Brown v. Brown

892 S.E.2d 206

James BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Tiffany BROWN, Defendant.

No. COA22-870

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed September 5, 2023

No brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee.

Collins Family Law Group, Monroe, by Rebecca K. Watts, for defendant-appellant.

ZACHARY, Judge.

Defendant Tiffany Brown ("Wife") appeals from the trial court's order dismissing any equitable distribution claims between her and her former husband, Plaintiff James Brown ("Husband"). After careful review, we affirm.

I. Background

Husband and Wife married in April 2007 and had two children. Their relationship deteriorated, and on 19 June 2017, Husband filed a complaint for custody of the children. Husband and Wife then separated on 30 June 2017. On 17 July 2017, Wife filed her answer, which raised a counterclaim for child custody. Neither Husband's complaint nor Wife's answer advanced any claim for or raised the issue of equitable distribution of the parties’ marital estate.

On 9 January 2018, the trial court entered a temporary parenting arrangement order. On 28 March 2018, Husband filed a notice of pretrial conference, to be held on 11 May 2018. On 6 April 2018, Wife served Husband with a request for production of documents together with a set of interrogatories, both of which included several requests regarding the parties’ property and finances. Wife filed her equitable distribution affidavit on 27 April 2018. On 1 May 2018, Husband filed his equitable distribution affidavit, and also served Wife with a set of interrogatories and a request for production of documents.

The equitable distribution matter came on for pretrial conference in Mecklenburg County District Court on 11 May 2018, and the trial court entered an "Initial Pretrial Conference, Scheduling, and Discovery Order in Equitable Distribution Matter" later that day. That order reflects, inter alia , that the parties had served their equitable distribution affidavits upon each other and would attend a mediated settlement conference with a court-appointed mediator. On 12 July 2018, the parties attended mediation, but the resulting report of the mediator filed on 23 July 2018 reflects that the parties reached an impasse.

In December 2018, in a separate proceeding, Wife obtained a judgment for absolute divorce from Husband. Nearly three years later, on 9 June 2021, Wife filed notice of hearing for a status conference in the equitable distribution matter. ¹ After the status conference, the trial court entered a "Status Conference Checklist and Order for Equitable Distribution Matter" on 28 July 2021.

On 2 December 2021, the matter came on for calendar call. At the calendar call, Husband asserted that no equitable distribution claims were actually pending before the court; the trial court scheduled a hearing for 28 January 2022 to resolve that issue. On the day of the hearing, Wife filed a memorandum of law in support of her contentions that (1) an equitable distribution claim was pending, in that the parties’ equitable distribution affidavits acted as applications for equitable distribution under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(a) (2021) and Rule 7(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) Husband should be equitably estopped from denying the existence of an equitable distribution claim.

On 25 March 2022, the trial court entered an order in which it made the following pertinent findings of fact:

23. The Court finds that it is undisputed that there is not, nor ever was, a claim or cross claim, by either party pending for Equitable Distribution.

24. The Court finds that both parties were represented by counsel at critical points during which a claim/cross claim could have been made and that both participated as if a claim was pending such that [Husband] did not intentionally misrepresent that a claim was pending and was apparently under the same false assumption, therefore, [Wife] cannot claim she depended on his representation.

Consequently, the trial court concluded and ordered, simply: "Equitable Distribution shall be dismissed." Wife timely filed notice of appeal.

II. Discussion

Wife raises similar arguments on appeal as she did before the trial court. Wife first argues that the trial court erred by concluding that no equitable distribution claim was pending "[b]ecause the parties had properly applied to the court for an equitable distribution through the filing of their equitable distribution affidavits[.]" Then, Wife alleges that "[t]he trial court acted under a misapprehension of the law and so abused its discretion when it declined to estop [Husband] from denying the existence of an equitable distribution claim."

A. Application for Equitable Distribution

Although Wife acknowledges that neither she nor Husband ever "filed a paper captioned as a complaint for equitable distribution, a counterclaim for equitable distribution, or a motion for equitable distribution," she nonetheless argues that she "sufficiently asserted a claim for equitable distribution through her pleadings which, when construed liberally, meet the statutory requirements for bringing an equitable distribution action by motion."

1. Standard of Review

Wife "presents an argument regarding the proper method for asserting an equitable distribution claim based upon an interpretation of [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 50-11 and thus raises an issue of statutory construction." Bradford v. Bradford , 279 N.C. App. 109, 112, 864 S.E.2d 783, 786 (2021). We conduct de novo review of statutory construction issues. Id. "Pursuant to the de novo standard of review, the [C]ourt considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court." Id. (citation omitted).

2. Analysis

In this case, it is undisputed that neither Husband nor Wife raised an equitable distribution claim in their initial pleadings; he did not raise it as a claim in his original complaint, nor did she raise it as a counterclaim in her answer. Instead, Wife contends that "the documents that they did file and sign were equivalent to filing a motion for equitable distribution." We disagree.

The basic procedure for properly raising a claim for equitable distribution is prescribed by statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(a) provides: "Upon application of a party, the court shall determine what is the marital property and divisible property and shall provide for an equitable distribution of the marital property and divisible property between the parties in accordance with the provisions of this section." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(a). Section 50-21(a) provides, in pertinent part:

At any time after a husband and wife begin to live separate and apart from each other, a claim for equitable distribution may be filed and adjudicated, either as a separate civil action, or together with any other action brought pursuant to Chapter 50 of the General Statutes, or as a motion in the cause as provided by [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 50-11(e) or (f).

Id. § 50-21(a).

Notably, our General Statutes also provide: "An absolute divorce obtained within this State shall destroy the right of a spouse to equitable distribution under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 50-20 unless the right is asserted prior to judgment of absolute divorce ...." Id. § 50-11(e). As Wife obtained an absolute divorce during the pendency of this supposed equitable distribution claim, her right to equitable distribution is entirely reliant on whether she asserted that right prior to her absolute divorce.

"Equitable distribution is a property right. Therefore, a married person is entitled to maintain an action for equitable distribution upon divorce if it is properly applied for and not otherwise waived." Hagler v. Hagler , 319 N.C. 287, 290, 354 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1987) (citations omitted). However, our Supreme Court has recognized that "equitable distribution is not automatic. The statute provides that a party seeking equitable distribution must specifically apply for it. " Id. (emphasis added). The question thus arises: does the filing of an equitable distribution affidavit in an ongoing child-custody action constitute an "application of a party" for equitable distribution? We conclude that it does not.

Wife relies in part upon our recent opinion in Bradford , in which this Court recognized that "[n]one of the statutes addressing equitable distribution limit the particular type of pleading for ‘filing’ ( N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-21 ) or ‘asserting’ ( N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-11 ) an equitable distribution claim." 279 N.C. App. at 121, 864 S.E.2d at 792. Wife reads our Bradford decision in tandem with the principle of broad construction of pleadings found in the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, see, e.g. , N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 8(f) ("All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."), to claim that, "[s]o long as the party has made assertions sufficient to put the other party on notice that an equitable distribution is being sought and the basis for that requested relief, the party has sufficiently applied for an equitable distribution."

However, in Bradford and each of the cases upon which Wife relies, the issue was whether a party sufficiently asserted an equitable distribution claim in the party's complaint, answer, or motion in the cause. See Bradford , 279 N.C. App. at 121, 864 S.E.2d at 792 (concluding that a wife's motion in the cause asserting a claim for equitable distribution in her husband's absolute divorce action was proper); see also, e.g. , Coleman v. Coleman , 182 N.C. App. 25, 29, 641 S.E.2d 332, 336 (2007) (concluding that a wife's " ‘request’ for ‘equitable distribution’ [in her counterclaim] was sufficient to put [her husband] on notice that [the wife] was asking the court to equitably distribute the parties’ marital and divisible property"); Hunt v. Hunt , 117 N.C. App. 280, 283, 450 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1994) (concluding that the husband, in his answer, "raised the issue of distribution of the parties’ marital property and prayed...