Briggs v. State

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CHARLES WADE BRIGGS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 06-22-00057-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Sixth District, Texarkana

April 21, 2023

Do Not Publish

Date Submitted: January 27, 2023

On Appeal from the 336th District Court Fannin County, Texas Trial Court No. CR-20-27898

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jeff Rambin, Justice

On the night of July 21, 2017, at least three men forced their way into the home of Gina and Johnnie Jones, and while one of the men subdued Gina, the other men subdued Johnnie and shot him at close range in the back of his head. As a result, a Fannin County jury convicted Charles Wade Briggs of attempted^[1] murder,^[2] burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault,^[3] and engaging in organized criminal activity.^[4] In this appeal,^[5] Briggs challenges his conviction for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault. He contends (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that he committed burglary of a habitation, (2) that the trial court erred when it failed to give an accomplice witness instruction, (3) that the evidence does not corroborate the testimony of the accomplice witness, (4) that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's deadly weapon finding, and (5) that he did not receive notice of the State's intent to seek a deadly weapon finding. We will affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.

Regarding Briggs's second, third, and fourth issues, Briggs raised identical issues and made virtually identical arguments in the appeal of his attempted murder conviction. Because these issues are identical to those addressed in our opinion dated this date in Briggs v. State, cause number 06-22-00056-CR, we overrule these issues for the reasons stated in that opinion. Further, because we have fully set forth the evidence presented at trial in our opinion in cause number 06-22-00058-CR, we will not repeat it here.

I. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury's Verdict

In his first issue, Briggs contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that he was guilty of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault. Briggs argues that there was no evidence that he entered Johnnie's house, that he knew or anticipated that a burglary and aggravated assault would be committed, that he solicited or aided others to commit the offense, or that he conspired with others to do so.

A. Standard of Review

"In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2019, pet. ref'd) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). “Our rigorous legal sufficiency review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917-18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). "We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury 'to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.'" Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

"Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge." Id. at 298 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). "The 'hypothetically correct' jury charge is 'one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.'" Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

In our review, we consider "events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). It is not required that each fact "point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction." Id. "Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone." Paroline v. State, 532 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004))). "Further, 'we must consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, even if that evidence was improperly admitted.'" Williamson, 589 S.W.3d at 297-98 (quoting Fowler v. State, 517 S.W.3d 167, 176 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2017), rev'd in part by 544 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).

The jury, as "the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony[, could] 'believe all of [the] witnesses' testimony, portions of it, or none of it.'" Id. at 297 (second alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). "We give 'almost complete deference to a jury's decision when that decision is based upon an evaluation of credibility.'" Id. (quoting Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).

B. Analysis

Briggs was charged with burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault. Because the evidence supported the theory that Briggs might be liable as a party, the court's charge included instructions that allowed the jury to convict Briggs either as a primary actor or as a party.^[6] Under the statute and the indictment, in order to convict Briggs, as a primary actor, of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault, the State had to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Briggs (1) entered a habitation (2) without the effective consent of the owner thereof, Johnnie,^[7] (3) with the intent to commit aggravated assault. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a), (d); Morrow v. State, 486 S.W.3d 139, 164 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2016, pet. ref'd). A person commits an "aggravated assault if the person commits an assault and (1) causes serious bodily injury to another; or (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault." McDonald v. State, No. 06-21-00059-CR, 2022 WL 23822, at *2, n.4 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Jan. 4, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (Supp.)). "A person commits an [assault if he] intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1) (Supp.).

The State tried the case, and the jury was charged, on the alternative theory that Briggs was liable as a party. Under that theory, "[a] person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.01. As applicable to this case, a person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by another person in two ways. First, the person is responsible for the conduct of another person if, "acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02(a)(2). Second, the person is responsible for the conduct of another person if,

in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02(b).

Under the first of these ways, § 7.02(a)(2), "[t]he words 'acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense' clearly mean, at a minimum, that a defendant must act intentionally with respect to the result elements of a result-oriented offense." Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) The first variant of aggravated assault-by causing serious bodily injury-is a result-oriented offense. Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Consequently, for the offense of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit aggravated assault by causing bodily injury, the intent to promote or assist includes not only the commission of the burglary of a habitation, but also the result of the aggravated assault, i.e., the serious bodily injury of Johnnie. See Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 300.

"The second variant of aggravated assault-assault while using a deadly weapon-is a 'nature of the conduct offense.'" Hall v. State, 145 S.W.3d 754 758 (Tex. App -Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (citing Guzman v. State, 988 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1999, no pet.)). "This is because the Texas Legislature has proscribed the method in which the actor commits the assault, regardless of the outcome of that conduct." Id. "A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct . . . when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct." Tex. Penal...