Brown v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps.

519 F.Supp.3d 512

Eric BROWN, Jody Tuchtenhagen, and Debbie Schultz, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL NO. 5, AFL-CIO, Defendant.

Mark Fellows, Alicia Bonner, and Catherine Wyatt, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.Minnesota Association of Professional Employees, Defendant.

Case No. 20-cv-01127 (SRN/ECW)

Case No. 20-cv-01128 (SRN/ECW)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Signed February 12, 2021

Craig S. Krummen, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 90 South Seventh Street, Suite 3500, Minneapolis, MN 55402; Daniel Robert Suhr and Jeffrey Michael Schwab, Liberty Justice Center, 208 South LaSalle Street, Suite 1690, Chicago, IL 60604; Douglas P. Seaton, Upper Midwest Law Center, 8421 Wayzata Boulevard, Suite 105, Golden Valley, MN 55426; and William L. Messenger, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, 8001 Braddock Road, Suite 600, Springfield, VA 22160, for Plaintiffs.

Josie Doris Hegarty, AFSCME Council 5, 300 Hardman Avenue South, South Saint Paul, MN 55075; and Leon Dayan and Ramya Ravindran, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC, 805 Fifteenth Street, Northwest, Suite 1000, Washington, D.C. 20005, for Defendant American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council No. 5.

Amanda C. Lynch, Patrick C. Pitts, and Scott A. Kronland, Altshuler Berzon LLP, 117 Post Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, CA 94108; and Brendan D. Cummins and Justin D. Cummins, Cummins & Cummins, LLP, 920 Second Avenue South, Suite 1245, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Defendant Minnesota Association of Professional Employees.

ORDER

SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge This matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss filed in two related cases [20-cv-01127, Doc. No. 19; 20-cv-01128, Doc. No. 21]. Based on a review of the files, submissions, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motions.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1977, the United States Supreme Court ruled that public-sector employers and labor unions representing public-sector employees could, consistent with the First Amendment, compel public-sector employees to contribute to a union's collective bargaining costs even if the employees refused to join the union. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. , 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Approximately forty years later, the Supreme Court overruled Abood and held that such "fair-share" or "agency" fee arrangements violate employees’ First Amendment rights. Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018).

Plaintiffs are current and former employees of various Minnesota state agencies who, prior to Janus , were compelled to pay fair-share fees as a condition of their employment notwithstanding their refusal to become union members. (Compl. [20-cv-01127, Doc. No. 1], at ¶¶ 2-4; Compl. [20-cv-01128, Doc. No. 21], at ¶¶ 2-4.) Plaintiffs brought these putative class actions against their unions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking the return of the fair-share fees they paid prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Janus .

Defendants, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council No. 5 and the Minnesota Association of Professional Employees (collectively, "the Unions") subsequently moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. The Unions argue that § 1983 provides a defense for private actors who act in good faith reliance on the law as it existed at the time of their actions. Because their actions in collecting fair-share fees from Plaintiffs were supported by more than forty years of Supreme Court precedent prior to Janus and specifically authorized by the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act, Minn. Stat. § 179A.06, Subd. 3, the Unions assert that the good faith defense bars Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

II. DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and views those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hager v. Arkansas Dep't of Health , 735 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013). However, the Court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id. In addition, the Court ordinarily does not consider matters outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it must contain facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are insufficient.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Where a motion to dismiss is based on an affirmative defense, the moving party must show that it is entitled to the defense on the face of the complaint. Dadd v. Anoka Cty. , 827 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2016).

2. Analysis

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit has squarely addressed whether § 1983 affords private actors a good faith defense to liability, nor whether such a defense applies to a public-sector employee's claim for reimbursement of fair-share fees paid prior to Janus . But in analyzing the Unions’ proffered defense, the Court is not without persuasive authority: every court to consider the issue has held that public-sector unions may assert a good faith defense to § 1983 claims for reimbursement of pre- Janus fair-share fees. E.g. , Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31; AFL-CIO , 942 F.3d 352, 364 (7th Cir. 2019) (" Janus Remand"); Danielson v. Inslee , 945 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied , No. 19-1130, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1265, 209 L.Ed.2d 7 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2021) ; Lee v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n , 951 F.3d 386, 389 (6th Cir. 2020), cert. denied , No. 20-422, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1264, 209 L.Ed.2d 7 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2021) ; Wholean v. CSEA SEIU Local 2001 , 955 F.3d 332, 334 (2d Cir. 2020) ; Diamond v. Pennsylvania State Educ. Ass'n , 972 F.3d 262, 271 (3d Cir. 2020)¹ ; Doughty v. State Emps.’ Ass'n of New Hampshire, SEIU Local 1984, CTW, CLC , 981 F.3d 128, 133 (1st Cir. 2020).

The Court begins its analysis, as did many of those courts, with the text of § 1983. It is true, as Plaintiffs point out, that the text of § 1983 does not itself provide for a good faith defense. Rather, "[i]ts language is absolute and unqualified; no mention is made of any privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted." Owen v. City of Indep. , 445 U.S. 622, 635, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980).

Notwithstanding the statute's unqualified language, the Supreme Court has long recognized defenses to § 1983 claims, where those defenses were sufficiently rooted in the common law and supported by sufficiently strong policy. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. , 453 U.S. 247, 259, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) ("Only after careful inquiry into considerations of both history and policy has the Court construed § 1983 to incorporate a particular immunity defense."). Beginning in Pierson v. Ray , the Supreme Court held that state actors may assert qualified immunity as a shield against § 1983 claims.

386 U.S. 547, 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). And when the Court held that private actors may, under certain circumstances, be sued under § 1983, it hinted at an affirmative defense available to them. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. , the Court held that a private actor who invokes a state's attachment procedures could be subject to § 1983 liability. 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). The Lugar Court acknowledged that its holding raised the "concern[ ] that private individuals who innocently make use of seemingly valid state laws would be responsible, if the law is subsequently held to be unconstitutional, for the consequences of their actions." Id. at 942 n.23, 102 S.Ct. 2744. In response to this concern, the Court expressed the view that "this problem should be dealt with not by changing the character of the cause of action but by establishing an affirmative defense." Id.

Although the Lugar Court declined to establish such an affirmative defense in that case, the Sixth Circuit noted the Court's suggestion and recognized a good faith affirmative defense to § 1983 liability. Duncan v. Peck , 844 F.2d 1261, 1267 (6th Cir. 1988). The Duncan court reasoned that § 1983 claims against private parties are analogous to common law malicious prosecution and wrongful attachment claims, which were subject to a good faith defense at common law. Id. The court found that a good faith defense to § 1983 liability was therefore consistent with the common law, and supported by strong public policy reasons. Id. at 1263–64, 1267–68 ; cf. City of Newport , 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616.

Then, in Wyatt v. Cole , the Supreme Court held that private actors sued under § 1983 may not assert qualified immunity. 504 U.S. 158, 159, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992). Facing the "narrow" question of whether private actors facing liability under Lugar may invoke the same qualified immunity available to government officials, the Court reasoned that "[a]lthough principles of equality and fairness may suggest ... that private citizens who rely unsuspectingly on state laws they did not create and may have no reason to believe are invalid should have some protection from liability, as do their government counterparts, such interests are not sufficiently similar to the traditional...