Britt v. United States

ROBERT BRITT, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

Civ. No. 18-16357 (PGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

June 16, 2020

OPINION

PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Robert Britt (hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Britt"), is a federal inmate proceeding pro se with a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Also pending before this Court is Petitioner's motion to amend his § 2255 motion. For the following reasons, Petitioner's motion to amend will be denied. Additionally, all but one claim in Petitioner's § 2255 motion are denied and a certificate of appealability shall not issue on those claims. An evidentiary hearing though is necessary on one of Petitioner's claims.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner, along with several other individuals, was charged in a criminal complaint on March 26, 2014 with conspiracy to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin. (See Crim. No. 16-403-1 ECF 1). At that time, Petitioner was serving a state criminal sentence. Petitioner had his initial appearance on August 6, 2014, where he waived his rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to remain in federal custody and elected to be returned to state custody. (See id. ECF 176). Over the next two years, Petitioner's counsel agreed to numerous continuances to further facilitate plea negotiations.

On September 8, 2016, a federal grand jury returned a one count indictment against Petitioner for conspiracy with intent to distribute one hundred grams or more of heroin. (See id. ECF 288). On July 10, 2017, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement. (See id. ECF 306). The plea agreement stipulated to a recommended sentence of 144 months pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). (See id. at 3). On December 7, 2017, this Court entered judgment against Petitioner and sentenced him to 144 months imprisonment. (See id. ECF 312). Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.

Petitioner submitted his original § 2255 motion in November, 2018. (See ECF 1). On November 29, 2018, this Court received a letter from Petitioner seeking to add another claim to this action. In December, 2018, this Court administratively terminated this matter because Petitioner had not filed his original § 2255 motion on the proper form. (See ECF 6). Thereafter, Petitioner submitted another § 2255 motion in December, 2018. (See ECF 7). On February 15, 2019, this Court issued a notice and order on Petitioner as his December 2018 § 2255 motion appeared to abandon claims that had been raised in Petitioner's November, 2018 filings. (See ECF 8). On March 1, 2019, this Court received Petitioner's response stating that he did not wish to abandon the claims he raised in his November, 2018 filings. Accordingly, the following claims are raised by Petitioner:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to assert that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act ("IADA") Anti-Shuttling Provision ("Claim I")

2. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to Petitioner's career offender designation ("Claim II")

3. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a § 5G1.3 sentencing issue ("Claim III")4. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a post-accusation delay dismissal of indictment ("Claim IV")

5. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to a three-level sentencing enhancement ("Claim V")

6. Sham prosecution ("Claim VI")

Respondent was ordered to file a response to Petitioner's claims. (See ECF 10). Respondent then received two extensions of time in which to file a response. (See ECF 15 & 17). Prior to Respondent filing its response, Petitioner filed a motion to amend on September 19, 2019. (See ECF 18). Petitioner sought to add a claim to this action that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the drug quantity stated in the indictment.

Respondent filed a response in opposition to Petitioner's six claims on September 23, 2019. (See ECF 19). Thereafter, Respondent filed a response in opposition to Petitioner's motion to amend (see ECF 23) and Petitioner filed a reply in support of his claims. (See ECF 24). Petitioner's six claims and his motion to amend are now ready for adjudication.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence of a person in federal custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 entitles a prisoner to relief if "the court finds . . . [t]here has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). "In considering a motion to vacate a defendant's sentence, 'the court must accept the truth of the movant's factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous based on the existing record.'" United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989)) (citing R. Governing § 2255 Cases R. 4(b)). A District Court "is required to hold an evidentiaryhearing 'unless the motion and files and records of the case show conclusively that the movant is not entitled to relief.'" Id. (quoting Forte, 865 F.2d at 62). The Third Circuit has stated that this standard creates a "'reasonably low threshold for habeas petitioners to meet.'" Id. (quoting United States v. McCoy, 410 F.3d 124, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2001))). Accordingly, this Court abuses its discretion "if it fails to hold an evidentiary hearing when the files and records of the case are inconclusive as to whether the movant is entitled to relief." Id. (citing McCoy, 410 F.3d at 134).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Claim I

Petitioner's first claim is that counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a violation of the IADA's anti-shuttling provision. The Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court articulated the two-prong test for demonstrating when counsel is deemed ineffective. First, the petitioner must show that considering all the circumstances, counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See id. at 688; see also Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that it is necessary to analyze an ineffectiveness claim considering all circumstances) (citation omitted). A petitioner must identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Under this first prong of the Strickland test, scrutiny of counsel's conduct must be "highly deferential." See id. at 689. Indeed, "[c]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. The reviewing court must make every effort to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and toevaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 689. If counsel makes "a thorough investigation of law and facts" about his plausible options, the strategic choices he makes accordingly are "virtually unchallengeable." Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1432 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91). If, on the other hand, counsel pursues a certain strategy after a less than complete investigation, his choices are considered reasonable "to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 682 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91).

The second prong of the Strickland test requires the petitioner to affirmatively prove prejudice. See 466 U.S at 693. Prejudice is found where "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.; see also McBridge v. Superintendent, SCI Houtzdale, 687 F.3d 92, 102 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012). "This does not require that counsel's actions more likely than not altered the outcome, but the difference between Strickland's prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters only in the rarest case. The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111-12 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

"With respect to the sequence of the two prongs, the Strickland Court held that 'a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.... If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice... that course should befollowed.'" Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

As explained by a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is an interstate compact entered into by 48 States . . . the federal Government, and the District of Columbia. 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9101. It creates uniform procedures for resolving one State's pending charges against an individual imprisoned by another State. Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148, 121 S. Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed. 2d 188 (2001); *282 New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111, 120 S. Ct. 659, 145 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2000). Article III extends to prisoners against whom a detainer is lodged the right to demand final disposition on the pending charges within 180 days of release to the charging jurisdiction unless good cause exists for a continuance. 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, Art. III(a). Article IV gives "the jurisdiction in which an untried

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