Bristol v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.

597 F.Supp.3d 574

Jessica BRISTOL, Plaintiff,

v.SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES USA, INC., Defendant.

21 Civ. 10636 (AJN) (GWG)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed April 11, 2022

Catherine Elizabeth Anderson, Amy Robinson, Giskan Solotaroff & Anderson, LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Lance N. Olitt, Kluger Healey, LLC, Fairfield, NJ, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Jessica Bristol brings this employment discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ; the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 29; and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y. City Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 131, alleging her former employer, Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. ("Securitas"), discriminated against her because of her pregnancy and disability. See Complaint, filed Dec. 13, 2021 (Docket # 1) ("Comp."), at 9-10. Before the Court is defendant's motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. ("FAA").¹ For the following reasons, defendant's motion is granted.²

I. BACKGROUND

Securitas "provides uniformed security officer and patrol services for businesses and organizations." Comp. ¶ 11. Bristol began working at Securitas in April 2016. See id. ¶ 20; see also Securitas Dispute Resolution Agreement Acknowledgement, dated Apr. 20, 2016, annexed as Ex. A to Fredericks Decl. ("DRA Acknowledgement"). During the onboarding process, Bristol signed a form acknowledging that she had received a copy of Securitas's Dispute Resolution Agreement (the "Agreement"). The form stated:

I have received a copy of the Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (the "Company") Dispute Resolution Agreement (the "Agreement") and I have read and I understand all of the terms contained in the Agreement. I understand that employment or continued employment at the Company constitutes acceptance of this Agreement and its terms. I further acknowledge that the Company and I are mutually bound by this Agreement and its terms.

DRA Acknowledgement at 1. The Agreement (annexed as Ex. B to Fredericks Decl.) states that it "applies to your employment whether or not you sign the acknowledgment, which is intended simply to confirm that you have received and read your copy." Agreement at 1.

In its first paragraph, the Agreement states that it is an "Arbitration Agreement." Id. The first paragraph further states: "Under the terms set forth below, both you and the Company mutually agree and thus are required to resolve claims either may have against the other by Arbitration instead of in a court of law." Id. (emphasis added). A later provision provides that the Agreement "appl[ies] to the resolution of disputes that otherwise would be resolved in a court of law or before a forum other than arbitration," including, "without limitation, disputes relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement." Id. at 2. The Agreement recognizes that a court would have to resolve any disputes "over the enforceability, revocability, or validity of the Agreement." Id. at 2. The Agreement applies to "all disputes regarding the employment relationship." Id. The Agreement states that it "is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act," id. at 1, and requires that disputes that fall under its terms are "to be resolved only by an Arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial," id. at 2.

According to the complaint, several years after beginning employment with Securitas, Bristol became pregnant, and in September 2019 she was diagnosed as having a high-risk pregnancy. See Comp. ¶¶ 27-28. After Bristol underwent a surgical procedure, her physicians advised her not to stand for long periods of time, and Bristol provided Securitas with a physician's note to that effect. See id. ¶¶ 29-31. Bristol alleges that Securitas could have placed her on restrictive desk duty to minimize the health risk associated with her employment, but it did not, and she was often required to stand at work. See id. ¶¶ 33-37. Bristol eventually gave birth prematurely to a child who has experienced significant health problems. See id. ¶¶ 38-56. Bristol alleges that Securitas's failure to provide her with a sitting post constituted discrimination on the basis of her disability and pregnancy. See id. ¶¶ 57-68.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The FAA reflects "a strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution." Ross v. Am. Express Co., 547 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Section 2 of the FAA provides in pertinent part:

A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 4 of the FAA permits a party to obtain from a federal district court "an order directing that [an] arbitration proceed in the manner provided for" in an arbitration agreement. Id. § 4. As the Second Circuit has held, the FAA "requires the federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements, reflecting Congress’ recognition that arbitration is to be encouraged as a means of reducing the costs and delays associated with litigation." Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).

The Second Circuit has held that a court considering a motion to compel arbitration of a dispute first must

determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; second, it must determine the scope of that agreement; third, if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the case are arbitrable, it must then decide whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration.

JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). "[U]nder the FAA, ‘any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’ " Id. at 171 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ).

When a motion to compel arbitration is brought, a "court applies a standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment." Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003). "If undisputed facts in the record require[ ] the issue of arbitrability to be resolved against the Plaintiff as a matter of law," the motion to compel arbitration must be granted. Id. If, however, the party opposing arbitration can show "there is an issue of fact as to the making of the agreement for arbitration, then a trial is necessary." Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4 ).

III. DISCUSSION

Bristol does not contest that factors two through four of the four-factor test require arbitration here. Instead, she argues that the Agreement is insufficiently definite in its terms to be enforceable. See Pl. Opp. at 3-7. She also argues that she did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her right to a jury trial. See id. at 7-12. We view each of these arguments as relating to the first factor of the four-factor test: mutual assent, and we thus turn to a discussion of that factor.

To determine whether there is an agreement to arbitrate, "we look to ‘state contract law principles.’ " Abdullayeva v. Attending Homecare Servs. LLC, 928 F.3d 218, 222 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) ). Under New York law, contract formation requires a "manifestation of mutual assent [that is] sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect to all material terms." Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 289 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541 (1981) ).

Bristol argues that the Agreement is too indefinite for her to be bound by its terms because it "lacks essential, material terms which are necessary for any agreement to arbitrate," such as "the location of the arbitration, the arbitral forum, the arbitrator or neutral to be selected, the rules of arbitration ... which will apply, and the applicable choice of law." Pl. Opp. at 5.

Bristol focuses first on the Agreement's procedure for selecting an arbitrator, arguing that the Agreement provides merely that the parties "will attempt to negotiate a mutually agreeable arbitrator." Id. While it is correct that the Agreement directs the parties to attempt to agree to an arbitrator, the Agreement provides details about the selection of an arbitrator if that attempt fails. The paragraph entitled "Selecting the Arbitrator" provides:

The Arbitrator shall be selected by mutual agreement of the Company and the Employee. Unless the Employee and Company mutually agree otherwise, the Arbitrator shall be an attorney licensed to practice in the location where the arbitration proceeding will be conducted or a retired federal or state judicial officer who presided in the jurisdiction where the arbitration will be conducted. If for any reason the parties cannot agree to an Arbitrator, either party may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction with authority over the location where the arbitration will be conducted for appointment of a neutral Arbitrator. The court shall then appoint an Arbitrator, who shall act under this agreement with the same force and effect as if the parties had selected the Arbitrator by mutual agreement. The location of the arbitration proceeding shall be no more

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