Brown v. City of Jersey City

JAMES JAMAL BROWN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-2792

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

November 21, 2022

Not for Publication

OPINION

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiff alleges that he was a victim of unlawful and unconstitutional racial profiling by multiple Jersey City police officers. Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).^[1] D.E. 15. Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion, D.E. 20, to which Defendants replied, D.E. 21.^[2] The Court reviewed the parties' submissions and decided the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL^[3] AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As Plaintiff was driving home from eating a carryout dinner and walking along the Jersey City waterfront on May 14, 2020, he was pulled over by multiple unmarked Jersey City police vehicles. Compl. ¶¶ 15-20. Plaintiff alleges that during his dinner and walk he did not interact with anyone nor was he engaged in any criminal activity. Id. ¶ 20. When Plaintiff was pulled over, Defendants Rivera Azmy, Coleman, Egan, Griffin, and Hauman approached and removed Plaintiff from his car. These Defendants then instructed Plaintiff to stand near the rear of the vehicle with his hands on his head, while they searched Plaintiff and looked into his vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants did not initially advise Plaintiff of the reason for the stop, but then told him that he was stopped for suspected drug activity near the Hyatt Hotel. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff was ultimately released and allowed to leave. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants stopped him solely because he is an African American man and Defendants had no information that would lead a reasonable officer to believe he was engaged in criminal activity. Id. ¶ 26.

Plaintiff made an Internal Affairs (“IA”) complaint against the Defendant officers involved in the traffic stop. Id. ¶ 27. Defendant Rotondo investigated Plaintiff's IA complaint and deemed the complaint to be unfounded. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. Plaintiff alleges that Rotondo failed to conduct a proper investigation. Id. ¶ 29.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights during the traffic stop. Id. ¶¶ 31-41, 55-65. Plaintiff also asserts a claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2, id. ¶¶ 66-68, and brings multiple tort claims, id. ¶¶ 42 54, 69-82. Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). D.E. 15

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the factual and legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court, however, “must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true” and give a plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Federal Law Claims (Counts One, Two and Six)

In Counts One, Two and Six, Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Compl. ¶¶ 31-37^[4]; in Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his federal rights, id. ¶ 38-41; and in Count Six, Plaintiff asserts a Monell claim against Jersey City and the Jersey City Police Department, id. ¶¶ 55-65.

Section 1983, in relevant part, provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not provide substantive rights; rather, Section 1983 provides a vehicle for vindicating violations of other federal rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 94 (1989). To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) a person deprived him of a federal right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Burt v. CFG Health Sys., No. 15-2279, 2015 WL 1646849, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2015).

1. Claims Against the Jersey City Police Department

Defendants maintain that Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed as to the Jersey City Police Department because a department cannot be subject to Section 1983 claims. Defs. Br. At 7-8. Plaintiff concedes that that the Police Department is an administrative arm of Jersey City that cannot be sued as a separate party under Section 1983. Plf. Opp. at 5. The parties are correct. See Mikhaeil v. Santos, 646 Fed.Appx. 158, 163 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curium) (explaining that “a city police department is a government sub-unit that is not distinct from the municipality of which it is a part”). Accordingly, the Section 1983 claims are dismissed as to the Jersey City Police Department.

2. Claims Against Jersey City

First, Defendants argue that the Monell claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plead facts demonstrating the existence of any policy, practice or custom that caused a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Defs. Br. at 11-14. A municipality may be liable under Section 1983 only “if the plaintiff identifies a municipal ‘policy' or ‘custom' that was the ‘moving force' behind the injury.” Jewell v. Ridley Township, 497 Fed.Appx. 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)); see also Meleika v. Bayonne Police Dep't, No. 21-19793, 2022 WL 522810, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2022) (explaining that for the City to be liable under Section 1983, the law “would require facts suggesting an unconstitutional municipal policy, practice, or custom”).

For purposes of Monell liability, a policy exists “when a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)) (internal punctuation omitted). A custom may be established “by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001)). A Monell claim may also be premised on a municipality's failure to train, supervise, and discipline. To plead such a failure-to claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a city's failure “reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.” Id. at 800 (quoting Brown, 269 F.3d at 215). For claims involving police officers, the alleged failure can only serve as a basis for Section 1983 liability where it “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)); see also Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 106 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that a Monell claim “predicated on a failure or inadequacy has the separate, but equally demanding requirement of demonstrating a failure or inadequacy amounting to deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality”). Deliberate indifference is plausibly pled by showing that “(1) municipal policy makers know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (quoting Doe v. Luzerne County, 660 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal brackets omitted)).

Plaintiff's Monell claim appears to be partially premised on Jersey City's alleged failures or inadequacies in training and supervising. Plaintiff pleads that in training and supervising its police officers, Jersey City pursued a policy of deliberate indifference to the rights of individuals. Compl. ¶ 64. But to the extent Plaintiff pleads a failure-to-train Monell claim, it is conclusory. The Complaint contains no specific factual allegations to support such a claim. Conclusory recitations of the elements of a Monell claim are insufficient.

Plaintiff also alleges that Jersey City had a “custom, polic[y] usage,...