Brodbeck v. Massachusetts Department of Correction

JENNIFER BRODBECK, Plaintiff, v. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Defendant.

No. 18-cv-10855-DJC

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

July 23, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DENISE J. CASPER, United States District Judge

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Jennifer Brodbeck (“Brodbeck†) has filed this lawsuit against Defendant Massachusetts Department of Correction (“DOC†) alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. D 1. DOC has moved for summary judgment. D. 73. The parties have also filed motions to strike. D. 78; D. 79. For the reasons stated below, the Court ALLOWS the motion for summary judgment, D. 73, and DENIES the motions to strike, D. 78; D 79.

II. Standard of Review

The Court grants summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the undisputed facts demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.” Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000); see Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant meets its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleadings, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986), but must come forward with specific admissible facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). The Court “view[s] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing reasonable inferences in his favor.” Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009).

III. Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed unless indicated otherwise. In 2004, DOC hired Brodbeck, a female veteran, as a Corrections Officer (“CO”). D. 75 ¶ 1; D. 76 ¶ 1. Brodbeck suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. The DOC granted Brodbeck accommodations for her PTSD, D. 75 ¶ 2, which Brodbeck alleges the DOC later violated. D. 76 ¶ 2.

In June 2010, Brodbeck reported to DOC that a male CO was stalking her. D. 75 ¶ 3; D. 77 ¶ 2. The DOC initiated an investigation into Brodbeck's allegations, which included interviewing Brodbeck, the accused CO and others. D. 75 ¶ 4. On December 5, 2011, Brodbeck had an incident on duty in which she told someone she was suffering from anxiety and may become violent. Id. ¶ 10. Following the incident, Brodbeck was detached from duty with pay pending a fitness for duty evaluation. Id. ¶ 11. On January 2, 2012, an independent medical examiner found Brodbeck fit for duty and permitted her to return to work. Id. ¶ 13. In February 2012, DOC accused Brodbeck of having made false allegations against the CO. Id. ¶ 5; D. 76 ¶ 3. On March 8, 2012, DOC issued Brodbeck a one-day suspension on these grounds. D. 75 ¶ 7; D. 76 ¶ 5. DOC's investigator also concluded that the male CO had failed to report court appearances, in violation of DOC regulations. D. 75 ¶ 8; D. 76 ¶ 6. DOC issued the male CO a one-day suspension, as well. Id. Brodbeck alleges DOC suspended her with pay pending investigation while the other CO's suspension did not affect his pay. D. 75 ¶ 22; D. 76 ¶ 14. Ultimately, the DOC withdrew Brodbeck's one-day suspension. D. 75 ¶ 23. The male CO served his suspension. D. 75 ¶ 8; D. 76 ¶ 6.

On April 5, 2012, Brodbeck filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (“MCAD”). D. 75 ¶ 17; D. 76 ¶ 10. In August 2012, approximately eight months after Brodbeck's positive fit for duty evaluation, Brodbeck returned to work. D. 75 ¶ 16. Two years later, in August 2014, DOC filed a petition to involuntarily retire Brodbeck from service. Id. ¶ 20.

IV. Procedural History

On April 5, 2012, Brodbeck filed a complaint with the MCAD, alleging disability and gender discrimination under both state and federal law. D. 75 ¶¶ 17, 28. The complaint was simultaneously referred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. ¶ 28.

Brodbeck instituted this action on May 1, 2018. D. 1. On June 5, 2018, Brodbeck voluntarily dismissed five of the six claims in her verified complaint, leaving her Title VII claim alleging gender discrimination before this Court. D. 10. On June 15, 2018, Brodbeck filed four of these dismissed claims, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under state and federal law, in a separate action against DOC and DOC's Commissioner in Suffolk Superior Court. D. 75 at 125-141. On March 21, 2019, the Superior Court dismissed Brodbeck's state law discrimination claims on statute of limitations grounds and dismissed Brodbeck's Americans with Disabilities Act claims (“ADA”) claims for monetary relief on sovereign immunity grounds. D. 75 ¶ 34. DOC has now moved for summary judgment on Brodbeck's remaining claim here for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. D. 73. This Court heard the parties on the pending motion and took the matter under advisement. D. 82.

V. Discussion

A. Motions to Strike

Brodbeck moves to strike several statements in DOC's statement of material facts, D. 75 ¶¶ 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, on the grounds that the statements are “not ‘a concise statement of material facts.” D. 78 at 1. Brodbeck also moves to strike the affidavits of Kelly Correira (“Correira”) and Christine Dodd (“Dodd”) on the grounds that they are not based on personal knowledge and are inadmissible hearsay. D. 78 at 1; see D. 75-1; D. 75 at 68-69 (Exh. 3).

Local Rule 56.1 obligates movants to provide a “concise statement of the material facts of record as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried” together with citations to record evidence. Oppositions to motions for summary judgment similarly are obligated to submit a “concise statement of the material facts or record as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” L.R. 56.1. District courts enjoy “broad latitude in administering local rules” and are “entitled to demand adherence to specific mandates contained in the rules.” Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Precision Valley Aviation, Inc., 26 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 1994). Here, however, the statements Brodbeck alleges violate Local Rule 56.1 are in fact concise, ranging from a single sentence in Paragraphs 5 and 9 or two sentences in Paragraph 8, to the longest paragraph, Paragraph 6, which totals six sentences. See D. 75 ¶¶ 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15. On this record, the motion to strike these paragraphs is denied.

Turning to Brodbeck's arguments with respect to Correira and Dodd's affidavits, D. 75-1; D. 75 at 68-69, a party may move to strike part or all of an affidavit in support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment if the party's objection is that “the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) which precludes evidence not properly produced in discovery, “applies with equal force to motions for summary judgment.” Lohnes v. Level 3 Commc'ns, Inc., 272 F.3d 49, 60 (1st Cir. 2001). That is, in connection with a summary judgment motion, a party may be precluded from relying on evidence where he fails to comply with discovery requirements under the Federal Rules and his failure to comply is not substantially justified or the failure to do so was not harmless. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1); see Hip Saver Co., Inc. v. J.T. Posey Co., 497 F.Supp.2d 96, 103 (D. Mass. 2007).

Here, Dodd is the Correction Program Officer at DOC who investigated Brodbeck's June 2010 complaint against another CO. D. 75 at 68-69. Dodd's affidavit establishes that that an investigation took place, that Dodd interviewed several individuals as part of the investigation and that Dodd concluded, following her investigation, that Brodbeck had made false allegations against the CO. See D. 75 ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Dodd had sufficient personal knowledge of DOC's investigation to submit an affidavit as to such facts, i.e., what she investigated and the basis for her findings, id. at 68-9, and such evidence would be admissible at trial. Similarly, Correia is DOC's Human Resources Director and was assigned to testify on behalf of DOC as to the Department's knowledge of various topics as its Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6) witness. D. 75-1 ¶¶ 1-2; D. 79 3-4. Correira's affidavit was submitted as to the facts she had knowledge of or could ascertain from DOC personnel records, of which she was familiar. D. 75-1 ¶¶ 1-2. Accordingly, the motion to strike these affidavits is also denied.

In its opposition to Brodbeck's motion to strike, DOC filed its own cross-motion to strike, D. 79, in which DOC seeks to strike Paragraph 13 of Brodbeck's Response to Local 56.1 Statement, D. 76, on the grounds that Brodbeck did not include the evidence therein in her response to DOC's interrogatories, D. 75 at 110-114 (Exh. 6). In an earlier interrogatory, DOC had asked Brodbeck to identify all similarly situated male employees who were treated better than her in the terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 111. In Brodbeck's response, Brodbeck stated that she only knew of the persons listed in the complaint. Id. (noting that “because the information [DOC] seek[s] is exclusively in [DOC's] possession, [Brodbeck] will supplement this Answer in accordance with the Rules”). DOC argues that Brodbeck failed to ever supplement this response. D. 79 at 5. It further argues that to permit Brodbeck to identify the eight comparators she lists in her response to its statement of facts, D. 76 ¶ 13,...