Briglin v. Baker

TODD BRIGLIN, Plaintiff, v. BROOKS T. BAKER, ESQ., DA, et al., Defendants.

15-CV-6162L

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

October 1, 2018

DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Todd Briglin, appearing pro se, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the time he filed the complaint in March 2015, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Dkt. #9) on November 9, 2015. It appears from the DOCCS Inmate Lookup Service, http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/, that plaintiff was released from custody in May 2016.

Plaintiff has sued several defendants, as described in more detail below, but in general they are associated either with Steuben County ("County defendants") or New York State ("State defendants"). Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his federal constitutional rights in a number of respects, arising out of his criminal prosecution, conviction, and subsequent incarceration. Both the County and State defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has not responded to the motions.¹

BACKGROUND

While plaintiff's allegations in the amended complaint (Dkt. #9) are prolix and somewhat convoluted, they may fairly be summarized as follows. In May 2012, plaintiff was arrested in connection with an alleged burglary and illegal sale of firearms. During the ensuing prosecution, he entered into a cooperation agreement, with the understanding that in exchange for his cooperation, some charges would later be dropped, and that he would receive some leniency if he were convicted and sentenced on the remaining charges.

Plaintiff alleges that as part of his cooperation, he provided investigators with information concerning certain other individuals. He alleges that he was assured by investigators from the Steuben County Sheriff's Office and the New York State Police that the fact of his cooperation would be kept confidential.

Based partly on the information provided by plaintiff, several other people were eventually charged and convicted of certain crimes. Plaintiff alleges, however, that word of his cooperation was leaked to the news media, and thereby made known to those individuals.

Plaintiff ultimately pleaded guilty to several charges, in January 2013, as part of a plea deal. Apparently some other charges were dismissed, as promised. He alleges that he once again received assurances from defendants, this time that he would not be placed in the same facility ashis codefendants, i.e., the persons about whom he had provided information, and that he would be kept safe from them.

Following his conviction, plaintiff was incarcerated at Livingston Correctional Facility ("Livingston"). He states that upon arrival, he was interviewed by Sergeant Macready, and that based on established intake procedures, plaintiff gave Macready a list of people in the prison system who might pose a threat to plaintiff, in other words, his "enemies."

After his arrival, however, plaintiff learned that Robert Mills was also an inmate there. Mills was one of the individuals about whom plaintiff had made statements to investigators, and he was one of the persons whom plaintiff identified to Macready as a potential enemy.

Plaintiff alleges that after he learned that Mills was also an inmate at Livingston, he informed his mother in a telephone conversation about his concerns, and she contacted Assistant Public Defender Philip Roche, who had been assigned to represent plaintiff during his criminal prosecution. Roche allegedly told plaintiff's mother that he would take steps to address plaintiff's concerns.

According to plaintiff, on July 17, 2013, while he was working in the maintenance department, he was warned by a fellow inmate that someone planned to attack him for being a "rat." Plaintiff alleges that he then went to see his job supervisor, Gregory Brewer, and told him about the impending assault. Brewer said that he would inform a sergeant.

About an hour and a half later, plaintiff was assaulted in the mess hall. Plaintiff states that he was sitting at a table when an inmate (whom plaintiff does not identify) walked up and struck plaintiff in the back of the head, repeatedly. Plaintiff alleges that there were about sevencorrection officers nearby, but they did nothing to intervene. Eventually plaintiff was able to get to his feet, whereupon he was escorted out by an officer.

Plaintiff was then taken to the medical building, where he was seen by a nurse. He alleges that he received no medication or other treatment at that time.

Plaintiff's symptoms worsened, however, to the point where he had two large swellings on his head. Almost a month after the assault, he was taken to see Dr. Marcia Fries, a staff physician at Livingston. She sent him for a consult with an ophthalmologist and a neurologist. Both prescribed certain treatment, but plaintiff alleges that he has continued to have problems with his right eye, and daily headaches.

In October 2014, plaintiff was transferred to Hale Creek Correctional Facility. There he was seen by Dr. McPhillips. McPhillips prescribed propranolol, but due to the negative side effects, plaintiff was taken off that medication and given ibuprofen instead.

In his amended complaint, plaintiff has asserted six causes of action, which will be described in more detail below. The current named defendants are the County defendants-Steuben County District Attorney Brooks Baker, Assistant Public Defender Philip Roche, and Steuben County Sheriff's Office Investigators Eric Tyner and Donald Lewis-and the State defendants: State Police Investigators Eric Hurd and John Karasiewicz; Livingston Superintendent Michelle Artus; Livingston Deputy Superintendent for Security ("D.S.S.") Gregory Saj; Maintenance Supervisor Gregory Brewer; Sergeant Macready; and doctors Fries and Phillips. Plaintiff has also asserted claims against several "John Doe" defendants, who are officers that were allegedly present, but failed to intervene, when plaintiff was assaulted. Thosedefendants have not been identified or served. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages in an unspecified amount.

DISCUSSION

I. Claims Against the County Defendants

Plaintiff's claims against the County defendants must be dismissed, for a variety of reasons.

First, plaintiff's claim against Roche (in the second cause of action, which alleges several constitutional violations) must be dismissed. "Section 1983 establishes a private right of action for money damages against state officials, acting 'under color' of law, who violate a constitutional or statutory right." Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525, 532 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). But as the Second Circuit has made clear, "public defenders or court-appointed defense attorneys do not act 'under color of law.'" Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir. 1979). There is thus no basis for a § 1983 claim against Roche.

The claims against defendant Baker (who is named in the first and second causes of action) must also be dismissed. Plaintiff's claims against Baker in these two counts are to a great extent duplicative of each other, but the gist of them is that Baker assured plaintiff that if plaintiff agreed to cooperate, his confidentiality would be protected, and he would not have to worry about being placed in the same facility as any of the individuals named by plaintiff.

Baker is immune from liability, however. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity when they engage in activities "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976), and done "in the course of [their] roleas ... advocate[s] for the State," Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). "Prosecutorial immunity from § 1983 liability is broadly defined, covering virtually all acts, regardless of motivation, associated with the prosecutor's function as an advocate." O'Neal v. Morales, 679 Fed.Appx. 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1995)).

The Second Circuit has held that plea bargaining is a prosecutorial function that confers absolute immunity. See Kent v. Cardone, 404 Fed.Appx. 540, 542-43 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Taylor v. Kavanaugh, 640 F.2d 450, 453 (1981)). Baker's alleged assurances to plaintiff about the confidentiality of his cooperation were made in the context of plea bargaining negotiations. Thus, he is absolutely immune from liability with regard to those statements.

Even if Baker's alleged assurances we viewed as investigative, rather than prosecutorial, Baker would still be entitled to dismissal of plaintiff's claims against him on the basis of qualified immunity. See O'Neal v. Morales, 679 Fed.Appx. 16, 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (only qualified immunity attaches when a prosecutor performs "investigative" functions) (citing Buckley, 509 U.S. 259).

"Qualified immunity shields public officials from an action for civil damages, to the extent that their challenged acts do not violate 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Ivery v. Baldauf, 284 F.Supp.3d 426, 442 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "[Q]ualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability ... ." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Accord Bryant v. Egan, 890 F.3d 382, 386 (2d Cir. 2018).On a motion to dismiss, the qualified immunity defense may be established if it is "based on facts appearing on the face of the complaint." McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2004).

There is no clearly established right that could have been violated here, and Baker is therefore entitled, at the least, to qualified immunity. For one thing, a state's failure to protect an individual from private...