Brook v. Holzerland

1

ADAM BROOK, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM HOLZERLAND, FOIA OFFICER; AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendants.

No. 1:23-CV-00379-MAC-ZJH

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division

August 13, 2024

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

ZACK HAWTHORN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case is assigned to the Honorable Marcia A. Crone, United States District Judge, and is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial management. Pending before the court is Defendants William Holzerland and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 9. After careful review of the filings and applicable law, the undersigned concludes that Defendants' instant motion should be granted because pro se Plaintiff Dr. Adam Brook fails to state a claim against Defendant Holzerland and his claims against Defendant U.S Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) are time-barred by applicable statutes of limitation.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 2015 and 2016, Dr. Brook filed four FOIA requests seeking various documents from HHS. Doc. No. 2 at 16-17. This case concerns the adequacy of HHS' response to those requests. Dr Brook is a medical doctor who currently resides in Brookeland, Texas. Id. at 3. The documents he seeks relate to his termination from employment as a surgeon on October 5, 2009, following a surgery he conducted three days earlier on October 2, 2009. Id. at 6-7. Dr. Brook's Complaint contains extensive factual allegations related to the surgery itself and the events preceding and following his termination. See generally id. However, the undersigned need not recount the entire underlying factual history, as the facts relevant to resolving the instant motion are straightforward and pertain to the timing of Dr. Brook's FOIA requests and appeals.

Three of Dr. Brook's FOIA requests are at issue in this case.^[1] The first is request 16F116, which Dr. Brook submitted on February 20, 2016. Id. at 16-17. The second is request 16F128, which Dr. Brook submitted on February 25, 2016. Id. at 17. HHS responded to both requests over one year later, on March 10, 2017. Id. Dr. Brook filed an appeal of HHS' responses three days later, on March 13, 2017. Id. More than six years later, HHS ultimately denied Dr. Brook's appeal of requests 16F116 and 16F128 on September 25, 2023. Id.

The third request is 2016-00450, which Dr. Brook submitted on March 17, 2016. Id. In his Complaint, Dr. Brook contends that he had not received a response from HHS as of October 20, 2023. Id. at 18. Dr. Brook has not alleged that he filed any appeal related to this third request. See generally Doc. No. 2.

Dr. Brook filed his Complaint on October 20, 2023. Id. Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on February 1, 2024. Doc. No. 9. Dr. Brook filed his Response (Doc. No. 11) on February 15, 2024, and Defendants filed their Reply (Doc. No. 12) on February 20, 2024.

II. Legal Standard

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges the subject-matter jurisdiction of a federal district court. See FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).

The court “must presume that a suit lies outside [its] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Gonzalez v. Limon, 926 F.3d 186, 188 (5th Cir. 2019). “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Walmart, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice, 21 F.4th 300, 307 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)). A court must address a jurisdictional challenge before addressing a challenge on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).

When ruling on a 12(b)(1) motion, a court may consider “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” In re S. Recycling, L.L.C., 982 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020). “[A] motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plaintiffs must state enough facts to “nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

When assessing a motion to dismiss under this rule, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023). However, “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions are not accepted as true.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

C. Pro Se Pleading Standard

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,” and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is represented by counsel, “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Nix v. Major League Baseball, 62 F.4th 920, 928 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 165 (2023) (quoting Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)).

III. Discussion

Dr. Brook asserts claims under FOIA and the Privacy Act and seeks to enjoin HHS from withholding records related to his three records requests. Doc. No. 2 at 18-19. Defendants move to dismiss Dr. Brook's claims on the basis that Defendant Holzerland is not a proper defendant for a FOIA action and that Dr. Brook's claims against HHS are barred by applicable statutes of limitation. Doc. No. 9 at 4-6, 9. The undersigned will discuss each contention in turn.

A. Defendant Holzerland is Not a Proper Party to Dr. Brook's FOIA or Privacy Act Claims

In his Complaint, Dr. Brook alleges that Defendant Holzerland is the Deputy Agency Chief FOIA Officer within HHS. Doc. No. 2 at 3. Defendant Holzerland moves to dismiss Dr. Brook's FOIA claims against him because individual federal officials are not proper parties to FOIA actions. Doc. No. 9 at 9. The undersigned agrees. Under FOIA, a court has jurisdiction to “enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” See Batton v. Evers, 598 F.3d 169, 173 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)) (emphasis in original). Therefore, a FOIA plaintiff may only assert a claim against the federal agency, not an individual federal official. Id.; see also Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1987). The same rule applies regarding claims under the Privacy Act: only agencies, not individual defendants, may be sued under the Privacy Act. See Flores ex rel. Est. of Flores v. Fox, 394 Fed.Appx. 170, 172 (5th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, all of Dr. Brook's claims against Defendant Holzerland should be dismissed.^[2]

B. Dr. Brook's FOIA Claims Against HHS are Barred by the Statute of Limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)

HHS moves to dismiss Dr. Brook's FOIA claims on the basis that they are barred by the six-year statute of limitations provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). FOIA claims are governed by the provisions of § 2401(a). See Harris v. Freedom of Info. Unit Drug Enf't Admin., No. CIV.A.3:06CV0176-R, 2006 WL 3342598, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2006); see also Reep v. United States Dep't of Just., 302 F.Supp.3d 174, 180 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd, No. 18-5132, 2018 WL 6721099 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 2018). This statute provides that “every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).

The statute of limitations in § 2401(a) is a jurisdictional condition attached to the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity. Gen. Land Off. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 947 F.3d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 2020) (stating that “[t]his timing requirement [in § 2401(a)] is jurisdictional, because it is a condition of the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity”); Am. Stewards of Liberty v. Dep't of Interior, 960 F.3d 223, 229 (5th Cir. 2020) (stating that “failure to sue the United States within the limitations period for a specific cause of action is not merely a waivable defense. It operates to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction.”) (internal quotations omitted); Ades v. United States, No. 22-10044, 2022 WL 1198206, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2022) (stating that “[m]issing the deadline is not without...