Brown v. Clements

RICHARD ALLEN BROWN, Plaintiff, v. RONNIE CLEMENTS, SARAH JANE BRUBAKER, NIRAJ VERMA, F. DOUGLAS BOUDINOT,AND DOUGLAS WILDER SCHOOL, VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:15cvl04

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

September 23, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants¹ Ronnie Clements, Sarah Jane Brubaker, Niraj Verma, F. Douglas Boudinet, and Douglas Wilder School, Virginia Commonwealth University's ("VCU") Motion to Dismiss the matter against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).² (ECF No. 3.) Despite receiving appropriate Roseboro notice,³ Plaintiff Richard Allen Brown, proceeding pro se, failed to respond to theMotion to Dismiss. The Court ordered Brown to respond (ECF No. 4), and Brown filed a response to the motion.⁴ (ECF No. 8.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 7.) The matter is ripe for disposition. The Court dispenses with oral argument because the materials before the Court adequately present the facts and legal contentions, and argument would not aid the decisional process. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 2) and dismiss Brown's Complaint.

I. Standard of Review

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[ ] only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice ofwhat the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (omission in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must assert facts that rise above speculation and conceivability to those that "show" a claim that is "plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

B. Effect of Extrinsic Documents

"If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . , matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56," and "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1998); Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985). However, "a court may consider official public records, documents central to plaintiff's claim, and documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint [without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment] so long as the authenticity of these documents is not disputed." Witthohn v. Fed. Ins. Co., 164 F. App'x 395, 396-97 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001); Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999); Gasner v. Cnty. of Dinwiddie, 162 F.R.D. 280, 282 (E.D. Va. 1995)).

Brown attached to his Complaint⁵ an "Exhibit A" that consisted of email and letter communications among Brown and various VCU officials. (See Defs.' Filing of Exs. Ex. A, ECF No. 9-1.) Brown sufficiently referred to the exhibits in his Complaint; the documents are central to Brown's claims; and, neither party disputes their authenticity. The Court will thus consider these documents. See Witthohn, 164 F. App'x at 396-97 (citations omitted).

C. Obligation to Construe Pro se Pleadings Liberally

District courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally. Bracey v. Buchanan, 55 F. Supp. 2d 416, 421 (E.D. Va. 1999). However, a pro se plaintiff must nevertheless allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Id. (citation omitted). The Court cannot act as a pro se litigant's "advocate and develop, sua sponte, statutory and constitutional claims that the [litigant] failed to clearly raise on the face of [the] complaint." Newkirk v. Circuit Court of the City of Hampton, No. 3:14cv372, 2014 WL 4072212, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014).

D. Special Deference Accorded to Academic Decisions Made by Educational Institutions

The Court must bear in mind the lens through which it examines this case because it involves academic decisions made by VCU, an educational institution, and its employees. "Courts are particularly ill-equipped to evaluate academic performance." Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 (1978). "Like the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his [or her] course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking." Id. at 90."A graduate or professional school is, after all, the best judge of its students' academic performance and their ability to master the required curriculum." Id. at 85 n.2.

Therefore, "[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, . . . they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment." Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985); see also Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91 (noting that judicial intervention in academic decisions by educational institutions must be exercised with "care and restraint" (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). "In the absence of a constitutional or statutory deprivation, the federal courts should be loathe to interfere with the organization and operation of an institution of higher education." Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 629 (4th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Courts may not override an academic decision "unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment." Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225; see Manickavasagar v. Va. Commonwealth Univ. Sch. of Med., 667 F. Supp. 2d 635, 642 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2009) ("Given the specialized nature of the academic environment, it is firmly settled that courts 'should only reluctantly intervene in academic decisions.'" (quoting Kaltenberger v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med., 162 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1998)). "This deference informs the context in which the . . . Complaint in this case must be evaluated, and it further underscores the need for the . . . Complaint to meet the pleading requirements articulated by the Supreme Court in Twombly [and Iqbal]." Manickavasagar, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 643.

II. Procedural and Factual Background

A. Summary of Allegations in Brown's Complaint⁶

The Complaint describes Brown's difficulty with Professor Clements' graduate-level research methods class, Brown's resulting letter grade of "D" for the course, and Brown's attempts to convince the VCU administration to change this grade. Although the Complaint lacks focus and Brown's claims are difficult to deconstruct, heeding the obligation to construe his Complaint liberally, the Court interprets the Complaint to raise five claims:

Claim I: Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,⁷ all Defendants violated Brown's substantive and procedural due process rights guaranteed to him under the Fourteenth Amendment⁸ to the United States Constitution in their management of his behavior issues in with Clements and when they affirmed his letter grade of "D" in Research Methods ("§ 1983 claim");Claim II: Clements violated Virginia Code §§ 18.1-255 (now § 18.2-416⁹) and 18.1-222¹⁰ when Clements used profanity while teaching class ("curse and abuse claim");

Claim III: All Defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706¹¹ when they failed to provide him with a hearing for his letter grade of "D" ("APA claim");

Claim IV: Clements breached a contract with Brown when he changed a course syllabus in the middle of the semester ("breach of contract claim"); and,Claim V: All Defendants retaliated against Brown in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3,¹² when they allowed Brown's letter grade of "D" to stand after Brown reported his due process concerns ("retaliation claim").

At all times relevant to this action, Brown was a graduate student at VCU in the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs. In the spring semester of 2014, Defendant Ronnie Clements taught a required graduate course called "Research Method[s] for Government and Public Affairs" ("Research Methods"). (Compl. 1.) Brown...