Brockington v. Boykins

TIMOTHY BROCKINGTON

v.ANTWAN LAMONT BOYKINS et al.

Case No. CCB-08-1713

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Date: March 29, 2013

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Timothy Brockington brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendant Antwan Boykin,¹ a former Baltimore City police ("BPD") officer, used excessive force in a confrontation with Brockington on the evening of July 4, 2005. Prior to filing this suit, Brockington was convicted in state court of carjacking, kidnapping, and robbing Boykin on that evening. Boykin shot Brockington multiple times during the encounter, leading to permanent injuries and paralysis. Brockington also brings related state law claims; alleges Boykin gave false information that Brockington was armed that evening, leading to gun possession charges for which Brockington was acquitted; and further alleges defendant BPD's policies and its failure to properly train and supervise Boykin led to his injuries. The defendants have filed motions for summary judgment, and both parties have filed discovery-related motions. All of the motions have been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011).

BACKGROUND

Brockington and non-party Tyrone Gross were convicted by a jury on March 1, 2007, of carjacking, kidnapping, and robbing Boykin on the evening of July 4, 2005. (BPD Mem., Ex. 1, State v. Timothy Brockington, Maryland Court of Special Appeals Unpublished Opinion,September 2007, ECF No. 167-3, at 5). The jury acquitted Brockington of all charges related to gun possession or the use of a weapon in connection with any other crime, as well as a charge that he conspired with Gross to murder Boykin. (Pl.'s Opp., Ex. J, Verdict Tr., ECF No. 173-10). Although Brockington maintains his complete innocence, he does not (and cannot) contest the validity of his convictions in this action.

The encounter between Brockington and Boykin ended shortly after midnight on July 5, 2005, in the alleyway behind the 1100 block of Myrtle Avenue in Baltimore. According to the testimony of both Brockington and Boykin, the confrontation between the parties culminated when Brockington was standing at the bottom of the back stairs of 1123 Myrtle Avenue and Boykin was standing at the top.² (BPD Mem., Ex. 3, Boykin's Testimony at Brockington's Criminal Trial ("Boykin Tr."), ECF No. 167-5, at 2-96; Pl.'s Opp., Ex. A, Brockington Dep., ECF No. 173-1, at 84-89). Boykin drew his service weapon and shot Brockington several times; Brockington then fell off the stairs and onto the ground. (Boykin Tr. at 2-96-97; Brockington Dep. at 88-90, 106-107). Boykin also dismounted the stairs and continued shooting at Brockington while he was on the ground. (Boykin Tr. at 2-97-98; Brockington Dep. at 90-95). Boykin then fired several shots into the house before turning the gun back onto Brockington. (Boykin Tr. at 2-98-99; Brockington Dep. at 93, 95). He continued pulling the trigger until he realized his weapon was out of ammunition. (Boykin Tr. at 2-99). Brockington was permanently paralyzed by the gunshot wounds he sustained that evening. (Pl.'s Opp., Ex. G, Dr. Callery Expert Report, ECF No. 173-7, at 5).

The central issue in this case, and the only genuine factual dispute between the parties, is whether it was lawful for Boykin to continue firing at Brockington once he was wounded and on the ground. Boykin testified at Brockington's criminal trial that Brockington was armed during the entire confrontation and that, after Brockington was initially shot, "[h]e was on the ground and had the gun in his hand. He was crawling, so I started shooting him again. . . . My life was still in danger." (Boykin Tr. at 2-97-98).

Brockington, however, has always maintained that he was not armed. (Brockington Dep. at 100, 136). He points to several facts in the record to support this assertion. First, at the criminal trial, Boykin identified Tyrone Gross as the individual who was armed that evening. (Boykin Tr. at 2-106-108). Second, a gun was recovered in a fenced yard near the crime scene, but not near Brockington's paralyzed body when he was secured by police. (Pl.'s Opp., Ex. F, Edmondson Dep., ECF No. 173-6, at 121). Brockington's medical expert has stated that Brockington would have been incapable of holding or throwing a gun after he was initially shot and fell to the ground. (Dr. Callery Expert Report at 5). The gun that was recovered had no blood or fingerprints on it. (See Pl.'s Opp., Ex H., Brown Dep., ECF No. 173-8, at 98; Ex. I, Lansey Dep., ECF No. 173-9, at 80-81). Finally, as noted above, the jury acquitted Brockington of all gun-related charges.

In short, this action turns on a genuine dispute between the parties regarding the threat Brockington posed once he was initially wounded and on the ground. Brockington filed this suit seeking damages for the injuries he sustained in the shooting, and this court subsequently appointed him counsel for the civil case. The court also granted BPD's request to bifurcate Brockington's Monell claims against the police department.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean any factual dispute will defeat the motion. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). Whether a fact is material depends upon the substantive law. See id.

"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment 'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court must "view the facts and draw reasonable inferences 'in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion,'" Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)), but the court also must abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Appropriate Standard for Excessive Force

The defendants incorrectly assert that they are entitled to partial summary judgment on Brockington's excessive force claim, to the extent it is in part brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, because "when a police officer . . . uses deadly force (at least within the course of an arrest), such claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment." (BPD's Reply, ECF No. 177, at 22). First, this argument is not grounds for summary judgment but is merely a dispute over the proper legal standard that governs Brockington's excessive force claim (he has pled both amendments in his second amended complaint). Second, the Fourteenth Amendment governs both excessive force claims occurring during a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, because the Fourth Amendment is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), and excessive force claims that occur outside of the scope of a "seizure" effected by law enforcement, see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-45 (1998); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (the Fourth Amendment governs "claim[s] that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of his person"). It is likely that the Fourth Amendment standard, as incorporated against the states in the Fourteenth, governs Brockington's claim, because Boykin was a law enforcement officer using intentional means to "seize" Brockington's person. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844 ("[A] Fourth Amendment seizure . . . occur[s] . . . only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.") (quotation omitted). Because Brockington's excessive force claim will go forward, however, it is unnecessary to determine the standard governing his claim at this time.

C. Absolute and Qualified Immunity

The defendants argue that Boykin is entitled to (1) absolute immunity on Brockington's claim that Boykin provided false information leading to wrongful gun possession charges and (2) qualified immunity with respect to Brockington's excessive force claim. The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the former ground, but not the latter.

Brockington attempts to rebut Boykin's absolute immunity argument by framing his false testimony claim against Boykin as a "malicious-prosecution type" § 1983 claim, as recognized by the Fourth Circuit in Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 261-62 (4th Cir. 2000). There, the Fourth Circuit explained that where a plaintiff's "arrest was not supported by probable cause and the authorities continued his prosecution after it was apparent he was innocent[,]" the plaintiff can state a claim for a violation of his or her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures under § 1983. See Id. at 261-62. Here, Brockington does not (and, indeed, cannot) argue that he was falsely arrested based on Boykin's statement that he was armed, even if this statement was shown to be malicious and false. As his conviction demonstrates, authorities had ample probable cause to arrest and prosecute him for his...