Brown-Boyd v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.

320 A.3d 872

Roxanne BROWN-BOYD, Executrix of the Estate of Brenda Watts

v.SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY and Sharon Gonzales, Appellants

No. 1167 C.D. 2022

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 9, 2024

Decided July 15, 2024

Appealed from No. 01224 November Term 2020, Common Pleas Court of the County of Philadelphia, Sean F. Kennedy, Judge

William K. Kennedy, II, Philadelphia, for Appellants.

Alan Zibelman, Philadelphia, for Appellees.

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge, HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge, HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT. Senior Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE WALLACE

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority and Sharon Gonzales (Gonzales) (collectively, SEPTA) appeal from the order dated September 22, 2022, of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Common Pleas), which denied their motion for summary judgment in favor of Roxanne Brown-Boyd (Brown-Boyd), Executrix of the Estate of Brenda Watts (Watts). Common Pleas denied summary judgment because it concluded Brown-Boyd’s negligence action fell within the vehicle exception to sovereign immunity at Section 8522(b)(1) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(1).¹ After careful review, we affirm.

I. Background

This case involves injuries Watts allegedly suffered on September 30, 2019, while attempting to exit a public bus that Gonzales was driving. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 12a. Watts was 67 years old at the time and suffering from multiple myeloma, a form of cancer that weakened her bones and left her susceptible to fractures "with very minimal trauma." Id. at 10a-12a, 401a. Watts entered the bus using a walker. Id. at 12a. According to Watts, she decided to exit the bus several minutes later and asked Gonzales to lower the handicap ramp. Id. at 13a. Gonzales refused, compelling Watts to exit by placing her walker outside the bus door and stepping down. Id. When Watts attempted to step down with her right leg, her left leg "twisted in an oblique manner," resulting in a fracture to her left femur. Id. In addition, Watts used "her arms to support her full weight to fully step off the bus," resulting in a fracture to her left humerus. Id. Watts was taken to a hospital, where she underwent surgery for her injuries.² Id.

Watts filed a praecipe for writ of summons on November 12, 2020, followed by a complaint on December 21, 2020. SEPTA responded with preliminary objections, and Watts filed an amended complaint on February 15, 2021. Watts alleged, pertinently, that Gonzales stopped the bus at an unsafe distance from the curb. R.R. at 13a, 17a-21a. She alleged the position of the bus caused her injuries because she was unable to place her walker down entirely on the road or entirely on the sidewalk, and, "due to her disability and the close proxim[ity] of the [bus’s] step to the back of the walker[, she] was unable to move her left leg in order to step down in a safe manner." Id. Moreover, Watts alleged Gonzales caused her injuries by failing to lower the handicap ramp on the bus. Id. Watts acknowledged sovereign immunity protected SEPTA from suit but argued this case fell within the vehicle exception at Section 8522(b)(1), which applies to negligent acts involving "[t]he operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of a Commonwealth party." 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(1).

SEPTA filed preliminary objections to Watts’ amended complaint on March 8, 2021, asserting sovereign immunity and challenging Watts’ claim for attorney’s fees. By order dated April 14, 2021, Common Pleas dismissed Watts’ claim for attorney’s fees but otherwise overruled the preliminary objections. SEPTA filed an answer with new matter, to which Watts filed a response. Watts passed away on September 13, 2021, and Brown-Boyd filed a praecipe to substitute herself as plaintiff. On August 1, 2022, SEPTA filed a motion for summary judgment, once again asserting sovereign immunity. Further, SEPTA contended Brown-Boyd failed to produce evidence to support her negligence claims. Brown-Boyd filed a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on September 1, 2022.

[1] Common Pleas denied SEPTA’s motion for summary judgment by order dated September 22, 2022, and SEPTA timely filed a notice of appeal.³ In its opinion, Common Pleas concluded Brown-Boyd’s negligence claim involved the "operation" of a vehicle under Section 8522(b)(1). Common Pleas discussed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, 648 Pa. 105, 191 A.3d 799 (2018), which interpreted the term "operation" more expansively than it had been in the past. Under Balentine, "operation" of a vehicle "reflects a continuum of activity, which entails a series of decisions and actions, taken together, which transport the individual from one place to another." Id. at 810 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Common Pleas explained, in relevant part, that the decision of "where to and how far away from the curb … to stop, kneel, and curb a bus is reasonably related to the decision-making process necessary to safely operate a bus and a part of the continuum of acts" necessary to transport patrons. R.R. at 483a. Common Pleas explained lowering and raising the handicap ramp was also part of the "continuum of acts" and decisions necessary to transport patrons with disabilities. Id. at 486a.

On appeal, SEPTA argues (1) Common Pleas misinterpreted the term "operation" in Section 8522(b)(1) and our Supreme Court’s discussion of that term in Balentine, (2) Common Pleas failed to determine whether Gonzales’s alleged actions or inactions caused Watts’ injuries and, regardless, Brown-Boyd failed to produce the necessary expert report establishing causation, and (3) Common Pleas applied the incorrect legal standard when ruling on summary judgment and generally misinterpreted or misapplied the evidence.⁴

II. Discussion

[2, 3] We review Common Pleas’ order for an error of law or abuse of discretion. Balentine, 191 A.3d at 803 n.3 (citing Yenchi v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 639 Pa. 618,-161 A.3d 811, 818 (2017)). Summary judgment should be granted "only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."⁵

Sellers v. Twp. of Abington, 630 Pa. 330, 106 A.3d 679, 684 (2014) (quoting Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294, 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (2010)). Whether genuine issues of material fact exist is a question of law, "and therefore, on that question our standard of review is de novo. This means we need not defer to the determinations made by the lower tribunals." Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 592 Pa. 458, 926 A.2d 899, 902-03 (2007) (citations omitted). We must review the record, including "all pleadings, as well as any depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and expert reports, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and we resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party." Moon v. Dauphin Cnty., 129 A.3d 16, 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting LJL Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 599 Pa. 546, 962 A.2d 639, 647 (2009)).

[4, 5] The Commonwealth and its agencies, officials, and employees are generally immune from suits for damages when acting within the scope of their duties. Log Cabin Prop., LP v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 276 A.3d 862, 870 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (en banc) (citing Stackhouse v. Pa. State Police, 892 A.2d 54, 58 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); Pa. Const. art. I, § 11), aff'd. sub nom. MFW Wine Co., LLC v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., — Pa. —, 318 A.3d 100 (Pa., Nos. 75-76 MAP 2022, filed July 2, 2024). The Judicial Code lists exceptions to sovereign immunity, which apply to "damages arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign immunity." 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a). The vehicle exception, which is at the heart of this dispute, appears at Section 8522(b)(1):

(b) Acts which may impose liability.--The following acts by a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability on the Commonwealth and the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by:

(1) Vehicle liability.--The operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of a Commonwealth party. As used in this paragraph, "motor vehicle" means any vehicle which is self-propelled and any attachment thereto, including vehicles operated by rail, through water or in the air.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(1).⁶

[6] In its first issue, SEPTA argues Common Pleas misinterpreted the term "operation" in Section 8522(b)(1) and our Supreme Court’s discussion of that term in Balentine. To understand SEPTA’s argument, we begin with a brief discussion of Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370, 543 A.2d 531 (1988). In Love, a disabled woman fell while exiting a van owned by the City of Philadelphia. Id. at 531. Our Supreme Court interpreted the vehicle exception to governmental immunity at Section 8542(b)(1) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1), which similarly requires "[t]he operation of any motor vehicle." The Court concluded the woman’s injury did not fall within the exception because "[g]etting into or alighting from a vehicle are merely acts ancillary to the actual operation of that vehicle." Love, 543 A.2d at 533. The Court explained: "to operate something means to actually put it in motion. Merely preparing to operate a vehicle, or acts taken at the cessation of operating a vehicle are not the same as actually operating that vehicle." Id. (emphasis in original).

Our Supreme Court decided Balentine just over 30 years later. Balentine involved a contractor who was working near a parked Chester Water Authority vehicle, which was struck from behind by another vehicle and moved forward,...