Briggs v. Yi

1

JOSHUA D. BRIGGS, Plaintiff, v. OREAN YI, in his personal capacity; and MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-00265-SLG

United States District Court, D. Alaska

April 12, 2023

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

SHARON L. GLEASON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This order addresses each of the four motions pending before the Court. The primary motion is Plaintiff Joshua Briggs' Motion and Memorandum in Support for Preliminary Injunction at Docket 8. Defendants Orean Yi and the Municipality of Anchorage responded in opposition to the preliminary injunction motion at Docket 23, to which Mr Briggs replied at Docket 26.

Defendants have also filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at Docket 24. Mr. Briggs responded to that motion at Docket 28, requesting that the Court defer consideration of the motion pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure until after close of discovery. Defendants filed a reply at Docket 34.

Mr Briggs has filed two additional motions that are ripe for decision. First, he filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint at Docket 30, to which Defendants responded in opposition at Docket 33, and Mr Briggs replied at Docket 35. Second, Mr. Briggs filed a Motion to Deem Confidentiality Waived or Require Defendants to Provide a Privilege Log at Docket 31, to which Defendants responded in opposition at Docket 36, and Mr. Briggs replied at Docket 37.

Mr. Briggs requested oral argument with respect to his Motion and Memorandum in Support for Preliminary Injunction at Docket 8, but oral argument is not necessary to the Court's determination. Oral argument was not requested with respect to any of the other pending motions and it is not necessary to the Court's determination.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Briggs alleges violations of his constitutional rights arising under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.^[1] His claims arise from his arrest on July 12, 2022, for Disorderly Conduct pursuant to Anchorage Municipal Code (“AMC”) 08.30.120(A)(2) and Harassment pursuant to AMC 08.10.110(A)(1).^[2]

According to Mr. Briggs' unverified complaint, on the day in question, he entered a Holiday Stationstore to purchase a few items and got in line to pay for them behind Officer Orean Yi, who was on duty and in uniform. Mr. Briggs said, “Hey look, it's a pig.” Officer Yi turned and assumed a “defensive posture.” Mr. Briggs repeated, “What, you're a pig.” Mr. Briggs claims that he “could smell alcohol on Yi's breath” and asked whether Officer Yi was drunk, saying that “he would contact Yi's superior to have him sobriety tested.” Officer Yi then arrested and handcuffed Mr. Briggs, searched the contents of his wallet without his consent, and put him in the back of a patrol car for more than an hour.^[3] The complaint alleges that Mr. Briggs was arrested in retaliation for criticizing a police officer, which he claims is constitutionally protected speech.^[4] In his motion for a preliminary injunction, Mr. Briggs explains that the Harassment charge was dismissed for lack of probable cause on September 13, 2022. He also states that he filed a motion contesting probable cause for his Disorderly Conduct charge and that charge was dismissed on December 5, 2022.^[5]

Based on these allegations, Mr. Briggs brings this action against Officer Yi in his personal capacity and the Municipality of Anchorage.^[6] The complaint contains the following counts: (1) First Amendment retaliation; (2) false arrest; (3) unreasonable search and seizure; (4) municipal liability for failure to train and supervise; (5) punitive damages; and (6) Anchorage Municipal Code 08.30.120(A)(2) is unconstitutional.^[7] Mr. Briggs seeks damages from Officer Yi in his personal capacity and the Municipality of Anchorage, an injunction against enforcement of AMC 08.30.120(A)(2), attorneys fees and costs, and punitive damages.^[8]

Defendants' statement of facts differs in several respects from the recitation of facts in Mr. Briggs' complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction. According to Defendants, “it was Mr. Briggs' conduct, and not the content of his speech, that resulted in charges being brought.”^[9] Specifically, Mr. Briggs “raised his voice” and “continued to yell and create loud noise disturbing other customers by acting disorderly.”^[10] And according to Defendants, while Mr. Briggs did move the state court to dismiss the Disorderly Conduct charge for failure to show probable cause, that court ruled from the bench that there was probable cause. Defendants maintain that the state court later dismissed the Disorderly Conduct charge for the convenience of the prosecutor and not for lack of probable cause.^[11]

Mr. Briggs's motion for a preliminary injunction seeks an order that would enjoin Defendants “from taking action to prevent him from exercising his first amendment rights or retaliating against him for doing so.” He also requests that Defendants “be preliminarily enjoined from enforcing AMC 08.30.120(A)(2) in any manner.”^[12]

JURISDICTION

Mr. Briggs brought this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 seeking redress for alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.^[13]

LEGAL STANDARD

In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) a preliminary injunction is in the public interest.^[14]

The Supreme Court in Winter characterized “injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”^[15] Thus, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that in the absence of a preliminary injunction, ‘the [plaintiff] is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered.'”^[16] “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury . ...[A] plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”^[17] Moreover, “[t]here must be a ‘sufficient causal connection' between the alleged irreparable harm and the activity to be enjoined,” such as a “showing that ‘the requested injunction would forestall' the irreparable harm.”^[18]

Following Winter, the Ninth Circuit addressed the first element-the likelihood of success on the merits-and held that its “serious questions” approach to preliminary injunctions was still valid “when applied as a part of the four-element Winter test.”^[19] Accordingly, if a plaintiff shows “that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits'-a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits- then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor.'”^[20] “Serious questions are ‘substantial, difficult, and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberative investigation.'”^[21] They “need not promise a certainty of success, nor even present a probability of success, but must involve a ‘fair chance on the merits.'”^[22] All four Winter elements must still be satisfied under this approach,^[23] but analyses of the last two elements-balance of the equities and consideration of the public interest-merge when the government is the opposing party.^[24]

Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, and “[t]he essence of equity jurisdiction is the power of the court to fashion a remedy depending upon the necessities of the particular case.”^[25]

“Courts asked to issue preliminary injunctions based on First Amendment grounds face an inherent tension: the moving party bears the burden of showing likely success on the merits . . . and yet within that merits determination the government bears the burden of justifying its speech-restrictive law.”^[26]Accordingly, “in the First Amendment context, the moving party bears the initial burden of making a colorable claim that its First Amendment rights have been infringed, or are threatened with infringement, at which point the burden shifts to the government to justify the restriction.”^[27]

DISCUSSION

I. Standing to Seek a Preliminary Injunction

Under Article III of the Constitution, “[t]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to ‘cases' and ‘controversies.'”^[28] Federal courts enforce this jurisdictional limitation through the doctrine of standing.^[29] A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” which consists of three elements.^[30] A plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact, meaning an “invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) causation; and (3) redressability, meaning that “the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.”^[31] The plaintiff “must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”^[32]

“First Amendment challenges ‘present unique standing considerations' because of the ‘chilling effect of sweeping restrictions' on speech.”^[33] These considerations “tilt[] dramatically toward a finding of standing.”^[34] “‘[T]he Supreme Court has dispensed with rigid standing requirements' for First Amendment protected speech claims and has instead endorsed a ‘hold your tongue and challenge now' approach.”^[35]

Yet even in the First Amendment context, a plaintiff seeking prospective injunctive relief must demonstrate a...