Brown-Sartor v. Greenville Cnty. Sch. Dist.

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Maxine Brown-Sartor, on behalf of A.B.; Alexis Carberry Benson, on behalf of A.B.; Plaintiffs, v. Greenville County School District, SCDOE, Burke Royster, Traci Hogan, Tracy Burns, Amy Mims, Brian Murphy, Defendants.

C/A No. 6:23-cv-05029-TMC-KFM

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division

December 21, 2023

REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the court on the plaintiffs' motion for emergency judgment, which is construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) (doc. 7). The plaintiffs are proceeding pro se and seeking to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.

The plaintiffs' complaint was entered on the docket on October 6, 2023 (doc. 1). On November 27, 2023, the plaintiffs purported to file an amended complaint (which is being returned unfiled for the reasons set forth in the order filed with this report and recommendation) and a motion for an emergency judgment, which has been construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction and a TRO (doc. 7). In the motion, the plaintiffs assert that one of the defendants Bryan Murphy, should be enjoined from continuing to adjudicate administrative proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) (with reference to another case Ms. Benson has pending in this court against him) (id.). The motion also seeks an independent audit of the funds paid by the South Carolina Department of Education for IDEA administrative proceedings as well as an order preventing Brian Murphy from continuing in his role as an IDEA administrative adjudicator (id.).

Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction or TRO must establish all four of the following elements: (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds by 559 U.S. 1089 (2010), reinstated in relevant part on remand by 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs must make a clear showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22; Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 345-46. Similarly, they must make a clear showing that they are likely to be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20-23; Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347. Only then may the court consider whether the balance of equities tips in the plaintiffs' favor. See Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 346-47. Finally, the court must pay particular regard to the public consequences of employing the extraordinary relief of injunction. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 24).

The plaintiffs have failed to meet the standard for issuance of a preliminary injunction or a TRO in this matter. As an initial matter, as set forth in the order filed herewith, the plaintiffs' complaint alleges several causes of action on behalf of a minor child, A.B., but does not assert any claims on behalf of Ms. Brown-Sartor, the parent who appears to have brought this action, or Ms. Benson, a self-described special education advocate (see doc. 1). Neither of the plaintiffs may bring claims pro se on behalf of A.B unless they are attorneys licensed to practice in South Carolina. See Myers v. Loudon Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 400-01 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that although an individual has the right to represent himself/herself by statute-28 U.S.C. § 1654-that right does not “create a coordinate right to litigate for others” as well as that “non-attorney parents generally may not litigate the claims of their minor children in federal court”). The various claims that are presented - willful gross negligence; conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; obstruction under § 1986; defamation/libel based on federal criminal law; embezzlement/theft based on federal criminal law; violations of their First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act; violations of various South Carolina Code Sections; and violations of the IDEA - are set forth in vague and rambling allegations grounded in general and conclusory references to non-specific IDEA administrative proceedings. Because the plaintiffs' claims are likely to fail as pleaded, and because they can't bring them on behalf of the minor A.B. in any event, they are not likely to succeed on the merits and have failed to make a clear showing of irreparable harm to justify injunctive relief. See S.C. Progressive Network Educ. Fund v. Andino, 493 F.Supp.3d 460, 465-66 (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2020) (noting that the “party seeking [a preliminary injunction or TRO] must prove [its] own case and adduce the requisite proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, of the conditions and circumstances upon which he bases the right to and necessity for injunctive relief” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1299 (10th Cir. 1980)). Finally, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the balance of equities tips in their favor should an injunction be imposed, nor that an injunction is in the public interest. Accordingly, as...