Bromfield v. Freeman

923 F. Supp. 783

Joseph Edwin BROMFIELD, Petitioner, v. Franklin L. FREEMAN, et al., Respondents.

No. 5:95-HC-553-BO.

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division.

April 20, 1996.

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Kathryn L. VandenBerg, NC Prisoner Legal Services, Inc., Raleigh, NC, for petitioner.

Clarence J. DelForge, III, Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, NC, for respondent.

ORDER

TERRENCE WILLIAM BOYLE, District Judge.

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and two corresponding counts of first-degree murder pursuant to the felony-murder rule. After capital sentencing proceedings, petitioner was sentenced to two concurrent life terms of imprisonment.

On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed the same arguments now raised by petitioner in this forum and found no error in petitioner's trial. State v. Bromfield, 332 N.C. 24, 418 S.E.2d 491 (1992). Familiarity with the facts as set forth in the opinions and orders of the trial court and the North Carolina Supreme Court will be assumed. Nevertheless, a brief recitation of the relevant facts is warranted.

Following the crime, petitioner voluntarily agreed to accompany the local police to the police station in order to make a written statement. Petitioner was Mirandized, but he had not been placed in any sort of restraint. Having been arrested for felonies on three prior occasions, petitioner well understood his various rights.

In this first statement, petitioner implicated his partner, Everett "Witt" Monroe, but omitted any mention of his own role. He claimed that at the time of the murders, he was at the motel room where he and Witt had been staying with Witt's family. Witt arrived, confessed to having committed the crimes, and insisted on leaving town. Petitioner claimed he agreed to leave the motel because he was already planning to visit his mother in New Hampshire, and that he paid for his bus ticket with money from his paycheck. Petitioner claimed he did not know the source of the money with which Witt purchased his tickets. The police chief advised petitioner that he thought the statement was inaccurate, reminded petitioner of his rights, and explained to petitioner that he was free to leave the police station as he had not been arrested or charged with any crime. Petitioner then indicated that he could lead the police to the murder weapons, and volunteered to make a second statement.

In the second statement, which was also reduced to writing, petitioner admitted that he voluntarily accompanied Witt to the crime scene knowing that his partner intended to kill the victims:

Q: When Witt came to your house at 00:30 hours, was he planning to kill Starr and Arlena?

A: Yes, I guess so, because he said we were going to do those bitches. I knew he was going to kill them.

(T., pp. 866-67). Petitioner also admitted, in some detail, that he had witnessed the murders, and that he and Witt later smoked some of the drugs Witt had stolen from the victims in a Raleigh motel room. Petitioner further admitted that Witt purchased petitioner's bus ticket, but he claimed that Witt had told him that he buried the weapons.

Although there was some question raised as to whether petitioner was under arrest at the time he made the second statement, both the trial court and the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed that this second statement was freely and voluntarily made after petitioner had been fully informed of his rights.

After the second statement was made, petitioner was jailed on two counts of accessory after the fact to murder. The next morning, petitioner attended his first appearance and requested appointment of counsel. Petitioner returned to the jail after counsel had been appointed for him. Meanwhile, the police searched the area earlier identified by petitioner as the place where the murder weapons had been discarded, and located the murder weapons. The police chief further caused to issue a new set of warrants charging petitioner with two counts of first-degree murder. Also at some point early in the day, the police chief reserved an office or interrogation room in the event the petitioner would make another statement.

Later that afternoon, the police chief, accompanied by a sheriff's deputy, presented petitioner with the new warrants for the purpose of arresting him on the counts of first-degree murder, with the admitted hope that petitioner would choose to provide further information. Petitioner expressed shock, and indicated that he wanted to make another statement. Petitioner was told that he could not make a statement unless he was again informed of his rights and signed another waiver. Petitioner agreed to do so, and accompanied the police downstairs to the reserved room, wherein he was fully advised of all his relevant Constitutional rights and freely, knowingly, and voluntarily signed a waiver of said rights. Petitioner was also apprised of, and consented to, the audio taping of his statement.

During this interview, petitioner made a third statement, confessing to a more active role in the offense. Petitioner admitted that he kicked one of the victims in the course of her murder, and further admitted to having taken some money and drugs from the victims. He also admitted ownership of one of the murder weapons, and admitted that he was with Witt when the weapons were discarded. Other elements of the story were new, and some were different; petitioner denied knowing beforehand that his trip with Witt to the victims' home would involve murder, stating he thought that by "going to do the girls" Witt meant only that they would steal the victims' drugs.

At trial, the petitioner moved unsuccessfully to suppress introduction of all three statements. The petitioner did not testify and introduced no evidence, except for witness testimony of his good character.

Upon conviction and an unsuccessful appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, State v. Bromfield, 332 N.C. 24, 418 S.E.2d 491 (1992), the petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner contends that the third statement was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and its admission at trial was thus prejudicial error. The state has waived the requirement of exhaustion, and now moves the Court for summary judgment.

Summary judgment shall be granted when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c). The party bearing the burden of proof on an issue at trial must "designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citation omitted). Factual disputes whose resolution would not affect the outcome of the suit are irrelevant to the consideration of a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). For the reasons stated below, the motion for summary judgment must be allowed.

I.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a person accused of a crime the right to counsel. "Once formal criminal proceedings begin, the Sixth Amendment renders inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief statements `deliberately elicited' from a defendant without an express waiver of the right to counsel." Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 348, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1179, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has "established the brightline rule that an accused who invokes his right to counsel `is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.'" Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied sub nom. Correll v. Jabe, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 688, 133 L.Ed.2d 593 (1996), quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); United States v. Cummings, 937 F.2d 941, 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 948, 112 S.Ct. 395, 116 L.Ed.2d 345 (1991). If the defendant has reinitiated communication with the police after having invoked his right to counsel,

the next inquiry is "whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities."

Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (plurality opinion), quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 n. 9; see Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 493, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984); Cummings, 937 F.2d at 946. Although this rule originates from a Fifth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has extended its application to the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. Harvey, 494 U.S. at 350, 110 S.Ct. at 1180; Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986).

II.

There is little doubt that petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attached by reason of his having been charged with the crime of accessory to murder after the fact, governed the circumstances of the third statement. Respondents have raised the question of whether the Sixth Amendment protection could extend to questioning about the first-degree murder charges, as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "is offense-specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2207, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 2399, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990); ...