Brochard v. Brochard

185 Conn.App. 204

196 A.3d 1171

Thomas BROCHARD

v.Britt BROCHARD

AC 38957

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 12, 2018

Officially released October 2, 2018

Britt Brochard, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Thomas Brochard, self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff).

Keller, Prescott and Bright, Js.

KELLER, J.

The defendant, Britt Brochard, appeals from the postdissolution judgment of the trial court rendered after a hearing on financial issues raised by the parties in multiple motions for contempt and modification.¹ The self-represented defendant's brief is not a model of clarity,² but after a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we have divined that the defendant claims that the court erred in (1) denying her motion for contempt alleging that the plaintiff, Thomas Brochard, had failed to pay his share of the minor children's medical and extracurricular activity expenses; (2) denying her motion for contempt alleging that the plaintiff had violated orders related to the mortgage on the former marital home; (3) denying her motion for contempt alleging that the plaintiff had failed to pay her one half of the amounts of 2010 tax refunds he received; (4) denying her motion for modification of the court's order allocating the parties' obligation pertaining to payment of the guardian ad litem's fees; (5) granting the plaintiff's motion for modification of child support, thereby decreasing his obligation, and failing to consider her cross motion for modification, which sought an increase in the amount of child support; and (6) granting her motion for contempt regarding certain alimony payments, but failing to order the plaintiff to pay her the full amount she was owed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as determined by multiple judges who have presided over pertinent proceedings in this case, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On July 6, 2011, the court, Gordon, J ., dissolved the parties' marriage. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the parties were married on August 27, 1995, in Ridgefield. They have two children, born in 1997 and 1999.³ The plaintiff initiated the divorce action in 2008, following the parties' separation. The court found that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and issued the following orders relevant to this appeal. It ordered the plaintiff to pay to the defendant child support in the amount of $342 per week, in accordance with the child support guidelines, on the basis of his yearly income of $85,441.72. It also ordered that he maintain medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor children if such insurance coverage was available through his employment. Additionally, the court ordered each of the parties to pay 50 percent of all unreimbursed, uninsured health related expenses for the minor children. The defendant was to submit the bill or statement for such expenses to the plaintiff within one week of receipt, and he was to pay it within one week. Each of the parties was responsible for one half of all reasonably incurred extracurricular expenses for the children. The court further ordered that the plaintiff pay to the defendant alimony of $350 per week until the earliest to occur of the following events: the death of either party, the remarriage of the defendant, June 30, 2021, or as otherwise provided for by law. The court stated that its order was subject to immediate wage withholding. As additional alimony, and subject to the same termination contingencies as the weekly order of alimony, the plaintiff was to pay, quarterly, 30 percent of all gross income earned from wages, self-employment, commissions, incentives, bonuses or other payment plan in excess of $90,000 per year ($22,500 per quarter), but less than $150,000 per year, and 20 percent of any such amounts between $150,000 and $200,000 per year. Every quarter, the plaintiff was to forward to the defendant proof of his earnings for the previous quarter together with any payment due. The court ordered the parties to file a joint tax return for 2010. The plaintiff was responsible for any taxes due and owing for that year, and any refund would be divided equally. The court awarded all right, title and interest in the marital home to the defendant, who would be responsible for all costs associated with the home.

The court also approved and incorporated into the judgment the terms of a parenting agreement between the parties dated March 25, 2011, which established joint legal custody of the children with primary residence with the defendant.

Protracted postdissolution proceedings commenced almost immediately after the court rendered the judgment of dissolution. In setting forth some of the postdissolution procedural history, we rely, in part, on our earlier opinion in Brochard v. Brochard , 165 Conn. App. 626, 140 A.3d 254 (2016) ( Brochard I ).

"On July 20, 2011, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion for order, alleging that the plaintiff had not made payments on the mortgage on the family home since March, 2011. The mortgage was solely in his name. The defendant requested that ‘the plaintiff be required to bring the mortgage current, including all attorneys' fees and other charges.’ In the alternative, the defendant move[d] that the plaintiff be required to immediately provide the bank with authorization to speak directly to the defendant, timely file all necessary paperwork in the foreclosure action to allow the parties to participate in the foreclosure mediation ... attend the foreclosure mediation sessions along with the defendant, and ... agree to any resolution the defendant comes to with the bank." Id., at 629, 140 A.3d 254. The plaintiff objected to this motion.

Judge Gordon heard the motion for order, granting it in part and denying it in part, on August 12, 2011. The nature of these orders is discussed more thoroughly in part II A of this opinion.

On February 5, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion to modify custody and child support, to which the defendant objected. The plaintiff claimed a substantial change in circumstances making it in the children's best interests for him to have primary physical custody and also sought a modification of his child support obligation. On April 26, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for modification seeking an increase in the child support order. On May 2, 2013, the parties agreed in writing that the plaintiff's motion would not go forward, but further agreed that he could seek retroactivity of any subsequent order(s) regarding child support. That written agreement was approved and made an order of the court. It indicates: "The [plaintiff's] motion to modify child support shall go off with orders retroactive to today. However, the [plaintiff] retains the right to seek retroactivity to the [date of] filing of the motion."⁴

Also on May 2, 2013, as part of the same written agreement the parties agreed that a guardian ad litem would be appointed for the parties' then two minor children. They agreed that the percentage of payment for the guardian ad litem's legal fees would be argued upon completion of some outstanding discovery. Attorney Susan E. Nugent was appointed as guardian ad litem. On May 24, 2013, the defendant moved that the plaintiff be ordered to pay the entirety of Nugent's fees. On February 6, 2014, the court, Munro, J. , ordered that the plaintiff pay 80 percent and the defendant pay 20 percent of Nugent's fees. Judge Munro found that Nugent's fees totaled $5400, and that the plaintiff already had paid $2500 toward that amount as a retainer. The defendant had paid nothing despite Nugent's request of a similar retainer from her. The court ordered that the plaintiff would be responsible for $4320 and that the defendant would be responsible for $1080. Both parties were ordered to make payments to Nugent within fourteen days.

On June 16, 2014, the defendant moved for an order reallocating the percentage payment obligations ordered by Judge Munro, alleging that she did not have sufficient income or assets to continue to pay her 20 percent share. The plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion for order and requested that either the defendant pay all of Nugent's fees, or, in the alternative, that the parties continue to pay pursuant to Judge Munro's allocated order.

On April 26, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for contempt with respect to the payment of medical and activity expenses, claiming that the plaintiff had failed to pay his 50 percent share of some of the children's extracurricular expenses and unreimbursed medical and dental expenses, which he was required to pay pursuant to the parenting agreement.

On April 16, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to compel, which supplemented an earlier motion to compel she had filed on March 24, 2014 claiming, inter alia, that the plaintiff should be ordered to pay her one half of the federal and state tax refunds he had received for the year 2010 and to reimburse her for an estimated tax payment she made that year, which she claimed was ordered by Judge Gordon in the dissolution judgment.

"On November 13, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the plaintiff had violated Judge Gordon's August 12, 2011 order [with respect to the mortgage on the marital home] by, inter alia, failing to execute an authorization allowing the defendant to speak with and represent the plaintiff with the mortgage loan holder, Wells Fargo, as the mortgage has been in the name of the plaintiff solely; said authorization to make [the] defendant the plaintiff's authorized agent for conversing, negotiating, entering into an agreement, all that kind of stuff with Wells Fargo to modify the mortgage loan to avoid foreclosure. Said authorization was to be specific that she has the authority." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brochard I , supra, 165 Conn. App. at 631, 140 A.3d 254.

In this contempt motion, the defendant further claimed that she...