Brown v. City of Chattanooga

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HOWARD BROWN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHATTANOOGA, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:24-cv-42

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Chattanooga

November 26, 2024

Susan K. Lee, Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Plaintiff Howard Brown's motion to withdraw his complaint. (Doc. 70.) For the following reasons Plaintiff's motion (id.) will be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on January 18, 2024, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state common law. (See Doc. 1.) On October 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint. (See Doc. 65.) Before the Court could rule on the motion, Plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw his complaint on October 18, 2024,^[1] (see Doc. 70), and the Court ordered Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's motion to determine whether Defendants opposed a dismissal without prejudice. (See Doc 71.) Before Defendants could respond, Plaintiff filed a motion to stay the case. (See Doc. 72.) The Court construed this motion as also requesting the certification of an interlocutory appeal and denied the motion. (See Doc. 74.) In the order denying Plaintiff's motion to stay, the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond within two weeks to inform the Court whether he intended to pursue the action or to dismiss it pursuant to his motion to withdraw his complaint. (Id. at 2.) The Court placed Plaintiff on notice that the Court could dismiss his action if he failed to respond by that deadline. (Id.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the Court's order within the time allotted, and, as a result, his motion to withdraw his complaint is ripe for review.

Defendants oppose a dismissal without prejudice, arguing that Plaintiff wasted the resources of the Court and of defense counsel, as: (1) Plaintiff informed Defendants that he would be withdrawing his complaint on October 10, 2024, stating that, “I will be withdrawing my complaint; I think I've made my point” (see Doc. 73-1); (2) Defendants sent Plaintiff a joint stipulation of dismissal for his review by email (see Doc. 73, at 2; Doc. 73-3); (3) Plaintiff did not respond to this email and instead filed his motion to stay the case (see Doc. 73, at 2); and (4) after Defendants inquired as to Plaintiff's position on the proposed joint stipulation for a third time, Plaintiff replied “nah... I'll let ya'll respond to the court's order.”^[2] (See id.; Doc. 73-5.) Defendant Thomas also moves for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Doc. 73, at 3), while Defendant Garrett anticipates moving for attorney fees at the close of the case (Doc. 76, at 2). All Defendants request that Plaintiff be ordered to pay court costs. (Docs. 73, 75, 76.)

II. STANDARD OF LAW

A. Rule 41

Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:

Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper. If a defendant has pleaded a counterclaim before being served with the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over the defendant's objection only if the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication. Unless the order states otherwise, a dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.

“[T]he purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is to protect the nonmovant . . . from unfair treatment.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Pub., Inc., 583 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir. 2009). “The Court must consider whether the non-movant ‘would suffer plain legal prejudice' as the result of a dismissal without prejudice.” Sohi v. Diversified Adjustment Serv., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-563, 2016 WL 2745298, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 10, 2016) (quoting Jones v. W. Rsrv. Transit Auth., 455 Fed.Appx. 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2012)). The Court must also consider: (1) the nonmovant's “effort and expense of preparation for trial,” (2) “excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the [movant] in prosecuting the action,” (3) “insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal,” and (4) “whether a motion for summary judgment has been filed by the [non-movant].” Bridgeport, 583 F.3d at 953 (quoting Grover by Grover v. Eli Lilly and Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir.1994)). “The mere possibility that the nonmovant would face a second lawsuit is an insufficient basis for finding” dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unwarranted. Sohi, 2016 WL 2745298 at *2 (citing Jones, 455 Fed.Appx. at 643). “A Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal may be conditioned on whatever terms the district court deems necessary to offset the prejudice the [nonmovant] may suffer from a dismissal without prejudice.” Id. at 954 (citations omitted). The Court may require the movant to pay a non-movant's costs, but this is not required under Rule 41(a)(2). See id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), “in any action to enforce a provision of” § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party” a “reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.” Recovery under this statute is the default for a prevailing § 1983 plaintiff; the United States Supreme Court has directed that a “prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, a prevailing party can be either a defendant or a plaintiff. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420 (1978) (holding that § 1988 authorizes a fee award to a prevailing defendant, who should also be protected “from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis”). Under § 1988, “[a] prevailing defendant should only recover upon a finding by the district court that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 720 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 1994)). Additionally, § 1988 does not allow for the recovery of attorney fees related to state-law claims. Ash v. Bezotte, No. 10-11875, 2013 WL 4777176, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 5, 2013).

In adjudicating a defendant's request for attorney fees pursuant to § 1988, the Court should determine whether: (1) the defendant is a “prevailing party”; (2) the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation; (3) the compensation sought is reasonable, as assessed by the lodestar method; and (4) there are any exceptional considerations requiring an upward or downward adjustment. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34; Wofe, 412 F.3d 707 at 720. The lodestar method requires a court to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by the applicable hourly market rate for legal services to find an objective basis for a lawyer's services. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984). There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure is reasonable, but a court should scrutinize the amount to ensure it does not produce windfalls to attorneys. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010); Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1995).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Dismissal Under Rule 41

The Court finds that a dismissal with prejudice is not warranted under Rule 41. All Defendants argue that Plaintiff wasted judicial resources.^[3] (See Doc. 73, at 2; Doc. 75; Doc. 76.) Defendant Garrett specifically argues that Plaintiff willfully thwarted the judicial proceedings in this matter, or at the least, recklessly disregarded the effect his conduct would have on the proceedings. (See Doc. 76, at 1-2.) However, Defendants' arguments against a dismissal without prejudice only focus on the second factor of the Court's Rule 41(a)(2) inquiry. See Bridgeport, 583 F.3d at 953. The Court will use all factors of the test, and in doing so, it concludes that a dismissal without prejudice is appropriate.

i. Effort and Expense

The first factor of the Rule 41(a)(2) inquiry weighs in favor of dismissal. The parties completed discovery in this matter on October 28, 2024, and this process was not abnormally onerous. While Defendants certainly expended reasonable effort in defending against Plaintiff's claims, they have not posited any reason that would suggest their efforts would not be useful if Plaintiff were to bring a subsequent action. See Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservatory Dist., No. 2:14-CV-2539, 2015 WL 2084709, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 4, 2015) (considering the applicability of “discovery and motions” if the plaintiff were to re-file a suit in state court); Cogent Solutions Grp., LLC v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-665, 2013 WL 6116052, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2013) (“A final point cuts against a finding of plain legal prejudice-it appears that much of the effort and expense devoted to this case would be useful in a subsequently filed action.”); Rosenthal v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 217 Fed.Appx. 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal because the defendants' efforts would be useful in a subsequent action). In Cogent Solutions Group, LLC v. Brown, the court also considered the amount of time the case had been open and the time left until trial when evaluating the defendant's effort and expense. 2013 WL 6116052 at *6. The court found that this factor favored dismissal when the plaintiff “moved to dismiss this case well before trial and almost exactly one year after it began.”^[4] See id. Here, trial was four months away when Plaintiff moved to dismiss his complaint and the action had been open for less than a year (see Docs. 1, 64, 70). As such, the Court finds that this factor favors dismissal.

ii. Delay in Prosecution

Defendants' arguments primarily address the second factor...