to get her contact information; that SL was stalking her; and that it was clear that SL had been thinking about her for much longer than sherealized. Id. ¶¶ 46, 47. Friends began to alert the plaintiff that SL was requesting her personal information. Id. ¶ 49.

On September 16, 2013, the plaintiff spoke with Carol Young, the City of Portland's Employee Assistance Program therapist, who encouraged the plaintiff to obtain an order of protection against SL. Id. ¶ 52. The following day, after being informed by another person that SL had made another attempt to get in contact with her and had made threatening remarks, the plaintiff filed a report with the Westbrook Police Department. Id. ¶ 53.

SL...